

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Chap. _____ Copyright No. _____

BL Shelf _____ W79

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE HUMAN
AND ITS
RELATION TO THE DIVINE.

"That we do know."—JOHN III. 11.

BY
revised
THEODORE F. WRIGHT, PH.D.



PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY.
1892.

38487X

BL51
.W79

COPYRIGHT, 1892,
BY
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY.

PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA.

PREFACE.

WHEN the Master, who was always teaching men about their relation to God, said to Nicodemus, "We speak that we do know," the words may have seemed an overstatement. If his auditor had imbibed the scepticism of the later academies which taught that there could be no conviction,—and this thoughtful teacher of the Jews probably knew of the current teaching that every sentence must be introduced with a perhaps,—he may have deemed the declaration naïve, as many now view it.

A recent writer, whose book is a healthful combination of theology and common sense, has said of the analytic habit that, "While it tends to accuracy of reasoning, it too often seems to liquefy the mind and incapacitate it for retaining the impress of any conviction except that knowledge is difficult."¹

¹ The Rev. P. H. Steenstra, D.D., in "The Being of God as Unity and Trinity." Boston, 1891, page 32.

It is probable that every student of philosophy has felt something of this aptly termed liquefaction of mind, and has found the first effect of his reading to be a sense of uncertainty on all subjects. In some cases this doubt is permanent and causes one regretfully or disdainfully, as the case may be, to leave to the less enlightened the privilege of expressing themselves apodictically. Instructors in philosophy have some responsibility here, especially when they advise students to adopt that system of thought which promotes the easiest life, thus instilling at once agnosticism and epicureanism.

In the following pages I have endeavored to solve, by means within the reach of all, the problems which present themselves to him who seeks to know man and his relation to God, hoping thus to be of some use in resisting the tendency of studious minds to cast off faith, and in leading them to build on firm foundations houses which shall be both sanctuaries and fortresses.

The word of God is frequently referred to, but undogmatically, and many writers are cited, as will sufficiently appear without giving a list of them. No quotations from Swedenborg have

been made, because I have written in the spirit of his works without consulting them.

This little treatise would not be added to the number of those which already exist in this field of inquiry if one of them were known to cover the ground here gone over. I have made the chapters as brief as possible without leaving them obscure; if, however, the third be found wearisome, its concluding page will be sufficient for the rapid reader's purpose.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGE

| | |
|--|----|
| Philosophy variously defined; its change of aim from time to time—Wisdom and the word <i>σοφία</i> , its origin from tasting, its first duty to obey the oracle “Know thyself,” why essential in knowledge—Purpose of the treatise | 11 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER I.

SELFHOOD.

| | |
|---|----|
| Explanation of terms <i>suus</i> , <i>privus</i> , and <i>proprius</i> , their Greek equivalents—Ownership an instinct, grounds of its necessity—Development of the sense of selfhood | 17 |
|---|----|

CHAPTER II.

THE SELF NOT THE FLESH.

| | |
|---|----|
| Socrates instructing Alcibiades, the doctrine of the ancients—The self mental and superior to the flesh . . . | 22 |
|---|----|

CHAPTER III.

THE SELF OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

| | |
|---|--|
| Consciousness defined and its testimony examined—Personal identity treated by Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Scholastics, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolff, Locke, Butler, Reid, Hume, Berkeley, Tucker, Hamilton, Voltaire, Condillac, Edwards, Kant, Fichte, Herbart, Schelling, Hegel, Ancillon, Taylor, Cousin, Ros- | |
|---|--|

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| mini, Hickok, Schopenhauer, Ulrici, Lotze, Ferrier, Mansel, J. S. Mill, Gatién-Arnoult, Spencer, Green, Bowen, Hedge, McCosh, Malone, Seth, Olssen, Knight, Momerie, and W. James—Criticism of all and summary view stated | 27 |

CHAPTER IV.

MAN A RECIPIENT.

| | |
|--|-----|
| Meaning stated—Metempsychosis opposed, its position examined in views of Walker, Knight, Schopenhauer, Hume, Emerson, and Hedge, weakness of the theory—Other forms of life recipient, so with man the microcosm unless he be Divine—Testimony of experience—The proprium, each one's form of reception, more than the stream of thought—Each one given a place by this fact—Heredity—Necessity of a general plan of human service, ethical value of this altruistic doctrine contrasted with that of metempsychosis | 100 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER V.

MAN REACTIVE.

| | |
|--|-----|
| Reciency must be active or passive, passive with Buddhists, Quietism, Spinozism—Active view defended—Not original, but received activity—Illustrated from nature and the body, experience of the race and the individual—Newman's account of the received life . . . | 125 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER VI.

MAN A FREE AGENT.

| | |
|--|-----|
| Freedom defined, determinism criticised in views of Spinoza, Edwards, Hume, Schopenhauer, Spencer, Bain—Affirmative view of Wundt, its moral value with Kant | 134 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER VII.

MAN'S INHERITANCE.

Not to be doubted, Ribot's statistics vindicated by reason
 —Calvinistic dogma of election destructive of freedom
 and confusing evil with sin—What is transmitted—
 Scientific rejection of freedom criticised, a true education
 leads to control of the inheritance 151

CHAPTER VIII.

THE POWERS OF MAN.

How many primary powers, triple divisions of Hamilton
 and others criticised—Will and understanding treated,
 confirmation of bodily analogy, will as designer, intellect
 as guide, their conjunction in act—Downward rather
 than upward inflow of life, use as the law of right
 activity—Genesis of evil, Spencer's confusion of evil
 with good, purification of self from selfishness 163

CHAPTER IX.

THE DIVINE.

Ancient perception of the Divine—Passage to polytheism,
 in ancient and in Christian history, the effect of degra-
 dation—Arguments for the existence of God examined,
 best of these arguments from man—No original God-
 consciousness, but the Divine inferable from man's
 reciprocity, reactivity, and freedom—The creative Divine,
 infinite love, wisdom, and usefulness—The manifestation
 of God in the Christ the only perfect theistic argument
 —Spirit of the Christ, doubts considered, gross concep-
 tions of His work criticised, the Divine personality as
 so shown, agnostic substitutes for Christian faith ex-

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| amined—The revelation perfect in itself and in its dealing with evil—No limitation of God as so exhibited, Arnold criticised, avoidance of crude anthropomorphism | 180 |

CHAPTER X.

MAN IMMORTAL.

| | |
|---|-----|
| Not a fact of consciousness, man's knowledge of the Divine plan in his creation, misconceptions reviewed—Man as a spirit co-operative with God, ancient knowledge of immortality, the teaching of the Christ, later return to physical view—Causes of doubt—Inferences as to the future life, death and its effect, the spirit now immortally alive, highest possible aim so afforded | 205 |
|---|-----|

CHAPTER XI.

MAN IN CHRISTIANITY.

| | |
|---|-----|
| The self in the teaching of the Christ, its recipient reactivity and freedom, division of man's powers, the design of utility, evil in man, man as image of God, man as microcosm, advent of the Divine in man, immortality, relation of God, spirit, and matter, vital influence, miracles | 217 |
|---|-----|

CHAPTER XII.

THE KNOWABLE.

| | |
|--|-----|
| Need of rational views, criticism displacing dogmatism—Man may know spirit in himself, also the body and thus matter, also the Christ and thus the Divine—The last explained by friendship—God otherwise unknowable, example of Mozoomdar, mysticism once despised, rational mysticism beneficent—The three knowables in their vital relation a unit | 254 |
|--|-----|

INTRODUCTION.

DEFINITIONS of philosophy have varied in a marked and significant manner from the beginning to the present day. Men have been wont to define it as the quest of that which at any time they most desired. With Pythagoras it was the aim of those who sought neither glory nor gain, but to observe; with Plato it was a resembling of the Deity, so far as that is possible to man; with Aristotle it was the science of being; with Bacon it was that part of human learning which referred to the reason; with Hobbes it was the knowledge of effects by their causes; with Leibnitz it was the science of sufficient reasons; with Adam Smith it dealt with the connecting principles of nature; with Kant it treated of the relations of all knowledge to the necessary ends of human reason; with Fichte it had the absolute ego for its ground; with Schelling it was the science of the absolute; with Hamilton it was the study of facts, laws, and results; with Hegel it was the thinking of thinking; with Morell it determined the funda-

mental certainty of human knowledge; with Lewes it was the explanation of phenomena; with Schwegler it was reflection; and with Ueberweg and Spencer philosophy is the science of principles.

All these definitions, and many more which might be gathered, for every philosophical writer has given one, are true, and in a sense equally true. They are true if accurately descriptive of the facts as historically represented, for these men were typical men, and their respective definitions of philosophy mark the objects of the best thought of their times. Their rational observations of that which most interested them, each at his own period, constituted their philosophemes.

If philosophy soared aloft towards the beginning and end of all things with Pythagoras, Socrates called it down from the heavens, as Cicero¹ tells us, gave it a place in cities, introduced it into men's homes, and forced it to make inquiry into life and morals. Anon it rose again; and so it has gone on, now dogmatic then sceptical, now transcendental then scientific, all the time an infallible indicator of the progress

¹ Tusculan Disputations, Book V., 4.

of the race, a progress which is thereby shown to have been unsteady but intensely interesting, as it was always intensely earnest. There has been more passion in philosophy than its devotees have acknowledged.

Aristotle gave the most enduring definition, because most free from accidents of time and place, when he pointed out that wisdom (*σοφία*, *sapientia*) was spoken of the greatest excellence in the arts, and also of those men who, not excelling in one art, were universally superior in intelligence; "thus wisdom," said he, "is the most limited and the most absolute of the sciences; but, since man is the most noble of all creatures and wisdom relates to that wherein he excels the brutes, therefore wisdom pertains to that which is by nature most worthy of honor, which is intelligence; wherefore we call Anaxagoras, Thales, and such men wise."¹

It would be a profitable study to trace through the languages the root from which is formed the second half of the word "philosophy," noting its kinship with the Greek *σάφης*, which means "sure," "clear," as applied to knowledge, and

¹ Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI., chap. vii.

with the Latin *sapio*, *sapiens*, which means first "to taste," and so to be a keen taster, to be quick in apprehension, to be well informed. The study would lead us to the Anglo-Saxon *supan*, the German *saufen*, and the English *sip* and *sup*. Apparently, as the child first learns by tasting, putting everything to its mouth, so man has used the word for tasting, of course made from the sound of the lips when taking liquid into the mouth, as the name for all knowledge, and supremely for that which answers the most fundamental questions which from time to time he has been able to frame; for, as Olympiodorus has reported to us from Aristotle, "we must philosophize; if we must, we must; and if we must not, still we must."¹ The non-philosophizing man is brutish. The animal does not question, does not philosophize. It is significant that sipping has become philosophic and has so long been applied to the getting of wisdom. In Solomon's day a good taste made a wise man. The Proverbs said that as honeycomb is sweet to the taste, so is the knowledge of wisdom;² and we read

¹ Commentary on Plato's First Alcibiades, Creuzer's edition, p. 144.

² Proverbs, xxiv. 13.

in the Psalms, "How sweet are thy words unto my taste."¹

Philosophy, it would appear, must not lose itself in words, nor mystify the student rather than enlighten him, making him agnostic in a hopeless way; it must impel him to seek for that which he needs to know in order to rise and to raise others, it must impel him to develop what is best in man, and thereby to make the most of the world, to seek a wisdom which shall be "in him a well of water springing up unto eternal life."²

The beginning of such wisdom is evidently to heed the oracle, "Know thyself," which, Pliny says, was inscribed in letters of gold on the temple at Delphi by order of Chilo of Sparta, one of the seven sages. Unless some clear idea of what man is in his own essential self be formed, philosophy must wander in the darkness. All other knowledge, if the self be an enigma, is as futile as it is to rule all other things but one's own nature. Unless we know the self we cannot understand the relation which we bear to all else. This is therefore the beginning of philosophy. "The geometer has lines

¹ Psalm cxix. 103.

² John, iv. 14.

and figures," said Fichte, "the philosopher only himself."¹

No point has been more difficult in philosophy, though none was more vital. Some have denied the possibility of knowing the self. "The words inscribed on the temple at Delphi have been oracular in vain," said Ferrier.² But this self, this "series of faint manifestations," as Spencer³ calls it, must be studied, and can be studied if man be more than a brute. Cicero says that the oracle meant "Know thy soul."⁴ We shall find out what it meant if we can find out the self. In attempting so to do, we may take encouragement from Thomas à Kempis:⁵ "An humble knowledge of thyself is a surer way to God than a deep search after knowledge." And Professor Schurman⁶ has lately wisely said, "It is from its notion of the self, the inevitable centre of everybody's world, that every system of philosophy takes its origin and tone."

¹ Sonnenklarer Bericht, Lecture 4.

² Institutes, Prop. vii. 4.

³ First Principles, 4th ed., p. 154.

⁴ Tusculan Disputations, I. 22.

⁵ Imitatione, Bk. I., ch. iii.

⁶ Belief in God, p. 222.

THE HUMAN

AND ITS

RELATION TO THE DIVINE.

CHAPTER I.

SELFHOOD.

THE distinction between what is one's own and what is another's, or between what is one's own and what is common property, is everywhere made. The Romans, by their words *suus*, *privus*, *proprius*, clearly indicated ownership and regard to self. It is common to regard *privus* as expressing the idea of one's own, not another's, which is to put *privus* in contrast with *alienus*, and to regard *proprius* as expressing what is one's own, and not common property, which is to put *proprius* in contrast with *communis*. Again, *peculiaris* may be contrasted with *universalis*, as expressive of one's own rights not shared by all.

Before the Romans the Greeks had the same

discernment in using *οἰκεῖος* and *ἴδιος* in contrast with *δημόσιος* and *κοινός* respectively, and *ἴδιος* was also contrasted with *ἀλλότριος*.

It is impossible to think of the universe as having any sort of law in it without admitting the idea of ownership. Animals know their places of rest, their offspring, and their proper food. The ox knoweth his owner, and the sheep the voice of the shepherd. Were it not so, the beasts would not survive a single winter. Men, however rude, know and insist that others shall recognize their right to the fruits of their hunting and their handiwork. Without this sense of ownership they would be inferior to the brutes. Without this the sense of home could never arise. Without this there could be no sense of responsibility to serve others with what one possessed. Without this there would be no nations. The Greeks going to war with Troy because Menelaus had lost his own Helen illustrate the general sense of property. *Amittit merito proprium qui alienum appetit* ("he deservedly loses his own who covets another's"), said Phædrus, the fabulist, and no one has ever failed to understand him.

This recognition of what is one's own is more

than the instinct which leads the dog in an Oriental city to defend the portion of narrow and filthy street which is his district, or which causes the bird to utter plaintive cries when her nest of little ones is threatened. With the animal it is irrational and lacks that full sense of the self which enables a man to define it and discuss it,—that is, to understand his own nature.

The infant is at first possessed only of sensations of pleasure and pain; when at peace he smiles or sleeps, when in pain he cries or writhes; this is only an instinct with him; but ere long he learns to distinguish between himself and others, to take an object in his hand and throw it from him, rejoicing in the sense of power, and so he comes to form some idea of the external world. The next step seems to be that of noting the connection between one act and another; he shakes the rattle and obtains a sound, he cries out and brings the mother to his aid; it is the sense of causality awaking within him. Finally he learns to distinguish self and self-interest, to make all serve his ends, to know himself as different from others, and to see that he has thoughts and pleasures of his own. As the self thus appears, full humanity is evolved. Before

this he was as an animal, he is now an incipient man.

In the development of the race there were no men, properly so called, till consciousness of self arose; when this arose, there was man, and he stood upright, and had dominion over the other animals. As soon as self-consciousness appears, and not till then, there can be self-determination. "One whose action is self-determined is a person," said Mulford in "The Nation," quoting from Ulrici.¹ And Heinroth justly says, "Without consciousness this self would not be I. The brute is a self but no I. I was before I became an I."² Everything in nature acts according to laws, is the Kantian idea, man according to consciousness of laws.³

Not yet to plunge into the great subject of consciousness, I only remark that the most general idea of the self which can be formed is up to this point sufficient. It has always been recognized since philosophy recorded itself, and it is essential to rational humanity. Men philosophize in the degree that they use their own privilege of gaining knowledge, and they cannot

¹ Gott und der Mensch, p. 207.

² Psychology, p. 27.

³ Kritik, p. 575.

philosophize till they recognize more than sensations of pleasure and pain, more than the externality of other beings and things, more than the causal connection between acts and events, and look upon their own individual natures, in every one a *suum*, a *privum*, a *proprium*. The question, What is the self? becomes therefore the question, What is one's own solely, and, if he live forever, eternally his own?

CHAPTER II.

THE SELF NOT THE FLESH.

ONE further distinction, which was an approach to the actual self, was made as the Greeks came gradually to see that a line was to be drawn between the man and his body. To the Ionic School the distinction seems to have been unknown. They were natural philosophers. To Thales all things, man included, seemed to arise from water and to return to it. To Anaximander came the somewhat higher view that all essences came forth from the "unlimited, eternal, and undetermined ground of all things," to which again they returned. Anaximenes, however, sought for a more definite principle, and found it in air.

Pythagoras and his disciples distinguished their school not only by a rigid moral discipline, but by conceiving of an internal harmony controlling all developments and establishing their proportions and relations by the law expressed by number. In accepting also the transmigra-

tion of the soul the Pythagoreans would seem to have distinguished soul from body, and we know that they did regard the body as a prison, but this idea was one which they had borrowed from the East, and it did not enter with them into the philosophical teaching for which they are famous.

With the Eleatics there is a distinct recognition of being as separate from its manifestations. Xenophanes declared wisely that being must be one, and therefore he condemned the polytheism of his day. Parmenides went further, and maintained that the one must be fixed and that nothing subject to change could be of it; but he also, when treating of the phenomenal world, found fire, rather than water or air, to be the moving agent. Zeno, as if to reaffirm Parmenides' abiding One, developed with much skill the antinomies of magnitude and movement, in the effort to show that all finite things could be dialectically shown to be full of contradictions, and so unworthy to be regarded in comparison with the infinite and undetermined.

It is here that one is strongly moved to adopt in full the Hegelian idea that philosophy has passed through the same stages in the race as in the individual. It certainly did begin with mere

consciousness and natural notions in the Ionics, and did advance to a recognition of being with the Eleatics. We now come certainly to the one who perfectly illustrates Hegel's next step, namely, of becoming (*werden*). This is Heraclitus, with his doctrine of the eternal stream of life in opposition to the fixedness of Parmenides. In the union of greater and less, of centre-seeking and centre-fleeing, Heraclitus found unity forming and reforming itself without end. The special agent of this movement was fire.

Not yet, however, had the distinction between flesh and spirit fully appeared, and certainly the Atomists did not make it, though they evolved being *per se* more fully, as Hegel points out. Empedocles, with his four elements, must be classed with the Ionics, while Anaxagoras, with his doctrine of the world-forming thought (*νοῦς*), leads the way to the point which, later, the Sophists reached with their full recognition of the ego, joined in their case with contempt for the external world.

But Socrates, by the length of his demonstration to Alcibiades, implies that the distinction must in his day be taught before it would be acknowledged,—

S. "Do you not converse with me?" A. "Yes." S. "And I with you?" A. "Yes." "It is Socrates who speaks?" "Yes." "And Alcibiades who listens?" "Yes." "Is it not with language that Socrates speaks?" "Yes." "He who uses a thing and the thing used, are not these different?" "Yes." "Then, does not a man use his whole body?" "Yes." "A man is therefore different from his body?" "Yes." "What then is the man?" "I cannot say." "Does anything use the body but the mind?" "Nothing." "The mind is therefore the man?" "The mind alone."¹

This, condensed to one-half its length, was Socrates' lesson. And Plato had no other thought upon this point than his master's. So Aristotle said, "The mind is the man."² And Hierocles, the Neo-Platonist, revived Platonism in the words, "Thou art the soul, the body is thine."³ "We are not bodies," said Cicero, in his first Tusculan Disputation, "nor am I, while saying these things to you, talking to your body."⁴ "He who is seen is not the real man,"

¹ Plato's First Alcibiades, 129.

² Nic. Ethics, ix. 8.

³ Aurea Carmina, 26.

⁴ I. 22.

said Macrobius, "but he is the real man by whom that which is seen is ruled."¹ Sir W. Hamilton concludes a series of such extracts by quoting from Arbuthnot's "Know Thyself," and a few of the lines must not be omitted:

"This frame compacted with transcendent skill,
Of moving joints obedient to my will,
Nursed from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree,
Waxes and wastes; I call it mine, not me.
New matter still the mouldering mass sustains,
The mansion changed, the tenant still remains;
And from the fleeting stream, repaired by food,
Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood."

This distinction between mind and body recognized, we are brought one step nearer to the actual self, because we are thereby directed to seek for it, not in any part of the body, but in that realm which lies above the bodily, which is not lessened when a part of the body is amputated, and which may and often does endure in strength while the body is going to decay. When we have admitted that it is mental, we have the self in full view.

¹ In *Somnium Scipionis*, ii. 12.

CHAPTER III.

THE SELF OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE self, which is not bodily and not cognizable by bodily sense, is revealed by that faculty which takes note of the mental operations, and which is well named consciousness. One not only knows and desires, but he knows that he knows and desires. He can contemplate his own mind and its varying states. This knowledge of knowledge is the consciousness. As Hamilton puts the truth, "Knowing that I know is consciousness."¹ And again he says, "Consciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the theologian."² "It is like an internal light. It is the knowledge which the thinking subject has of the modifications of its being."³

The question as to the actual self is therefore the question, What does the consciousness re-

¹ *Metaphysics*, Lecture ix. p. 110.

² *Ibid.* v. p. 58.

³ *Ibid.*, xi. p. 126.

veal? This question was easily answered while men dealt with general views, but when they began to employ more and more subtle analyses, they came to differ and even to doubt. Consequently it seems to be necessary to trace the study of consciousness from the ancients down, proving it all and holding fast what is good.

The first doubt which was raised was as to the connection of conscious moments. At any instant one could say, "I am I, I know that I am I;" but could he say in the light of consciousness, "I am the I who was, I am the I who knew, who desired?" This raised the question of personal identity and made the study of the self turn mainly upon this one point, so that a review must deal largely with this topic, before one can pass to consider others.

Aristotle makes it evident that this question of personal identity had invaded the Lyceum, for he said, "To be of opinion that a thing which is changed is not when it changes, possesses some truth, but is attended with ambiguity. For that which casts away possesses something of that which is cast away. Let it be granted that a thing does not abide according to quantity, yet we know that all things abide as to form.

To admit no essence takes away the necessary subsistence of a thing.”¹

Here the Stagirite contends that the change which is undergone is not a dissolution, which is not a change, but an extinction, and that in that which is permanent or which endures the change the identity is preserved. If there be nothing which endures, nothing exists except for the instant, and that which only momentarily exists has no subsistence. Every subsisting object, whether animate or inanimate, vindicates its self-identity. Equally so man.

Plotinus seems to have regarded the query as to identity as already disposed of, for he serenely rhapsodizes in Neo-Platonist fashion: “Often when by an intellectual energy I am roused from the body and converted to myself, and being separated from externals, I retire into the depths of my essence, I then perceive an admirable beauty, and am then vehemently confident that I am of a more excellent condition than that of a life merely animal and terrene.”²

This merely repeats the saying put by Plato into the mouth of Socrates: “He who knows his

¹Metaphysics, iv. 5.

²Descent of Soul, tome iv. 8.

body only, knows that which belongs to him, but does not know himself.”¹

In sharp contrast with the rhetoric of Plotinus is the eager declaration of Augustine: “I know that I am myself, that this I know and love. I fear not Academic arguments which say, What if you err? If I err, I am. Mine error proves my being. Though I be one that may err, yet in that I know my being I err not.”² It must be acknowledged, however, that Augustine did not meet all cavil by his passionate appeal to consciousness; for if his knowledge were but that of the instant, it was not sufficient, and he was not so successful in his reply to the Academy as was Aristotle.

The Schoolmen, as skilfully reported to us by Harper, sought to be more thorough: “Personality is a substantial mode by which a complete intellectual substance is so individually completed in its own right that it is incommunicable to any other.”³ This is an illogical definition, for a “complete intellectual substance” begs the ques-

¹ First Alcibiades.

² City of God, Book XI. ch. xxvi.

³ Metaphysics of the School, Glossary, article Personality.

tion by giving to the simple notion "personality," an attribute "complete," which carries with it all that is to be claimed; and the same objection might be made to the word "individually." But the Schoolmen deserve credit for going somewhat deeply into the subject when they said, "We are supremely conscious that there is something within us which links the past, so far as memory reaches, to the present in such wise as to give us fullest assurance and certainty that each one of us, during the whole of that defined period, remains personally identical with his own self. This consciousness does not forsake us even in our dreams. We never dream that we are not ourselves. . . . Consciousness testifies to the existence of a spiritual something which is permanent and which is the origin of thought, will, and imagination. . . . I am aware of phenomena that are ever changing; of all these I am conscious; yet I am equally conscious that the *I* remains the same through all modifications. The phenomena are not essential to my being, the *I* is."¹

This is admirably clear, though it will be

¹ Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii. pp. 405, 406.

found that others doubt the alleged fact that we are conscious of remaining the same through all modifications. Aristotle, with his cautious plea that a part remains, is more safe, because he claims only what he can hold against all comers.

Now that we are upon the Schoolmen and their authoritative teaching, it may be well to note that the Council of Vienne (France), which met A.D. 1311, decreed that "whoever henceforth shall obstinately presume to assert, defend, or hold that the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body, of itself and essentially, is to be accounted for a heretic." This was confirmed by Leo X. in the Lateran Council, 1513, and again by Pius IX. in the Brief called *Etenim*, issued June 15, 1857.¹ It is unreasonable to depreciate the Schoolmen. Hampered by authority to be feared and by authority to be preserved they certainly were, and they leaned much too heavily upon their Angelical Doctor, but they retained much that was good in Greek philosophy, and among other things a firm belief in personal identity.

We reach now, however, a new period which

¹ Quoted by Harper, vol. ii. p. 409.

had its beginning with Descartes, a period when little more was claimed than the right to reason, and when philosophy looked forward as well as backward, to a new structure rather than to the adornment of the old.

Descartes said simply, "I, that is, the mind, by which alone I am that I am (*sum qui sum*), is a thing wholly distinct from the body, much more easily known than the body, and which might clearly be the same that it now is, though the body were not existing."¹ This is plain, except the last part. It is not self-evident that the mind is absolutely independent of the body. It may be alert when the body is asleep or powerless, but this does not justify the much larger assertion that the mind might be the same were the body not existing. The mind without an organ would be like the vision without an eye, it could only potentially exist, and such existence can scarcely be called "the same."

Descartes was more exact when he said, "I can doubt whether I have a body, yea, whether there be body in the nature of things; yet it is not allowable for me to doubt that I am or exist,

¹ Methode, iv.

so long as I doubt or think.”¹ Here he was upon the firm ground of his original proposition, *cogito ergo sum*, a ground which future idealism would not take from him though scepticism might essay to do so. But Descartes in his principle was only a pupil of Augustine, with his saying, “If I err, I am.” Descartes in contrast with the Schoolmen is great; measured by a more ancient standard, his fame diminishes, except as a scientist.

There is no place in Spinoza’s Ethics where one can trace the progress of the doctrine of self, for he excludes it when he says, “When we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing else than that God, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is explained by the nature of the human mind, or in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea.”² He had already said, “The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.” He adds a request to his readers to defer their decision as to this declaration till they have read the whole, but no delay

¹ Meditationes : Objectio Quarta.

² Ethics, Smith’s Edition, Part II., Prop. xi., Cor. and Schol.

found Spinoza making man anything more than a mirror in which his Creator surveyed His perfections. "Let us make man" becomes with this pantheistic monist, "Let us make human machinery." The system is a superb theocracy, but the devout Spinoza left no place in it for himself.

As Descartes repeated Augustine, so Leibnitz renewed the saying, already quoted, of Aristotle. Leibnitz attempted to go further, but with doubtful success. He said, "An immaterial being or a spirit cannot be stripped of all perception of its past existence. It has remaining the impressions of all that has hitherto come to it, and it has also presentiments of that which will come. That continuation and connection of perceptions makes the same individual a reality, but the same apperceptions (perceptions of past feelings) prove again a moral identity."¹

Here, in overstating Aristotle's more cautious remark, that a changing thing subsists while changing, Leibnitz has gone so far as to say that a mind cannot lose its memory, when old age affords in every community examples of such

¹ *Nouveaux Essais*, Lib. II., ch. xxvii.

loss, and when disease has often obliterated from some mind all recollection of the past. It is true that in no case do one's friends fail to note the continuance of the personality, but to say that this is invariably self-perceived is to exaggerate experience. Moreover, it seems wholly unphilosophical to include as evidences of identity presentiments, mere conditional notions of what we shall do to-morrow, along with the impressions of the past. It would seem impossible to admit presentiments to the class of perceptions.

But, leaving out of account what Leibnitz overstated, we find what is of great and permanent value remaining, namely, the sense of identity through the continuation of perceptions, and, included therein as an inseparable part, the sense of accountability for the past. If Augustine and Descartes took an ontological view of the self, Aristotle and Leibnitz present the empiric view. And every one sees the ethical value of the doctrine of personal identity; for, if this be doubted, even so much as by the suave scepticism of Hume, the result is that moral accountability ceases at once. From Leibnitz forward the doctrine is furnished with the defence that it is essential to ethics, to accountability, and to

capability of improvement; for, if there be no past that is ours, we cannot be instructed by it, nor warned by it, nor encouraged by it; nor can the poet's word then be accepted,—

“Men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things.”¹

Wolff carried the thought no further when he said, “The soul is conscious to itself of itself, and thus of what is in its act or of its acts. The mind may also reflect upon itself and its acts.”² This is a mild way of putting the thought that the mental self possesses itself and is adapted to rule itself. “The mind is its own place,” as Milton hath it.

With Locke the subject was taken up by the strong empirical British mind, and it took on at once a fresh interest. Locke said, “Personal identity consists not in the identity of substance, but in the identity of consciousness. Consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, unites existences and actions very remote in time with the same person. In

¹ Tennyson : *In Memoriam*, i.

² *Psych. Emp.*, Part I., sect. 3, ch. i., n. 261.

consciousness alone consists personal identity,—that is, the sameness of a rational being. Whilst I know by seeing or hearing that there is some corporeal being outside of me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears.”¹

The criticism of these statements is so thoroughly made by Butler and Reid, who had been stimulated by Hume to use a caution which Locke did not suspect to be necessary, that it may be well to pass on at once, only stopping to point out that, in his desire to avoid the scholastic appeal to substance because it is not an object of perception, Locke made an equally serious mistake in ignoring the memory and placing the evidence of identity in that consciousness of identity or “identity of consciousness,” which is after all the thing to be proved, and which is not proved by the assertion that it always tells us of an inner spiritual being. We may be conscious of such an inner life to-day; we sleep and wake to-morrow with the sense of

¹ Essay on Human Mind, Book II., ch. xxiii., sect. 9, and ch. xxvii., sect. 15.

an inner being, but, unless memory comes to our aid, these two separated series of moments of consciousness will give no perception of the identity of those inner beings.

Deferring our notice of Hume till we have brought forward Butler and Reid as critics of Locke and defenders of personal identity against Hume, we note Butler's remarks annexed to the *Analogy*, "By reflecting upon that which is myself now and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern that they are not two, but one and the same self. Consciousness of personal identity presupposes but cannot constitute personal identity, any more than knowledge can constitute truth which it presupposes. The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the same person; and therefore is one and the same. . . . If the self or person of to-day and that of to-morrow are not the same, but only like persons, the person of to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person to-morrow than in what will befall any other person."¹

¹ *Analogy*, First Dissertation.

If Butler is justly famous for his Analogy, which opened the way to the grand study of the correspondence of nature and spirit, he ought also to be praised for the fine discernment of these remarks. It is true that the deficiencies of Locke's view and the inadequacy of previous definitions of identity had been pointed out, but it is certain that Butler freed Locke's statement of its weakness and gave one of lasting strength. To the suggestion that Butler does not call in the memory, a suggestion which may be hastily made, it is only necessary to answer that he certainly does use the memory, though not by name, when he "reflects" upon himself as he is and upon himself as he was twenty years before.

Reid's¹ criticism of Locke is more severe in terms, but not more acute. He notes, of course, that Locke made identity to consist in consciousness alone, and he points out that a defect in consciousness, an omission to hold distinctly a past experience, would then destroy the identity. He declares that there can be no consciousness of a past event except through memory, and that Locke could not have meant what he said.

¹ Essay III., chap. iii., sect. 3.

He shows that sense of identity is confounded by Locke with evidence of identity. He points out that consciousness alone cannot be the evidence of sameness of the being because it is "not any two minutes the same." Moreover, he shows that Locke uses the word "same" in a way which lays him open to Hume's attack. Reid had not a hospitable mind, which made a strange doctrine welcome and put the best construction upon it, but he was justified in dealing thus with Locke after Hume had opened fire upon the doctrine and had been hailed by some as a victorious sceptic.

But before proceeding to Hume there is a most interesting passage to be noticed in Berkeley's "Three Dialogues," in which Hylas, with prophetic instinct, though, of course, an imaginary character, utters a doubt which Philonous, who represents Berkeley himself, remedies by statements as positive as any realist could make :

"HYLAS. It seems to me that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that *you* are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to

be used without a meaning; and as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than in material substance, the one ought to be exploded as well as the other.

“PHILONOUS. How often must I repeat that I *know* or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colors and sounds; that a color cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a color; that I am therefore one individual principle distinct from color and sound, and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of matter.”¹

Nothing could be more positive as to the ego than this, and nothing could have been said beforehand which would more nearly have met the very criticisms which Hume was about to make upon Berkeley. It cannot be objected to Berkeley's idealism, as might be urged against later

¹ Works, vol. i. p. 327 et seq. Quoted in Fraser's Selections, p. 333.

idealists, that it infringed upon the identity and permanence of the self.

Hume has a long chapter, one of his liveliest, on personal identity. "There are some philosophers," thus he begins with his usual wave of the hand, "who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call ourself; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity: no proof can be derived from any fact of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there anything of which we can be certain if we doubt of this."¹

Having thus set up his target, not quite fairly, for Aristotle and Augustine were not the transcendentalists which this description implies, Hume asserts that we have no separate idea of self, but always derive it from some other idea of wider content, and that therefore we cannot truly say that we know self, indeed that other ideas always place themselves in our way when we seek to contemplate self. "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and

¹ Human Nature, Book I., Part IV., sect. 6.

never can observe anything but the perception.” Moreover, the mind is like a theatre which never presents twice precisely the same scene; how then can we speak of identity? Again, our idea of identity, if we have any, must be like that which we have of an animal or a plant, but here we can only predicate relation of states, not identity of states, for here we have only resemblance. The plant or animal cannot be identically the same, for it continually increases or is diminished. The change may be so gradual that we do not note it, but to use the word “identical” of it is only to disclose our lack of observation. A reference is made to Jason’s ship. Men say that two sounds, separated by an interval of time, are the same, that two churches which have been erected in succession upon the same lot or under the same name are the same, and so on; but they do not mean it, any more than they mean the same river when its waters are always changing. “The identity which we ascribe to man is a fictitious one and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It proceeds from a like operation of the imagination.” Taking up the subject afresh, Hume then proceeds to hold that

resemblance, contiguity, and the succession of states or events which is called causation, are really all there is of identity. Memory merely declares the resemblance between our past and present selves. Causation is only a name for successive experiences, the actual connection of which no one can prove. And memory is too defective to be evidence of identity. "Who can remember his thoughts and actions January 1, 1715, or March 11, 1719?"¹ The doctrine of identity, in fine, rests on verbal grounds alone, on words which have been shown to be used inaccurately.

Hume does not deny the self; he says, "Ourself is intimately present;"² he only denies the alleged grounds of the doctrine of the identity of self. Exactly what he holds and denies we should have been better able to say if he had not written a strange note beginning, "Upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth that I must confess I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to

¹ Human Nature, Book I., Part IV., sect. 6.

² Ibid., Book II., Part III., sect. 7.

render them consistent." He then repeats in briefer sentences his former doubts, but closes with the confession that the difficulty of obtaining a perception of a permanent self may be in his own mind.¹

This shows Hume rather in the light of a sincere doubter, endeavoring to be a true Cartesian, than in that of an incorrigible sceptic, and yet the necessity of considering his objections is not diminished by his apologetic note. He is most thoroughly replied to in a little, almost unknown, book, entitled "Man in Quest of Himself," by Abraham Tucker, London, 1763, the only book but one which is known to deal exclusively with this subject. He also wrote under the name of "Edward Search." His little treatise may be summarized thus:

While replying to an assault on the individuality of the human mind or self, made by Cuthbert Comment, in the *Monthly Review*, Tucker attempts to reply to all real and possible objectors by taking up a long line of argument. The word "same," he remarks, is used vaguely enough, as when one glass of wine is called the

¹ Appendix, edition of Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888, p. 633-6.

same as another if filled from the same bottle; but this is a mere statement of likeness, and should not be confused with "specific identity." So a man changes and does not remain the same as to "flesh, blood, bones, and humours." But man is a substance, his qualities are not qualities of nothing; and, when thought of apart from the qualities of his active life, as in sleep, he is thought of as to substance. Qualities may and do change. The same clay may be moulded into various successive forms. The same water may be now hot, then cold. But man, clay, and water continue in existence. Moreover, every man is an individual; he may be composed of parts, but is their perfect sum. They may undergo some change, as the men of a regiment may change, but the Guards remain the Guards, and the man remains himself. Were a man not an individual he would not be a first entity, and he might be reincorporated into other forms. A man's personality is the sum of his qualities. His personality is not a separate thing as the dozen is not separate from its twelve components, itself a thirteenth; and the personality is the sum of the real qualities. In sleep we lay down some qualities for a time and then resume

them, retaining all the time our identity; so may it be in death. Tucker goes into a skillfully-constructed catechism to show the absurdity of making the self anything but an individuality. He does not call the mind the man himself, for this undergoes changes; he postulates an unchanging substance.

It does not appear whether or not Mr. Com-ment was forever silenced by this reply. He might have suggested that, in taking refuge in a substance and in surrendering even the identity of mind, Mr. Tucker had voluntarily yielded his case, and that the identity ought to be something more than an inference, which Hume at once would call a fiction. The dozen example is not bad, but the trouble with it is that personality, if exhibited thus, seems but a name. On the whole the clay example is much to be preferred.

Sir W. Hamilton met Hume more acutely by charging him with making the ego only a bundle of impressions and ideas, while he, Hamilton, asserted, "As clearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious at every moment of my existence, that the conscious ego is not itself a mere modification, nor a series of modifications of any other subject, but that it is itself

something different from all its modifications and a self-existent entity.”¹ He does not try to explain this fact, to go below it and account for it. No one, he truly says, doubts this deliverance of consciousness, though Hume doubted its truth. Hume, he asserts, argued against the ill-formed premises of the dogmatic philosophers, and is refuted by the correction of those premises. He commends what Locke, Leibnitz, Butler, and Reid had said of the immorality of the doubt of personal and moral identity. Hamilton must be referred to again when the view of Kant is considered, for he joins Kant with Hume just here. Deferring further mention of Hamilton for the present till he is reached in the order of time, we may go back to the eighteenth century and note Voltaire’s sceptical saying, “It would be a fine thing to see one’s soul. ‘Know thyself’ is an excellent rule, but it is for God only to put it in practice; who but He can know his own essence?”²

Condillac is more philosophical if less epigrammatic: “The self of every man is only the collection of sensations which he experiences and of

¹ Lectures on Metaphysics, xix.

² Dictionnaire philosophique, Ame.

those which his memory reports to him ; that is all,—the consciousness of what he is and the recollection of what he has been.”¹ This, of course, stands or falls with Hume and is to be judged by its fruits. If Condillac be right, the self is a fiction indeed, and moral responsibility a ghost.

Everything that Jonathan Edwards wrote comes to us with the weight of a great name, but it would appear that here Edwards was not in vision. Perhaps he too much approached Spinoza in his form of mind to give man his true place. He said, with conspicuous caution, “We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls. And, notwithstanding all the progress which has been made in past and present ages, yet there is still work enough left for future inquiries and researches, and room for progress still to be made for many ages and generations.”²

He did not know how soon new light would shine. When he published these words, in 1754, Immanuel Kant was preparing his first course of

¹ *Traité des Sensations*, quoted by Ueberweg, vol. ii. p. 127.

² *Treatise on the Will*, Part IV., sect. 7.

lectures. Taking his starting-point with Hume, but proceeding in a much more thorough and convincing way, Kant was, as regards much that he found in philosophy, wholly sceptical, but he was also constructive and positive. What do we possess through pure reason? was his question in the *Kritik*. We have sense, and we have thought; what do we gain thereby? In sense we have, as *à priori* conditions of all perception, space and time. Under these and other relations we know. Our objects are the phenomena of experience, not noumena. We think under twelve categories, which are explained. Judgments based on experience directly are *à posteriori*; those absolutely made universal are *à priori*. Having dwelt at length upon these points, including also a treatment of synthetic and analytic judgments, Kant proceeded to free the pure reason from psychological accretions. "The transcendental doctrine of the soul is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and perfectly contentless representation *I*, which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all

conceptions. By this I, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x , which is known only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a perpetual circle.¹ All the modes of self-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (categories); they are mere logical functions which do not present to thought an object to be cognized, and therefore cannot present my self as an object. . . .

(1) In all judgments I am the determining subject of that relation which constitutes a judgment; . . . but this does not signify that I, as an object, am for myself a self-subsistent being or substance.² . . . (2) The I of apperception is a single one and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects; . . . but this is not to declare that the thinking I is a simple substance. . . . (3) The proposition of the identity of my self, amid all the representations of which I am con-

¹ Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Theil II., Abth. II., Buch II., p. 404.

² Ibid., p. 408.

scious, lies in the conceptions themselves; . . . but this identity is not the same as the perception of the subject, whereby it is presented as object, and therefore this proposition cannot declare the identity of the person, by which is meant the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change of circumstances. . . . (4) I distinguish my own existence as one thinking being from other things external to me, among them my body; . . . but whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things external, . . . and whether I can exist merely as a thinking being (without being man), I cannot know from this.”¹

The four parallogisms and their corrections, condensed as much as possible, are given in the last four sentences. The whole idea is stated by Kant thus: “The unity of consciousness which lies at the basis of the categoris, is considered to be a perception of the subject as object, and the category of substance is applied to the subject. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which

¹ Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Theil II., Abth. II., Buch II., p. 408.

therefore the category of substance, which always presupposes a given perception, cannot be applied. Consequently the subject cannot be known.”¹

So far as Kant was here aiming to show against Knutzen, M. Mendelssohn, and others, the fallacy of grounding belief in immortality upon the soul as a substance, it is not to the present purpose to deal with him. This was his main object in this chapter, but incidentally he sought to show that we know the self only as subject and never as predicate or object.

Hamilton's answer to this is that Kant makes the self less substantial than consciousness makes it, and that thus to reduce it is to discredit consciousness,—a proceeding which stops all philosophizing at once. “In disputing the testimony of consciousness to our mental unity and substantiality, Kant disputes the possibility of philosophy, and, consequently, reduces his own attempts at philosophizing to an absurdity.”²

This is scarcely just. Kant is not seeking to do away with the self, thus denying a part of every thought he has and despising conscious-

¹ Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Theil II., Abth. II., Buch II., p. 422.

² Metaphysics, Lecture XIX.

ness as a guide; he is only seeking to make self an apperception rather than a judgment. He cannot be so rash, skilled introspectionist as he was, as to deny the possibility of thorough self-contemplation, of a train of thought which would end in the sentence, "Such a being, with such a history, such purposes, such powers, is the being called I by my self, by my name by others."

Mahaffy seeks to be just to Kant when he says, "Are you conscious of being presented with yourself as a substance? Or are you conscious that in every act of thought you must presuppose a permanent self, and always refer it to self, while still that self you cannot grasp, and it remains a hidden basis upon which you erect the structure of your thoughts? Kant's view, the latter, is the simpler and the more consistent with the ordinary language."¹

It is enough to say to this that this is going beyond Kant, who did not make the I a hidden thing, but a "consciousness accompanying all conceptions." In appealing to "ordinary language," again, Mahaffy is wholly unwise, for that appeal is to ignorance, to Alcibiades before

¹ Kant's *Critical Philosophy for English Readers*, lvi.

he had had his conversation with Socrates, to one who has not heeded the oracle, "Know thyself."

To vindicate Kant from friendly or unfriendly misrepresentation we must briefly remark upon his doctrine of the self as it appears in his "Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception." He there presents in vivid contrast the merely empirical self of the passing moment and the original and permanent and transcendental self, and declares: "The empirical consciousness, which accompanies each determination as it arises, is in itself broken up into units, and is unrelated to the one identical subject. Relation to a single subject does not take place when I accompany each determination with consciousness, but only when I add one determination to another, and am conscious of this act of synthesis. It is only because I am capable of combining in one consciousness the various determinations presented to me that I can become aware that in every one of them the consciousness is the same. It is only because I can grasp the various determinations in one consciousness that I can call them all mine; were it not so, I should have a self as many-colored and various as the separate determinations of which I am conscious.

Synthetic unity of the various determinations is therefore the ground of that identity of apperception which precedes *à priori* every definite act of thought. . . . The unity of apperception is therefore the supreme principle of all our knowledge.”¹

By presenting this transcendental synthetic conception of the self as combining subject Kant seems to separate himself from Hume by the whole breadth of this conception, while in his description of the empirical self he agrees with Hume and covers all that Hume had to say of the self. It is clear that Kant is a firm believer in personal identity, and must be counted on the side of those who affirm the positive, substantial existence of the individual self, and cannot be set down as positing only the mere “I think” of passing experience. Only Kant rightly declares that some have gone too far in holding that in thinking we know the self independently as an object.

Fichte, so modifying or rather transcending Kant’s view as to exclude the dualism of phenomena and noumena, presented the self as ab-

¹ Kritik, Theil II., Abth. I., Buch I., pp. 133-135.

solute, but manifesting itself in consciousness as knowing subject and known object: "The I is this, the subject-objectivity, and nothing else whatever; the positing of the subjective and its objective, of the consciousness and its known as one; and absolutely nothing else outside of this identity."¹

Of this doctrine Dr. McCosh says that Fichte did for Kant what Berkeley did for Locke. He charges Fichte with denying any self but a phenomenon, and argues that a phenomenon, although but an appearance, is an appearance of something exhibiting some of its qualities. So with the self, "We perceive qualities of self, of self in such and such a state."² Dr. McCosh is too hasty, in conclusion, to do Fichte justice.

Herbart engages with the question as treated by Kant and Fichte: "What we observe in ourselves is, taken generally, a very great variety of our thoughts and mental states, a continual becoming and changing. Over against these appears the I, which is always present there, to form a fixed point. . . . Of the reality of this I

¹ *Sonnenklarer Bericht*, edition 1801, p. 86.

² *Cognitive Powers*, Book I., chap. ii.

we have so strong and immediate a conviction that it has become a form of oath to establish all other knowledge and conviction, 'As true as I am.' . . . What does self-consciousness declare? The I declares itself, that is, its I, that is, its self-declaration. If the inquiries for the ego, the opening of which is here suggested, be properly carried on, the entrance will show itself in speculative psychology. After Kant and Fichte philosophers must go this way."¹

In thus pointing out that the Kantian criticism had opened a new way which would be much more prolific in result than the old, Herbart was surely right. In his strictures upon Fichte he is skilfully summarized in Dr. C. C. Everett's exposition of "Fichte's Science of Knowledge."² The result is the vindication of self-consciousness as positing the I in distinction from all else, "In its highest form it is self-affirmation, which is the one fundamental and absolute affirmation."³

Schelling, denying the absolutely egoistic point of view of Fichte, and gradually coming into direct opposition in mysticism, held that "the

¹ *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung*, I. B. 2, IV. I. 124.

² Chicago, 1844, pp. 81-87.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

I can be conscious of itself only in contrast with a not-self. At the same time this not-self or limit is laid down by itself and is recognized as its own. The I is therefore a perpetual process of laying down and removing a limit.”¹ . . . “There is an immediate consciousness of the self as distinct from and contrasted with an outer object.”² “The question whether the I of self-consciousness is a thing in itself or a phenomenon is utterly meaningless. To speak of the I as a thing in itself is to suppose that the I exists otherwise than for itself, which is as absurd as to suppose that the I exists before it exists.”³

This was a transition from Kant to Hegel, and in the latter’s view the extreme idealistic position was fully exhibited.

Hegel, in his “Philosophy of History,” said simply, “Two things must be distinguished in consciousness: first, that I know; secondly, what I know. In self-consciousness they are merged in one; for spirit knows itself.”⁴ Here

¹ Schelling’s *Transcendental Idealism* summarized by Watson, Chicago, 1882, p. 111.

² *Ibid.*, p. 127.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁴ Introduction.

he has set consciousness over against self-consciousness, and has presented his habitual notion that consciousness, in which the subject and the object stand over against each other, is but a step to self-consciousness in which a synthesis takes place and the mind contemplates itself as knowing. In another place, which Hegel reached in the course of a full examination of his categories, he said, "One has not the least idea of the I nor of anything, even of the idea itself, so far as he does not comprehend anything and remains standing only by the simple, fixed perception and name. It is a singular thought, if it can be named a thought, that I must myself make use of the I in order to judge of the I. The I, which makes use of the self-consciousness as a means of judging, is indeed an *x* of which one, as to the relation of such usage, can have not the least idea. . . . A stone has not this awkwardness. If it is to be thought or judged upon, it does not stand in its own way. It is freed from the inconvenience of making use of itself for this purpose; another, outside of it, must do the thinking."¹

¹ Logik, Werke V., p. 257.

It is difficult to make an extract, either from the "Logic" or from the "Phenomenology," which will clearly show how Hegel regarded the ego, for he is discussing only the process of thinking, and thus he presupposes the ego all the way, though at first the object, the "this," is prominent, and therefore mere consciousness precedes what may more properly be called self-consciousness. The *selbst* may be said to be in Hegel's hands a substance which undergoes a constant clarifying. He is affirmative in regard to personal identity and the selfhood, and in his Nuremberg Outline thus sums up the case: "The content of reason is for the ego no alien somewhat, nothing given from without, but throughout penetrated and assimilated by the ego and therefore to all intents produced by the ego."¹ Dr. W. T. Harris expresses it thus: "Looking closely at his treatment of idea, we discover plain evidence sufficient to convince us that he has in his thoughts always a personal first principle as the necessary result of his system. We see well enough that his talk about

¹Journal of Speculative Philosophy for August, 1869, p. 174.

method and dialectic treatment is meant merely for a statement of the nature of this highest personal self-activity.”¹

Passing now to such English, French, German, Italian, and American philosophers as it has seemed well to consult in addition, I note Sir W. Hamilton’s remark: “The I is manifested only in one or the other of these modes [of perception, feeling, memory, and so forth]; but it is manifested in them all; they are all only phenomena of the I. The self, the I, is recognized in every act of intelligence, as the subject to which that act belongs.”²

Closely affiliated with this perfect faith in consciousness, which no criticism could shake, stands the view of J. J. F. Ancillon, a French resident of Berlin, who sympathized with Jacobi rather than with Kant. He said, “The consciousness or ego is the impenetrability of souls. . . . If the consciousness of ourselves or of the ego be not an immediate revelation of the reality of our own existence, and if the consciousness of other existences be not given us

¹ Hegel’s *Logic*, Chicago, 1891, p. 392.

² *Metaphysics*, Lecture IX., p. 116.

in the ego, we can never attain to a real existence. . . . Consciousness gives us the reality of our own existence and therein the reality of infinite being. The soul is given us in and by the consciousness which we have of ourselves. It is us, and we are it. The ego forces us to believe in the universe and in ourselves; and if we doubt it, we believe absolutely nothing.”¹

This last is not too strongly stated, as may sufficiently appear from Kant’s rejection of such belief as objectively founded or constitutive, and his reinstating it as regulative or practically valuable. It is right to act, he held, as if there were a soul. It is not important to ascertain, it is impossible to know, whether God be in one person, or three, or ten; it is enough if we accept the number which will give the right rule of conduct. And so on, almost as if one could be voluntarily self-deceived. Ancillon was on firm ground here, and made his statement in another way which seems worthy of quotation: “The reflective ego distinguishes self from its

¹ *La Science et la Foi Philosophique*, Paris, 1830, pp. 101, 136, 163.

modifications and separates spectator from spectacle.”¹

It may be well also to hear from Thomas Taylor, although he was only introducing Plotinus as the reproducer of Plato: “Prior both to reason and the one life is *the one* of the soul, which says, I perceive, I desire; which follows all these energies and energizes together with them; for we should not be able to know all these and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which subsists above common sense, and which, prior to all opinion, desire, and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an indivisible mode of apprehension.”²

In contrast with this antique and dogmatic style is the remarkably perspicuous Cousin: “In every act of consciousness there is the consciousness of some operation, phenomenon, thought, volition, or sensation; and at the same time the conception of our existence. And when memory, following consciousness, comes into existence, the

¹ Nouveaux Mélanges, ii. p. 103.

² Introduction to Plotinus, London, 1794.

phenomena which just before were under the eye of consciousness, fall under that of memory, with the implicit conviction that the same being, the same I myself, who was the subject of the phenomena of which I was conscious, still exists and is the same whom my memory recalls to me. . . . In the order of nature and reason, consciousness and memory involve the supposition of personal identity. In chronological order some act of memory and of consciousness is the condition of the conception of our identity. . . . The condition of consciousness is attention, and that of attention is the will. It is the continuity of the will, attested by memory, which gives the conviction of personal identity.”¹

Cousin proceeds to criticise Locke’s meagre definition that “consciousness alone makes self,” and declares that the self is known in the operations which manifest it, that identity is the conviction of reason. He adds: “Personal identity is the union of your being, yourself, opposed to the plurality of consciousness and memory. It is impossible to know phenomena of sensation, volition and intelligence, without instantly refer-

¹ Criticism of Locke, Hartford, 1834, pp. 70, 73.

ring them to a subject one and identical, which is self, the I.”¹

Cousin seems to go too far in this criticism of Locke; for, if we admit with him that the self does not fall under consciousness and memory, but only the operations in which the self is engaged, we are precluded from making the perfectly rational statement, “I am.” Indeed, we should not find difficulty in criticising Cousin by his own words.

In the works of the Italian Rosmini, whose system has been conveniently set forth, largely in the author’s words, by Thomas Davidson, who compared his influence upon the thought of Italy to that of Aristotle and Kant, may be found clear statements as to the selfhood: “When I think, myself, I, the subject, become the object of my own thought. . . . The human soul is a single substantial subject.² . . . The ego is an active principle in a given nature, in so far as it has consciousness of itself and pronounces the act of consciousness. In order to be self-conscious, that is, to be an ego, the subject must

¹ Criticism of Locke, p. 259.

² Rosmini’s Philosophical System, London, 1882, pp. 63, 118.

have combined the feeling of selfhood [we decline to adopt Mr. Davidson's *meity* for the Italian *meita*] with ideal being as intuited, and then, by reflection, must have analyzed the object thus formed into the judgment, 'Myself is.' But this self is precisely what we mean by ego. . . . The identity of principles in different reflections arises from the inner feeling,—that is, from the feeling which man has of his own universal activity, wherein are virtually contained and identified all partial activities, and wherein it is felt that that act which gives rise to perception and reasoning is nothing other than an act, a partial application of that first fundamental activity, from which likewise proceeds reflection upon that which is perceived and reasoned about, upon perceptions, upon reasonings, upon the reflections themselves, and that this activity is the very one which speaks and which posits itself by saying 'I.' Thus is generated the ego."¹

Hickok views the subject similarly: "Something is while the varied exercises successively come and go upon the field of human consciousness. What that something is, the conscious-

¹ Rosmini's *Philosophical System*, London, 1882, pp. 202, 217.

ness does not reveal; but that it permanently is, in its unchanged identity, the consciousness does testify. It is as if the mirror could feel itself and its repeated throes of reflection, while it can by no means envisage itself, but only that which stands before it.”¹

This is the same as to say that consciousness is a mere mirror. If it were such, the existence of a self would indeed be but a reflection from a passive consciousness, but the mirror is at least so full of life that it can turn a hundred ways, and can itself make up the composite image, including all the reflections. Nay, more, aided by the judgment and memory, it can say, “Thou art the man,” and can bid him repent, or suffer the reward of his deeds.

Schopenhauer, with his hand against every man and his mind as inhospitable as possible towards other men’s views, was acute and brilliant in thought and speech. His word is, “All knowledge presupposes subject and object. Self-consciousness knows only will, not knowledge. The ego is as described by the Upanishad: ‘It is not seen, yet sees all things; it is not heard,

¹ Empirical Psychology, Schenectady, 1854, p. 75.

yet hears all things; it is not known, yet knows all things; it is not understood, yet understands all things.' There can be no knowledge of knowing. 'I know that I know' means only that I know, and this nothing more than I. The subject of knowledge can never be known, it can never become object. . . . The identity of the willing with the knowing subject, in virtue of which the word 'I' designates both, is the nodus of the universe (*Weltknoten*), and therefore inexplicable."¹

The answer to this would best be made by one who was learning with interest something which he had not previously known. The will to know would come first, and then the use of knowledge acquired would follow, and then he might look upon himself and say, "You, who were ignorant of this language, can now speak it; be thankful." It is needless to analyze Schopenhauer's obstinate negations.

How different the spirit of Ulrici: "By strength of his self-consciousness, his higher spontaneity and his thorough individuality, not only is the man himself in general but the single

¹ Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason, sect. 42.

individual in an eminent sense a subject, a self. Through the fact of self-distinction he affirms and knows himself as self; through the will he actuates and maintains himself as self.”¹

These are weighty words which might be enlarged upon, but they are passed over with the single remark that they will repay one for the closest examination.

Lotze does not go quite so far: “Self-consciousness is not an innate endowment of the mind so that from the first we see mirrored before us what we ourselves are. Our consciousness never presents to us this image as found; we are merely directed to a more or less obscure point in which lies our ego. . . . Self-consciousness is to us but as the interpretation of a sense of self. With culture the content of the ego becomes clearer, and extends over an enlarging circumference.”²

It is, of course, of this cultured self-consciousness, this mature mind obedient to the oracle, “Know thyself,” that we ought to think; and that Lotze abates nothing from the objective

¹ *Gott und der Mensch*, Leipzig, 1873, p. 30.

² *Microcosmos*, Book II., chap. v., sect. 3.

reality of this may be seen from his words: "Among all the errors of the human mind it has always seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own existence, of which alone it has direct experience, or to take it at second hand as the product of our external nature which we know only indirectly, only by means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence."¹ And still more emphatically he says, "Mortality reaches its highest stage in self-consciousness. . . . Self-consciousness sets itself as ego in opposition to the non-ego."²

When in a passage we meet with an apparent contradiction of this, and Lotze is found speaking of the self as "never rising into complete self-consciousness,"³ it seems to be his reverence for man leading him to attribute to him an infinite depth transcending the plummet of self-consciousness. There is no harm in this, provided it is agreed that we can know and measure and judge the agent of our own acts.

Ferrier has some emphatic sentences: "Self

¹ *Microcosmos*, Book II., chap. v., sect. 6.

² *Ibid.*, Book IX., chap. iv.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. iv.

is the *ens unum*, the *semper cognitum in omnibus notitiis*. It is the centre in which all cognitions meet and agree. . . . No cognition in which one does not apprehend one's self is possible. . . . The ego comes before us along with whatever comes before us. . . . When I observe a book I also observe myself. . . . There can be no knowledge of self or ego in a purely indeterminate state. The ego can know itself only in connection with some non-ego. . . . Hume says that he catches his perceptions without any self; in other words, he finds that they do not belong to any one. . . . The essence of the mind is the knowledge which it has of itself with that which it is cognizant of."¹

The expression *ens unum* seems too strong for Ferrier's purpose, and we note that his last sentence ignores the will; but his criticism of Hume shows that he means to be counted among the supporters of personality as actual, discernible, and permanent.

It suited the purpose of Dean Mansel to note the limits of personality, but he affirmatively said, "Personality is a limitation, for

¹ Institutes of Metaphysics, Propositions I., II., VII., IX.

the thought and the thinker limit each other. If I am any one of my own thoughts, I live and die with each successive moment of my own consciousness. If I am not any one of my own thoughts, I am limited by that very difference." This is clear, and he goes further in the direction of definition of the self when he says, "That which I see, or hear, or think, or feel changes and passes away with each moment of my varied existence. I who see, hear, think, and feel am one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole."¹ He also holds that we are conscious of our selves as depending upon another Person.

In his note to his father's "Phenomena of Mind," J. S. Mill has expressed himself with great vigor: "Suppose a being gifted with sensation, but devoid of memory; whose sensations follow after one another, but leave no trace of their existence when they cease. Could this being have any knowledge or notion of a self? Would he ever say to himself, 'I feel; this sensation is mine?' I think not. The notion of a

¹ Limits of Religious Thought, Lecture III., pp. 103, 105; iv. p. 130.

self is, I apprehend, a consequence of memory. There is no meaning in the word ego or I unless the I of to-day is also the I of yesterday.”¹

This is somewhat too strong. It is true that the notion of the self depends on memory, but it is not so true that it depends on memory alone; for an aged person, whose memory is gone, as the saying is, still retains in momentary self-consciousness a distinct idea of self, and every new sensation renews the thought of self. Indeed, Mill says for himself that “there is a mental process over and above the having a mere feeling, to which the word consciousness is sometimes, and it can hardly be said improperly, applied, namely the reference of the feeling to our self.”²

But in another place, having mentioned a succession of feelings, he said, “This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish myself. Myself is the person who had that series of feelings, and I know nothing of myself by direct knowledge except that I had them. But there is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series; and

¹ Vol. i., note 75.

² Ibid.

this bond, to me, constitutes my ego. Here, I think, the question must rest until some psychologist succeeds better than any one has yet done in showing a mode in which the analysis can be carried further.”¹

Mansel would probably have answered that, by pursuing the subject of the relation of self to the other Person, some further light would be obtained, but this Mill would not have heeded. Indeed he was wholly a sceptic and might be joined with Schopenhauer when he (Mill) said, “There seems to be no ground for believing, with Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, that the ego is an original presentation of consciousness; that the mere impression on our senses involves and carries with it any consciousness of a self, any more than I believe it to do of a not-self. The inexplicable tie, or law, or organic union, which connects the present consciousness with the past one, is as near as I think we can get to a positive conception of self.”²

The light that was in him seems to have been darkness. He spoke of his own mind as if he

¹ Vol. ii., note 33.

² Examination of Hamilton, 4th edition, p. 262.

had no more intimate knowledge of it than of another's. What he groped for lay before his own consciousness if he could follow Hegel's advice and raise it to self-consciousness.

In strong contrast with Mill is Gatiien-Arnoult, whom Hamilton approvingly quoted at length. In a more succinct statement than that used by Hamilton this writer said, "The identity of the ego is the continuity of its existence without interruption or alteration. It knows by the memory and consciousness that it goes on without interruption or alteration. The ego which I am now is no other than that which I was yesterday. I am always myself. The identity of the ego results from its unity,—that is, its simplicity, immateriality, spirituality."¹

Herbert Spencer, under the question, "What is this that thinks?" declares the ego to be unknowable. Common speech makes the ego an entity, and the belief in it is "unavoidable"; but "it is a belief admitting of no justification by reason." He expresses his approval of the views of Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel, and concludes: "A true cognition of self implies a

¹ Philosophie élémentaire : Réponses aux Question iv.

state in which the knowing and the known are one,—in which subject and object are identified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation of both. So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a thing which cannot be truly known at all; knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought.”¹

Spencer is clearly mistaken here, and the appeal from Spencer can be made to Spencer. He has said that we must believe in self (“Belief in the reality of self is a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape”); and he has said that “it is a belief which reason, when pressed for an answer, rejects;” but later he said, “The totality of my consciousness is divisible into a faint aggregate which I call my mind; a special part of the vivid aggregate which, cohering with this in various ways, I call my body; and the rest of the vivid aggregate, which has no such coherence with the faint aggregate. The principle of continuity, forming into a whole the faint states of consciousness, moulding and modifying them

¹ First Principles: New York, 1890, pp. 64, 65.

by some unknown energy, is distinguished as the ego.”¹

This personification of the principle of continuity exercising an unknown energy will not guide Spencer into all truth, but it would appear that in ten years he had come to accept the ego as something distinguishable in consciousness, and this is a really noteworthy progress.

T. H. Green is full of light, in contrast with Spencer, when he says, “The more strongly Hume insists that ‘the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one,’ the more completely does his doctrine refute itself. In all his attempts we find that the relation, which has to be explained away, is presupposed under some other expression, and that it is ‘fictitious’ not in the sense which Hume’s theory requires, that there is no such thing, but in the sense that it would not exist if we did not think about our feelings.”²

Still more strongly and with equal clearness Green has spoken in a passage quoted by Dr. C.

¹ Principles of Psychology, sect. 462.

² Philosophical Works, London, 1885, General Introduction, p. 297.

C. Everett in his "Fichte's Science of Knowledge:"¹ "If there is such a thing as a connected experience of related objects, there must be operative in consciousness a unifying principle, which not only presents related objects to itself, but at once renders them objects and unites them in relation to each other by this act of presentation; and which is single throughout the experience. The unity of this principle must be correlative to the unity of the experience. If all possible experience of related objects—the experience of a thousand years ago and the experience of to-day, the experience which I have here and that which I might have in any other region of space—forms a single system; if there be no such thing as an experience of unrelated objects; then there must be a corresponding singleness in that principle of consciousness which forms the bonds of the relation between the objects."²

This noble passage might well close the historical summary of the doctrine were there not a few other authors who deserved mention. Professor Bowen boldly defends the self against "all metaphysical cavils" by declaring that it is

¹ P. 76.² Prolegomena to Ethics, 34.

indivisible; that it exercises one mind; that there is "a direct consciousness of self;" that it is a monad; that we are conscious of it in itself and in its passing into thought and act; that we are not compelled to infer its existence from its manifestations; and that the only difficulty with defining it is that it is indivisible.¹

Dr. Hedge, however, is more Kantian in his view. In his essay on Personality² he "supposes the ego to be peculiar to man; that the brutes have only simple consciousness, not the reflected consciousness of self." He mentions Jean Paul's account of the birth of his self-consciousness. He proceeds to point out that man has three parts: "first, the unknown factor which constitutes the ground of our being; secondly, the ego or conscious self; thirdly, the person." By person he means, in the proper sense of that word, the man's manifestation before men. By the ego he means what Professor Bowen and the rest meant by it. By the "unknown factor" he means either the inmost soul which is not rationally discerned or the Divine mind hidden in its

¹ *Metaphysics and Ethics*, chap. iii.

² *Luther, and other Essays*, Boston, 1888, pp. 281-285.

infinity. He declines to say which of the two he means, and it is unnecessary to seek to discover. He should be reckoned on the positive side as to the ego, but beyond that he is a pantheist of the type of the peripatetic Dicæarch, holding that God cannot be self-conscious, and that the word "I," attributed to Him in the Scriptures, is an anthropomorphism.¹

Dr. McCosh has been referred to as a critic of Fichte. Let him also be heard in saying, "Consciousness cannot be said to furnish an idea of, or belief in, our personal identity, for it looks solely to the present. But it reveals self as present. When we remember the past, there is involved a memory of self as remembering. We compare the two, the present self known and the past self remembered, and declare the two to be identical. Consciousness does not constitute our personal identity. It makes it known. A full and distinct knowledge of self is a late acquisition, but from birth there is a knowledge of self in acts."²

As to these last words Dr. Hedge is more ac-

¹ Luther, etc., p. 281.

² Cognitive Powers, Book I., chap. ii., sect. 1.

curate when he says, "There is a time, varying, I suppose, from the second to the fourth year, when a human individual first says to himself, 'I.' Jean Paul probably meant a point in the same period, and perhaps it will be found upon inquiry that the earliest event which one can remember is one which, through some extreme sensation of pleasure or pain, awoke the self-consciousness from its infantile slumber and made a deep impression."¹

Tennyson has accurately and happily described the awakening self-consciousness,—

"The baby new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is pressed
Against the circle of the breast,
Has never thought that 'this is I.'

"But as he grows he gathers much,
And learns the use of 'I' and 'me,'
And finds 'I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch.'

"So rounds he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin,
As through the frame that bounds him in,
His isolation grows defined."²

¹ Luther, etc., p. 282.

² In Memoriam, xlv.

Perhaps the only rival of Tucker's "Man in Quest of Himself," as a book treating exclusively of the self, is a little volume by one J. S. Malone, of Waco, Texas.¹ His subject is announced as "The Self: What Is It?" and he proceeds in an earnest way to point out that the intellect is but an instrument of man rather than his essential being; that his real life lies in sensibility and in the principal desire among all the desires of any one; that this ruling love is the ego; that Descartes should have said, "I feel, therefore I am," rather than, "I think, therefore I am;" that the sense of responsibility attaches less to our thoughts than to our purposes; that to know one's self requires scrutiny of the heart rather than of the head; that the development of sensibility must precede that of the intellectual powers; that the training of humanity requires attention to be given to the affections even more than to the intellectual faculties; and that it has been the weakness of philosophers to "become wholly absorbed in hair-splitting intricacies of intelligence," while the Christian teaching was directed to the heart.

¹ Louisville: John P. Morton & Co., 1888.

It would be improper to find fault with these suggestions unless they were in danger of being carried too far. In exalting the will Mr. Malone must not forget that the intellect is not only its servant, carrying out its purposes, but also its guide and instructor, examining those purposes and giving judgment upon them. The intellect trained without regard to the corresponding education of the will corrupts the nature, but the least undervaluation of the intellect in the account causes a serious loss to the nature. The philosophers are not so guilty as they are here represented to be, and will be found in good time to have done an indispensable work.

In his lectures on "Hegelianism and Personality,"¹ Professor Andrew Seth has considered the effect of the doctrine of Hegel in regard to personality upon the conception of the Divine Being. After making a presentation of the views of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Green, he shows that their tendency was to obliterate the Divine self-consciousness in favor of the human or the human in favor of the Divine, thereby confounding the two, and, in fact, reach-

¹ Edinburgh, 1887.

ing "a logical abstraction called the Idea, in which both God and man disappear." "The unification of consciousness in a single Self" he considers to be the radical error of Hegelianism. He complains that the self recognized by Hegelians and Neo-Kantians is but "a logical and not a real self." It is impossible to see that there is not the danger which he points out, yet it is not in the present place necessary to dwell upon it, except to say that any monistic plan, Spinozistic, Fichtean, or Hegelian, which admits but one individuality into its universe, defeats itself by rejecting the microcosm, the only explanation of the universe. If man be not a distinct individuality, the world, made for naught, comes to naught. There is a truth in the saying of the sophistic Protagoras, "Man is the measure of the universe." A God alone or a man alone is an absurdity. Henry More was consistent when he wrote, *Nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo Deus*,¹ "No spirit in the microcosm, no God in the macrocosm," for both ideas stand or fall together.

In a small volume entitled "Personality," by

¹ Atheism, III., chap. xvi.

Professor W. W. Olssen, of St. Stephen's College, New York,¹ we find three lectures, the first of which deals with the personality of man and the second and third with that of God. The treatment is wholly untechnical and without reference to the philosophers. It is wisely pointed out that man's personality is not merely bodily and not merely spiritual, but exists on both these planes, in the consciousness of a distinct physical existence with its instinct of self-preservation, and in the will with its consciousness of power.

In the essay on "Personality and the Infinite," which Professor William Knight printed first in the *Contemporary Review* and then in his volume entitled "Studies in Philosophy and Literature,"² an excellent statement of the question is to be found so far as regards the personality of the Infinite; but, in passing, this thought is expressed: "The radical feature of personality, as known to us,—whether apprehended by self-consciousness or recognized in others,—is the survival of a permanent self under all the fleeting

¹ New York, 1882.

² London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1879, also Boston, 1891.

or deciduous phases of experience; in other words, the personal identity which is involved in the assertion, 'I am.' While my thoughts, feelings, and acts pass away and perish, I continue to exist, to live, and to grow in the fulness of experience. Beneath the shows of things, the everlasting flux and reflux of phenomenal change, a substance or interior essence survives."¹

That rapid and brilliant writer, Professor A. W. Momerie, pursued a similar line of thought with a similar purpose in his "Personality the Beginning and End of Metaphysics and a Necessary Assumption of all Positive Philosophy."² He means to assail the Comtists with their own weapons and to entrap them in their own web. Taking Professor Bain's saying, that "the ego is a pure fiction, coined from nonentity," as his starting-point, he proceeds, not sparing his powers of mockery, to defend the ego as to its existence, its self-knowledge, and its freedom, concluding with a chapter on the Infinite Ego. He says, "The fact that every feeling involves some one to feel it has never been, in so many words, denied. The most zealous opponents of

¹ Page 79.

² Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1886

an ego avail themselves of ambiguities by which the existence of an ego can, at pleasure, be tacitly assumed. It is sometimes ludicrous to observe how, after denying a possible ego, writers are obliged to resort to an impossible one. Mr. Lewes, in his first volume of '*Problems*,' seems inclined to make the ego consist of a mass of 'systematic' sensations, namely, of nutrition, respiration, generation, and the muscles. These, he says, constitute a stream of sentience, upon which each external stimulus forms a ripple, and consciousness is caused by the consequent breach of equilibrium. But it is manifest that this illustration goes for nothing without the presupposition of a sentient observer. A mass of feeling, however large, cannot apprehend a feeling. . . . Since, then, the necessity for an ego is never denied without being tacitly assumed, it may be taken to be really a self-evident truth, the contradictory of which is inconceivable, that, along with every sensation or feeling of any description whatever, there must exist a sentient principle capable of feeling it."¹

Dr. Momerie then goes on to consider the aid

¹ Page 29.

given by the memory, since the Positivist may grant that there is a sentient for every sensation, but may deny the permanent identity of such subject. The argument is presented by means of an illustration: "I remember that ten years ago many of my opinions were changed by the reading of a certain book. Now this implies (1) the object remembered, namely, the change of opinions; (2) my soul or mind which remembers the fact; and (3) a consciousness of personal identity,—that is to say, a conviction that the mind or soul, which is now experiencing the remembrance of the fact, is the self-same mind or soul which formerly experienced the fact itself, that it is, in other words, *my* mind. The identity of which I am conscious is certainly not an identity of body, for during the ten years which have elapsed my body has lost its identity. Nor is the identity an identity of phenomena, for the remembrance of the fact is something essentially different from the fact itself. The identity of which I am conscious is an identity of soul. . . . In every act of remembrance I know that I have existed in at least two different states, and that therefore I have *persisted* between them."¹

¹ Pages 41-43.

This is not the place to make use of this writer's argument for the freedom of the ego, and in what he says of its self-knowledge he is not as original as elsewhere, but we must quote a summary paragraph for which we are indebted to him: "The ego is a real existence. Without a permanent subject there could never have existed a single remembrance or cognition, nor even a sensation. So far negatively. But further positively: we are sometimes conscious of ourselves, apprehending ourselves along with our states in the same indivisible moment of time; and, after reflection upon these past experiences, we are able to form a conception of self not less distinct, at any rate, than are our conceptions of material objects or of natural forces."¹

Chronologically last, but in the breadth of its scope scarcely rivalled, is the treatment of our subject in Professor James's "New Psychology."² These general points are first treated and are called the five characters of thought: (1) it tends to personal form; (2) it is in constant

¹ Page 62.

² New York, 1890, chapter ix., "The Stream of Thought;" chapter x., "The Consciousness of Self."

change; (3) in each consciousness thought is sensibly continuous; (4) it is cognitive of objects which appear to be independent; (5) it chooses among its objects while it thinks of them. In unfolding these parts of the subject Professor James seems to overstate in one remark when he declares that there is a "consciousness of a teeming multiplicity of objects from our natal day,"¹ but he proceeds very clearly to point out that "the elementary psychic fact is not this thought or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned."² The conscious fact is not "feelings and thoughts exist," but "I think" and "I feel"; and he firmly declares: "No psychology, at any rate, can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth. . . . There are no marks of personalty to be gathered *aliunde*, and then found lacking in the train of thought. It has them all already."³ He then shows that no two states are ever just alike, and argues that the continuous stream of thought bears with it the sense of personal identity, so that "the

¹ Page 226.² Page 226.³ Pages 226, 227.

consciousness remains sensibly continuous and one.”¹

After dwelling upon the feelings of relation and tendency in thought, the “fringe” of an object which affects us when it is not definitely in view, the feeling of rational sequence, and the relation of thought to language, our author takes up his fourth point, that thought appears to deal with independent objects, and remarks that “many philosophers hold that the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function of thought: . . . but this is a perfectly wanton assumption.”² By this refusal to accept the ground of Ferrier, Hamilton, and others whom he cites, he seems simply to draw the distinction, made by Hegel, between consciousness and self-consciousness. In mere consciousness we know that the thought is ours, but we do not stop to objectify the owner. The fifth fact, that the thought always exercises preference, either in careful discrimination or in mere “accentuation,” is treated in the author’s vivid way.

In the chapter on “The Consciousness of Self,” Professor James deals with the empirical

¹ Page 238.

² Page 274.

ego, expanding this to its greatest extent by saying that, "in its widest possible sense, a man's self is the sum total of all that he can call his."¹ His powers of mind and body, his property, his family, his ancestry, his acquaintance, his fame, his works, and his pleasures are enumerated. Thus the constituents of the self may be divided into (1) the material, (2) the social, (3) the spiritual, and (4) what the Germans would call the pure self. The social self he rightly divides into neighborly, official, political, and so on.² The spiritual self is "a man's inner being," "a certain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest," "that which welcomes or rejects," "which presides over the perception of sensations," "that around which the other elements accrete," "the central, active self," "the self of selves."³ But this self manifests itself to him also in bodily sensations, and he is inclined to hold that the consciousness of it is mainly corporeal. He does not definitely adopt this suggestion, but takes great interest in the idea as a physiological psychologist, and thus approaches Herbert Spencer's "faint aggregate" of mind and "vivid aggregate" of body.

¹ Page 291.² Page 295.³ Pages 296-301.

The conflicts between the selves of a man are then acutely described, and favor is given to the "hierarchy with the bodily self at the bottom, the spiritual self at top, and the extracorporeal material selves and the various social selves between."¹ Each self has its form of self-love, which may take the form of either self-seeking or self-estimation.²

In considering the pure ego, he discusses the postulate: "I am the same self that I was yesterday," and defends it on the ground of our warmth of interest in all that has concerned us, holding "the ordinary doctrine professed by the empirical school."³ But he goes further and uses the illustration of an owner's brand upon his cattle to explain the active possession by the self of all its objects. "Common sense would, in fact, drive us to admit an Arch-Ego, dominating the entire stream of thought and all the selves that may be represented in it."⁴ Of course, he recognizes that this is Kant's transcendental ego. Here again he finds a material basis for the sense of personal identity in the

¹ Page 313.

² Page 329.

³ Page 336.

⁴ Page 338.

“sense of bodily existence;” but this suggestion is placed in a foot-note.¹

Passing then to a discussion as to what the ego is, he finds three theories : (1) the Spiritualist, (2) the Associationist, and (3) the Transcendental. He does not regard the spiritualistic or soul view, commonly held from Plato down, as necessary to explain “the phenomena of consciousness as they appear.”² The stream of thought is sufficient for him. He does not go behind the passing thoughts. The hypothesis of a “substantial soul explains nothing and guarantees nothing.” Still, his “reasonings have not established the non-existence of the soul.”³ He rejects outright the associationist theory as futile in view of the sense of ownership of the sensations. He ridicules Kant’s transcendental theory as cumbrous and obscure and mythological : “by Kant’s confession, the transcendental ego has no properties, and from it nothing can be deduced.”⁴ The words *me* and *I* shall, therefore, mean to him “the empirical person and the judging thought.”⁵ We do not need to refer to

¹ Page 341.

² Page 344.

³ Page 350.

⁴ Page 364.

⁵ Page 371.

the carefully-selected cases cited from the records of spiritism, hypnotism, and insanity to throw light upon the self, but pass directly to the author's own summary :

“The consciousness of self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as ‘I’ can (1) remember those which went before, and know the things they knew; and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as ‘me’ and appropriate to these the rest. The nucleus of the ‘me’ is always the bodily existence felt to be present at the time. . . . This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for metaphysical purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the soul, or a principle like the pure ego, viewed as ‘out of time.’ It is a thought, at each moment different from the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own. All the experiential facts find their place in this description.”¹ Even now Professor James admits that a hard question as to the phases of the

¹ Page 400.

thought may be asked, but he ends with saying that the passing thought is the proper ground of psychology, and that to go behind this is to enter the field of metaphysical problems.

This is not a thoroughly satisfactory ending of so rich a discussion, which has been largely metaphysical; but one is free to take out of the impartially presented materials what he will and to build as he will. The view of Professor James is, it would seem, just that which psychology would give when describing phenomena and declining to draw inferences from them. It would then candidly say, "There may be a self of all these selves, a judge of these judgments, but he is not as visible as his acts are, and the acts we mainly care for." Indeed, Professor James transcended this "naturalistic point of view" when he said, "The basis of our personality, as M. Ribot says, is that feeling of our vitality which, because it is so perpetually present, remains in the background of our consciousness."¹ Here, what he means by the personality, or at least by its basis, is apparently what Kant's term, "the original transcendental synthetic unity

¹ Page 375.

of apperception," means, and what is meant by such expressions as "a man and his moods," or Goethe's saying, "I will be lord over myself."

In this attempted summary of the views of philosophers remarks have been introduced which indicate the ground to be taken here as a basis for what is to follow, namely, the reality of the ego, its indivisibility, its distinctly human or rational quality, its gradual emergence into self-consciousness in the history of the individual and of the race, its dependence upon the memory for full recognition, its endurance in spite of physical changes, its insistence upon acknowledgment under some mode or other and in a greater or less degree by all philosophers however sceptical, its enthronement where all mental operations go on, and, consequently and necessarily, its supreme demand to be studied and understood so far as light is given.

CHAPTER IV.

MAN A RECIPIENT.

THIS indivisible personality which each human being has is either a created or an uncreated thing,—that is, it looks to some source of life outside of itself, or it does not do so and looks solely to itself. Is the self self-formed? Is there a self-made man?

To answer “yes” to these questions is inevitably to adopt some theory of metempsychosis or reincarnation. Every one’s age can be told by somebody, and the only way in which one can make himself out to be uncreated is to assert that he lived previously in some other form. That is by no means tantamount to saying that he had no date of original creation or birth, since he may have been reincarnated a thousand times and still from some superior being may have received his first form; but those who have believed in metempsychosis have assumed that souls were “from the beginning.” Saith the Bhagavad Gita: “You cannot say of the soul, it

shall be, or is about to be, or is to be hereafter. It is a thing without birth." A careful writer, who has given much time to a restatement of all that can be said in favor of this theory, declares at once that this is the truth about it. Note some of his utterances at the outset of his book, "Reincarnation: A Study of Forgotten Truth:"¹ "The soul enters this life not as a fresh creation, but after a long course of previous existences on this earth and elsewhere. . . . Infancy brings to earth, not a blank scroll, but one inscribed with ancestral histories stretching back into the remotest past. . . . The habits, impulses, tendencies, pursuits, and friendships of the present descend from far-reaching previous activities. . . . The soul is therefore an eternal water globule, which sprang in the beginningless past from mother ocean, and is destined, after an unreckonable course of meandering, to at last return with the garnered experience of all lonely existences into the central heart of all."²

In this statement, much condensed, but not deprived of any part of its argument, note the

¹ By E. D. Walker. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1888.

² Pages 11-13.

use of the word "therefore" to render "long," "remotest," and "far-reaching," equivalent to "eternal" and "beginningless." This begging of the question seems to be as old as the theory, for the self has, at the most, only signs of antiquity,—to grant this for the moment,—but no signs whatever of eternal duration, and not the slightest mark of infinity. Stripped of this assumption of eternal being, the theory of metempsychosis does not in itself assert that the soul is uncreated, but it has made the assumption and is to be judged by it. Still, Mr. Walker speaks of the "heart of all," and leaves the impression that his book is really an argument for immortality,—Christian immortality, too, of course of a Gnostic type.

Professor William Knight deals very gently with this theory, admitting its ethical value and saying, "The ethical leverage of the doctrine is immense. Its motive power is great. With peculiar emphasis it proclaims the survival of moral individuality and personal identity, along with the final adjustment of external conditions to the internal state of the agent."¹ But he also

¹ *Philosophy and Literature*, page 139.

makes the same mistake as to the unbegotten quality of the soul, for he says, in closing, that the only alternative which can be held, if metempsychosis be rejected, is "a perpetual miracle, the incessant and rapid increase in the amount of spiritual existence in the universe."¹

This is the same as to say that the doctrine of pre-existence or reincarnation holds that there is no increase of spiritual existence in the universe; that there is, and has been, no sort of creation in case of the souls already existing; and that these souls always have existed. If otherwise, then at some time there was a miracle, an increase of spirit. Rejecting such increase, one may seem to be forced to conclude that the souls now in existence have always been in existence, and were never created; that, indeed, there are as many gods, as many infinite people, as there are souls, or, at least, as many "eternal globules," differing from the ocean in size, but not in quality.

All the way down the theory is traced, through India, Egypt, Persia, Greece (especially with Pythagoras), and western Europe. Schopen-

¹ Philosophy and Literature, page 153.

hauer liked it as a remedy for the fear of death, and said all he could in its favor. Hume made this argument for it: "The soul, if immortal, existed before our birth. What is incorruptible must be ungenerable. Metempsychosis is the only system of immortality which philosophy can hearken to."

The assumption here is in the premises. It is not necessary that the soul, to be immortal, should have had pre-existent personality; and it is not necessary that the incorruptible should be ungenerable or uncreated. Lessing, Fichte, Herder, Thomas Brown, Shelley, Southey, and many others, are quoted by Walker in defence of reincarnation. Emerson said in his "Method of Nature:" "We cannot describe the natural history of the soul, but we know that it is divine. This one thing I know, that these qualities did not now begin to exist, cannot be sick with my sickness nor buried in my grave; but that they circulate through the universe; before the world was, they were. Nothing can bar them out, or shut them in, but they penetrate the ocean and land, space and time, form and essence, and hold the key to universal nature."¹

¹ Walker, p. 98.

This is so vague as to mean almost anything, but a cooler writer on metempsychosis follows the same line of thought: "Of all the theories," says Dr. Hedge, "respecting the nature of the soul it seems to me the most plausible, and therefore the one most likely to throw light on the question of a life to come."¹ The poets are full of what reincarnationists call their doctrine. "Nearly all the poets profess it," says Walker.

It is, however, very noticeable in all writers on this subject that the exceeding weakness of their arguments from perceptions of new places as familiar, from seeming recollections of persons, and from immortal instincts, has compelled them to grasp at every possible support, so that, for example, they cite as an authority Spenser with his lines,—

"For of the soul the body form doth take,
For soul is form and doth the body make,"

and even find metempsychosis in the words of Scripture, which prophesied that Elijah should go before the Messiah (Mal. iv. 5), and which later reported the Messiah saying of John the

¹ Ways of the Spirit, chap. xii., on "The Human Soul."

Baptist, "This is Elias, which was to come" (Matt. xi. 14).

Were the array of authorities, legitimately or illegitimately cited to support some form of this theory, a thousand times larger, the fact would remain that to declare souls uncreated is to declare of every feeble infant, of every dunce, that he is a god.

But even this theory admits that men are passing through states of preparation for higher achievements, and, shorn of its preposterous polytheism, it presents the living man in much the common way, as an infant, a child, a youth, an adult, always receiving impressions, always developing for good or evil by means of instruction received directly and consciously through parents and teachers, or indirectly and unconsciously through associations and sympathies and ambitions.

Even in this view, then, man is a recipient form. Every organism has its cells which secrete that which it needs for nutriment and development. The brain, the heart, the lungs, the bones, the muscles, the nerves are made of cellular tissue, and this unmistakably indicates a receptive life in the body, a body formed to receive

from without, to assimilate what it needs, and thereby to live. It is but a step from this to the thought that the whole, being but a complex of cells, is fitted to receive a soul, an animating presence, or whatever the inner man may be called; and it is but a step beyond that to the thought that this inner man is a recipient, but, of course, this cannot be anatomically demonstrated.

In respect to the indivisible selfhood, the idea of infinite pre-existence must give place to some view more consonant with reason and experience. The only alternative is that the mind is a created existence, in this respect the perfect analogue of the body. Here, again, two ways appear: for we may think of the mind as created and completed, once for all, at some past time; or we may think of it as created in the sense that it is so made as to require to be continually recipient of that which it needs for sustenance and growth.

The former view, that the mind was created at one stroke and sent forth, supplied once for all with inexhaustible energy, is that which is held by those more cautious reincarnationists who avoid giving man self-creative or infinite power,

and the same view seems to be held by all those who regard 'every one as from his beginning elected or reprobated by his Creator, especially when held in the extreme form that all subsequent men were on trial for their lives in the first man.¹ But with the daily-increasing evidences gathered by science that the cosmic creation goes on and always will go on, the general mind is accepting the idea that the individual man, himself a creation, and a microcosmic type of the creation, is in process of development. This only revives the old saying, "Preservation is perpetual creation." As the body, confessed by all to be created, must be fed, so the soul, or immaterial man, being less than the Divine, is a recipient of life, of immaterial "daily bread."

Every one who has observed the development of an individual from infancy to maturity has noted the gradual reception and appropriation of motives and manners, whether gained by means of lessons learned, or acquired by that observation and imitation of others which is, in a large degree, indiscriminating, and which gives so

¹ The Assembly's Catechism, Question 16.

much of good or evil to the child. As Emerson said, in his essay on "Spiritual Laws:" "There is no teaching till the pupil is brought into the same state or principle in which you are; a transfusion takes place; he is you and you are he; *there* is a teaching."

Granting the immeasurable influence of teachers upon young minds, the question may be asked, "Do not the influences of heredity need to be reckoned of great importance?" Certainly, but this is not an objection to the doctrine of the receptive quality of the self. What we inherit we certainly receive,—by another way, indeed, than that by which we receive the influences of instructors, but none the less do we receive the traits which are so important a part of ourselves. It is an objection to metempsychosis that heredity seems to destroy the fancy of man ascending independently by successive reincarnations, but against the simple idea of the receptivity of man no such objection lies.

It is, however, when one examines himself that he is most convinced of the fact that he is a recipient. As he looks over the library of his precious, earliest books he sees from what source he drew his information, now made a part of

himself by constant exercise. As he looks upon the portraits of his teachers he recalls the scenes in which they ministered to him of their abundance. As he goes back in memory to early days he is like a traveller who views the trophies of his rambles, and says, "This I got one day in Naples, that in Cairo, that in Calcutta." A man's memory may fail to enable him to name the respective sources of all that he has mentally acquired, but others may assist him to complete the account. Especially can they assure him that certain of his tendencies clearly represent his parents and ancestors.

Thus he learns, from the exclusion as absurd of the view of himself as an uncreated being, from the analogy of all other created existences, from his own experiences revealed by memory, and from the information which intimate older friends can give him, that his life is, and has been since its inception, a recipient life; that his selfhood is an organism of cells spiritually filled or filling; that he was made by some power greater than himself, and that his daily life is a process of acquisition from sources outside of himself.

He, therefore, regards without dismay the

alternative presented by Professor Knight: either every man an uncreated god, or the miracle of increase of spiritual existence in the universe; but he corrects the alternative by pointing out that the second member should read, "increase of *forms* of spiritual existence," for every man is a recipient form of life. If the source of life be in God, his gift from an infinite source to a newly-created form should arouse the repugnance of Professor Knight no more than the irrigation of a hitherto arid and untilled plain which is made thus to increase the plant-life of the universe.

Finally, the selfhood of each individual, his *proprium*, is not uncreated and independent, but it is the peculiar form of life which he is, that combination of receptive qualities, which combination makes him to be unlike all others, his own self. It is the special and permanent capacity to receive in his own way, and to exercise what common sense wisely calls his "gifts" in his own way by making use of what he receives, which capacity is his individuality, for "what is received is received *ad modum recipientis*."

Professor James's figure of the stream of

thought is as graphic as it is convenient, but it should never be forgotten that we cannot think of a stream without its banks; that we think of a stream with one kind of bed and banks as rushing forcefully along to perform magnificent tasks, and, on the other hand, that we think of a stream with another kind of bed and banks as moving sluggishly, with little capacity for giving power as it goes. It is not our heredity alone, it is not what we have imbibed alone, which makes us what we are, or two boys of the same family, attending the same school, would be much the same; it is not only our own acquisitions, plus our heredity, for then the children of a family would be more alike than they are seen to be; it is something plus heredity, plus acquisition, which something is the primary cause of individualization, and which makes every one so distinct a personality.

What this something is can be told by suggesting the microcosmic image instead of that of the stream alone. While the stream correctly describes the thoughts in their flow, we need to think also of the solid ground beneath and beside the stream, the voluntary nature which underlies the intellectual and which constantly

modifies the stream, and we need to think of that which makes both bed and stream to be the man's own and not another's. This is his peculiar, original nature, and it is something which the man has not made, and which his ancestors have not made, and which his teachers may in a degree mould but cannot make; it is the special form originally given to his nature, not by an irrational decision that he shall be elect or reprobated, but by a decision of infinite wisdom that he shall be fitted to fill a certain place. It is the man whom the Lord God putteth into the garden with its ground and its river to dress it and to keep it. As the Israelites drew lots to obtain places in the promised land, so there is assigned to every one, apart from his parents' wishes and prior of course to acts of his judgment, a place to fill. "Poets are born, not made," is a true saying; but the word "born" here is equivalent to "are created," and is not to be taken in an atheistic sense, as if the poet were such because he from birth happened to be such. And so Dryden says, "Genius must be born and never can be taught,"¹ meaning the original creation

¹ Epistle X., line 60.

of the mind. Genius is an inherent aptitude to do a work, and to this aptitude heredity and education minister, but they do not do more. It was weak in Gray to sing,—

“Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air,”

and then to go on about “some mute inglorious Milton,” and so forth, because to be seen is not the whole purpose of a flower, and because a true Hampden or Milton or Cromwell is in-suppressible.

No conception of human order at all commensurate with cosmic order can be formed without admitting that every man has a place in the universal plan, and that his place is worthy of him and of his Maker. We have thousands of men in one profession, it is true, but they are all different, and their propinquity emphasizes their separateness. The greater the variety in a harmony the more perfect the harmony. Since no possible conception of the human order is greater than this, so all inferior conceptions are unsatisfactory, because they leave one to conclude that some are brought into the world to have no vocation except to imitate others. That some

are of more humble capacity than others does not militate against this conception, because the humility of a task is no bar to its being regarded as important and as conferring true dignity upon its faithful minister. The great are not always to be envied their proportionate responsibility, and it is neither more easy nor more magnanimous to be a king than to be an artisan.

“Who sweeps a room as for thy laws
Makes that and the action fine.”¹

It is a part of the wonderful universalism of human order, the infractions of which will be considered hereafter, that one grows into his place. With many a young man an anxious state of waiting to see what his life-work shall be is conspicuous, and this anticipates the decision which will come very gently in the mingled lesson of conviction and circumstance when the time is ripe. Others have no anxiety, but find duty calling them to some task, by no means easy, but not impossible, as it would be if they had no fitness for it.

In his essay on “Lords of Life,” Dr. Hedge

¹ George Herbert, *Elixir*.

makes a just distinction between the influences brought to bear upon a man from without and his inward essential life: "It is often affirmed that circumstances make the man; that character and destiny are the product of influences that have acted upon us from without; that we are what these influences have made us, and could not, with such motives, have been other than we are; that had circumstances been different we should have developed differently, it might have been better, or it might have been worse. . . . This view of man overlooks the element of individuality, or makes individuality itself an accident."¹ But he then proceeds to make a statement which militates against our principle of creative individualization: "If all that before our birth contributed to make us what we are; if pre-natal as well as post-natal influences are to be reckoned as circumstance,—then it is unquestionably true, or rather, it is an identical proposition, that circumstances make the man; for then circumstances are the man."²

It seems impossible to take this otherwise

¹ *Atheism in Philosophy*, p. 378.

² *Ibid.*, p. 379.

than atheistically. "By circumstance I understand external surrounding," is the author's definition. Pre-natal circumstances, then, would mean those conditions which go to make up the heredity of a person, and this is the same as to say that his personality is his heredity, and that his heredity is his individuality. Now, if this were true, the man would be, not self-created indeed, but man-created,—that is, created by parents and ancestors. But if one man cannot be self-created, one's ancestor cannot be self-created; and if ancestors and parents have not in them the source of life, they cannot create other men; they can be only agencies of creation. Moreover, if the whole man were essentially what his heredity was, what would become of the world plan? And how could children rise above parents, a David above a Jesse, a John above a Zebedee?

Not only is it irrational thus, with Dr. Hedge, to make finite men do the work, unaided, of infinite energy, but it wholly excludes the thought of a Divine authorship of individual and collective humanity. It limits the Holy One of Israel, and the limited god is mythological. If it is a part of infinite wisdom to make men, who must

be recipients of life, also mediums of the transmission of life, it is a mistake in the medium to say, "I create."

It is what is created from above which first receives the heredity as it afterwards receives the education, bearing both wisely or unwisely. The man is more than the stream of his thought, and he is more than its bed, yea, more than both; for he is the owner of both, the user of both, at once a master and a steward.

When a man begins to discern his peculiar gift and to develop it for the sake of making his life "tell" to the fullest extent, when he goes on chastening and perfecting himself as a wise son uses the portion of goods that falleth to him, he is filling his place in the mighty aggregate of humanity. Acknowledging that he cannot make himself another man, but must remain in his special quality and capacity what he was designed to be, making himself, as Bacon said, "a debtor to his profession," he does not exalt his own interest to the disregard of others' interests and rights, but does his work and exercises his gifts in the way which Kant admirably declared in his categorical imperative of duty: "Act as if the maxims of thy action were to become through thy

will a universal law of nature." And, since Professor Knight has been criticised here, let him be heard from in a wise word on this point: "Let your whole nature expand to the very uttermost of which it is capable, in every possible direction, that it may grow into a perfect structure, compacted by that which every joint supplieth."¹

The ethical effect of *this* doctrine is indeed "immense." It appoints duty, it enforces duty, it glorifies duty. "What have I to do?" one asks; and the answer is ready, "What you can do." And herein is individuality vindicated, for there is neither comfort nor value in the possession of a special gift, or of anything which is peculiarly one's own, unless there be a demand for the exercise of that gift, a place for one's peculiar form of usefulness.

This thought is illustrated upon a day's journey, especially among communities not so large that the individual seems lost in the mass, nor so small that there is little room for combination of activities. In a town one sees a few thousand persons exercising the arts required for the general welfare. In ways which need no

¹ "The Summum Bonum," p. 255.

enumeration all are busy. There may be some idle on account of wealth, and some on account of poverty; but, between the home of luxury and the poor-farm, the average life of the community occupies itself. It does not matter that several may pursue one calling, for of a dozen physicians, each one has so far his own preferences as to treatment of disease that all worthy ones have work, and that no two do the like work. It is so with those who might seem most bound to sameness of task,—the agriculturists. As to them it is enough to say that no two farms are alike, and no two men alike, and that individuality is even more noticeable in the farmer than in the inhabitant of the city. Passing on his way, the traveller reaches another community likewise furnished with its people of various capacities; and so he may go on and on, round the world. No two communities, however, are precisely alike; no two states, no two nations. The cosmos is a unit composed of myriads of lesser units, as the body has its multitude of parts; and the rational unit is a human selfhood, a person. What each one can do is, therefore, what each one ought to do. Selfishness raising the demands of the individual above

those of the community may sadly mar this system of order, but unselfishness can restore it, and, so far as it is found, it mirrors in its unspotted surface the plan of the universe, the cosmic unity in variety.

“Not chaos-like together crushed and bruised,
But as the world, harmoniously confused,
Where order in variety we see,
And where, though all things differ, all agree.”¹

So wrote Pope most wisely. And others have sung the same strain, as when Shakespeare applies the thought to government, by making Henry V. say,—

“For government, though high, and low, and lower,
Put into parts, doth keep in one consent;
Congreeing in a full and natural close,
Like music.”²

A brief comparison between the ethical value of this view of a recipient personality, part of a universal unity, and the ethical value of the view now known as reincarnation, shows at once the difference to be so great that what Professor

¹ Windsor Forest.

² Act I., Scene 2.

Knight calls the "immense" value of the latter dwindles to nothing, and it is seen to be only self-seeking. That theory is wounded in the house of its friends. The misanthropic Schopenhauer should not have been permitted to praise it as the remedy for the fear of death, for the weariness of memory, and for the tædium of "life-dreams until the will abolishes or abrogates itself."¹ Even Professor Knight talks of its "horizon of hope," a purely selfish consideration. This is Epicurean, this looks to Nirvana. "Ethical leverage" must use the strength of altruism. It has long been with many the reproach of the Christian pulpit that it stimulates self-love, proclaims future reward for righteousness, and appeals to the sinful to avoid future misery. In his essay on "Ethical Systems," Dr. Hedge points out this defect in Paley's "Moral Philosophy," once a standard text. In this appeal to selfishness, the pulpit has uttered a false gospel and denied its Christ, of whose unselfish love it was truly said, "He saved others, Himself he cannot save."² A good shepherd,

¹ The World as Will and Idea; chapter on Death.

² Matt. xxvii. 42.

laying down his life for the sheep, rather than a hireling, whose own the sheep are not, is the model Christian. And life lays itself down for its friends when it pursues its daily round in acknowledgment of its obligation to make return for benefits had, and to serve the world with all it hath, even all its living.

Schopenhauer, pessimistic reincarnationist, felt no "ethical leverage" as he sank lower and lower in despair. The "ethical leverage" of the theistic view may be studied in the martyrs from Stephen down, in every humble and faithful worker, in every pure patriot living or dying, in all such as, with the spirit of Abou Ben Adhem, climb "the great world's altar-stairs."

In this altruism is no concealed selfishness of the baser kind. The self has consecrated itself. The personality regards itself as a sacred trust. It asks not, "What shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" going away grieved when the answer calls for self-sacrifice;¹ it bears its cross silently; in its underserved suffering it commands its friends, "Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and your children;"² it makes no

¹ Mark x. 22.

² Luke xxiii. 28.

excuses when called to give account of its stewardship, but is ready to answer with truth, "Thou deliveredst unto me five talents: lo, I have gained other five talents;"¹ it has no reluctance to confess, "Thine eyes did see mine imperfect substance, and in thy book were all my members written, which day by day were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them."²

The self, in this view, beholds as its ideal the greatest possible excellence of serviceableness, or more correctly the effort to approach that, and it rejoices in the discipline necessary to its training for the largest, because the most devoted, usefulness in its own task, its own loved office among the uses of this life, and its preparation thereby for a higher usefulness in another life of immaterial conditions.

More wisely than he knew spake Polonius when he said,—

"This above all,—to thine own self be true;
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."³

¹ Matt. xxv. 20.

² Psalm cxxxix. 16.

³ Hamlet, Act I., Scene 3.

CHAPTER V.

MAN REACTIVE.

IF the self be a created and not an uncreated thing, if, being created, it is and must forever be a recipient or perish; if the fact of this recipient nature be regarded as sufficiently shown from reason and experience, and if the personality be regarded as the peculiar form of receptivity which each one possesses, which gives form to his own life, and which gives to him his own place in the great body of humanity, the question will arise, Is this reception active or passive? This is to ask whether the self in man is a mere conduit or not, a passive receptacle or an active agency.

That man is or ought to be passive has been a favorite view with many of widely different origins. Nirvana is not regarded in precisely the same way by all, but it means to present as the goal of the soul a state that is passive. Sir

Edwin Arnold is surely an authority on the subject, and he has said,—

“If he shall day by day dwell merciful,
Holy and just and kind and true; and rend
Desire from where it clings with bleeding roots,
Till love of life have end :

“Never shall yearnings torture him, nor sins
Stain him, nor ache of earthly joys and woes
Invade his safe eternal peace; nor deaths
And lives recur. He goes

“Unto Nirvana. He is one with Life,
Yet lives not. He is blest, ceasing to be.
Om, mani padme, om ! the dewdrop slips
Into the shining sea.”¹

Here the passivity is not present but to come. The restlessness of man is to attain it by hard striving. But the implication is that the best state of the self is its passive one,—“sinless, stirless rest.”

Similarly the Christian quietist contemplates and cultivates passivity as the supreme end. Molinos, in his “Spiritual Guide,” makes a similar utterance: “By the way of nothing thou

¹ Light of Asia.

must come to lose thyself in God (which is the last degree of perfection), and happy will thou be if thou canst so lose thyself. In this same shop of nothing, simplicity is made, interior and infused recollection is possessed, quiet is obtained, and the heart is cleansed from all imperfection.”¹ Such expressions caused the sympathetic Vaughn, in his “Hours with the Mystics,” to speak of the “holy indifference” of quietism.

Schopenhauer is far removed from Molinos and Fénelon, but his tendency to seek for a Nirvana in which the will would cease from troubling has been shown above.

Spinoza in a very different way came even more openly to the conclusion that man, the wise man, is passive: “He is scarcely moved in mind; but, being conscious of himself, of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but is always possessed of true satisfaction of mind.”²

But these and similar opinions only point out by contrast the true view. Man is not passive and never will be passive. His energies demand

¹ English edition, 1699, p. 157.

² Ethics, Part V., Prop. XLII., Scholium.

exercise, and his development in any rational way does not diminish but increases his energy, concentrating it on some one function to which all his powers minister, and in the performance of which he contributes his best gift to the welfare of the whole. It is unnecessary to offer arguments for the necessity and consequent nobility of work. Without exercise the mind and body wither. Lethargy, whether in Nirvana or out of it, is as destructive as it is abnormal and unworthy. "The gods sell everything for toil," said Epicharmus, and Socrates quoted it to Aristippus, who had attempted to defend an idle life.¹

There is no true conception of human life which overlooks or depreciates its capacities. The will which Schopenhauer would have abrogated must be a diseased will, wanting purification. If the will to live be or become the will to serve, it is not to be compared for value with an ignoble and self-contented sloth. The "holy indifference" of the quietist can be called such only in the degree that self-interest is subordinated to a broader interest in the welfare of the

¹ Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, II. 1.

race. All talk of self-extinction is miserable, because selfish, unless it means the overcoming of that in a man which limits his serviceableness.

If it be granted that the self is active rather than passive, that its recipiency is not that of a mere sponge or a mere conduit, the question then arises, Is its activity self-originated or reactive? This is involved in what has been said already as to the created self. If now independently active, the soul can be conceived of as having always been so. If self-propelled thus far, then now it needs no aid from without. And the reverse follows if the opposite view be taken of its nature. Reasons have been given for holding that man is a created and receptive being.

Receptivity, if at all active, implies, in the degree of its activity, a constant reaction. The mind's agency is a reagency. It is to be regretted that the words "react" and "reagent" have only a scientific use, but the fact that they are almost entirely restricted to physics is highly significant. It has not been seen that man and nature are in correspondence, and so far nature is better understood than man.

The tree is a recipient of all that it can obtain

by leaf and root, and, reacting upon the life so received, it brings forth fruit stored with the sunlight and the moisture formed by it into the olive or the apple, which contain the seed or germinal cell of a new tree. Sundered from these sources of life the tree would speedily perish. Receiving the contributed life without reactive operation the tree would have no seed in itself and would hopelessly cumber the ground. By its reaction upon the action which it receives the tree is a tree of life. The bird is not self-created, but likewise depends upon life which is given to it and upon which it must react in co-operative activity by all the means in its power, building a nest, rearing young, finding food, flying hither and thither as climate requires. Refusing to do its part as a reagent the bird would die. Doing its little part with instinctive faithfulness, it is "the herald of the morn."

Is not this true, upon a grander scale, of man? Not self-caused, nor self-perpetuated, like all else that is created, he receives his life and receives it as a reagent. "Freely ye have received, freely give."¹ Hamilton has well said, "Life is energy,

¹ Matt. x. 8.

and conscious energy is conscious life.”¹ Now all that is received by mind and body must be energized by the mind or body and sent forth in activity, or there is no life in us.

The body is certainly reactive. “The vital agencies are at work incessantly all over the system, as if it were a busy laboratory, in building up the tissues, in converting elements into immediate principles [reckoned as eighty-four], and in separating and casting out of the body the superfluous and deleterious materials.”² “The food in the stomach is rolled in a spiral course, is mingled and worked over with the acid gastric fluid whose function it is to set the purer parts of the food free and to separate them from the gross and worthless.”³

If the mind be not fed, if there be no mental assimilation in it, it is different from all other created things. But since it has been found to be dependent upon life received and made its own, its activity is, like that of the body and all Nature, reactive.

¹ Metaphysics, Lecture XLII.

² Hitchcock's Anatomy and Physiology, n. 789.

³ Worcester's Physiological Correspondences, p. 45.

The empirical evidence of this doctrine is as perfect as possible. The infant, so far as it begins to manifest a thought, is found to be giving to the life which it receives a form, an utterance, which is its own. The child, as it uses its faculties to question why this is done and why that, is forming its own opinions, and developing, in reaction upon the information and all formative influences received, its own character. The adult, engrossed perhaps in business, sleeps and wakes, indifferent to questions of his origin or relations, but nevertheless every act is but the result of some life received, reacted upon in his mind, and sent forth again by voice and hand. The most strongly individual men are those in whom the reactive force is greatest, so that they give forth opinions or perform their acts with peculiar emphasis and with marked effect upon others. The more reaction a man has, the stronger man he is; the more nearly one approaches to the condition of a mere conduit, a mere transmitter of opinion, a mere tool of another, the weaker he is.

The movement from the savage state to the civilized is in the direction of the development of individuality, that is, of reactive ability. The

perfection of modes of education looks in the same direction, and does not attempt to fill the memory and merely enable one to answer the questions of others, but aims to expedite development, to sharpen the faculties, and to produce noble men and women. Sir W. Hamilton, in his address on "Academic Honors," rightly defined the object of instruction as "determination of the student to self-activity," and what is self-activity but the putting forth of one's powers by energetic reactive exercise?

Professor Newman, in his "Theism," describes the case: "This energy of life within is ours, yet it is not we. It is in us, it belongs to us, yet we cannot control it. It acts without bidding even when we do not think of it. Nor will it cease its acting at our command, or otherwise obey us. . . . But while it recalls from evil, and reproaches us for evil, and is not silenced by our effort, surely it is not *we*. It pervades mankind, as one life pervades the trees."¹

¹ Edition 1874, p. 9.

CHAPTER VI.

MAN A FREE AGENT.

It is in the acknowledgment of man's true place in the creation as a recipient but not a mere conduit, an agent but not a tool, a reagent and not absolute inactivity, that his freedom of agency is vindicated from all objection.

It may be conceded at once that he is not as free as if he were not in a world which has its laws, and that he is restrained by his understanding of law and of the penalty which its infringement brings, and thus that he is free, not as a lawless tyrant, but within the limits which belong to a rational, created, recipient, reactive being. He is not free to make himself another. He is not free to render himself absolutely independent of the source of life. He is not free to cease to be a reagent. But, with "the portion of goods that falleth to him," he is free to go and expend it as he will, and free to return; free to dwell in a far country of ways foreign to his

best good, or to abide in peace with his Father ; free, when affected by a seductive impulse, to refuse to heed it, or free to obey the siren's voice ; free to decide what occupation he will pursue, and free to pursue it in accordance with what he finds to be his capacity, or in defiance of lessons which tell him that he is out of place ; free to be a wise man, or to be an unwise man.

It is somewhat common to deny freedom on the ground that, when two roads are before a man and he weighs the reasons for taking this or that, he is impelled by the circumstances of the case and makes no free choice. But the fact is that he is just as free to ignore as to be influenced by the circumstances, to remain still as to take either road. A lion being in one path and a lamb in the other leaves him perfectly free to go the way of the lion, if he will. "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?"¹ sounded as if the young man, when informed, must go in the way pointed out ; but no, he turned his back upon it. "What must I do to be healed?" one asks a physician, and he seems to have no free-

¹ Mark x. 17.

dom in the matter, but he can take the remedy or neglect it, as he will.

There is no freedom with Spinoza, there is none with Edwards, and there is none with materialistic determinism, but in all these and similar views there is neglect of the empiric evidence of freedom. Even Spinoza finds the unwise man using as much "imagination" as he pleases in doing his own thinking; even Edwards seems to have given man liberty to sin; and modern materialism, with all its extreme exaltation of heredity and environment, has not made out its case that man is a slave to impulse and that his acts are the mere reflex of his sensations.

It would not seem to be necessary to plead against a form of religious enthusiasm like Spinoza's or Edwards's, which would make God to have defeated His own end and to have produced a race whose humanity was only a name for machinery, and this can be considered later when the relation of the self to its Maker is treated of; but the objection to free agency on account of controlling circumstances and inheritances requires a brief comment; for Professor Huxley states a fact when he says, "The prog-

ress of science in all ages has meant the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.”¹

Hume illustrated this tendency when, in treating of liberty and necessity, he pointed out that all movements in nature are necessary: “Every object is determined by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion, and can no more depart from that line in which it moves than it can convert itself into an angel or spirit or any superior substance. The actions, therefore, of matter are to be regarded as instances of necessary actions; and whatever is in this respect on the same footing with matter must be acknowledged to be necessary. That we may know whether this be the case with the actions of the mind, we shall begin with examining matter.”²

Unfortunately for the value of his argument, he not only begins with examining matter, but ends there; thus: the bodily difference between

¹ Lay Sermons : New York Edition, 1871, p. 142.

² Human Nature, Oxford, 1888, p. 400.

the sexes is the same as that of their minds, with bodily decline in old age goes mental decline, with the hard hands of the laborer goes a corresponding quality of mind, with climates racial traits agree; and this correspondence is so noticeable that it marks a law. Madmen have no liberty because they act as moved; nor have others because they too act as moved. But men dislike to confess that they are under necessity to act as they do, and they do indeed feel a false sensation of indifference or liberty of choice, and their religion, "which has been very unnecessarily interested in this question," persuades them that they are free. But every act, continued Hume, has its cause both with God and men, and there is no liberty. "Upon a review of these reasonings I cannot doubt of an entire victory."¹ Later on in the essay he said, "As to free-will we have shown that it has no place with regard to the actions no more than the qualities of men. It is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free. Our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in one than in the other."²

¹ Human Nature, p. 422.

² Ibid., p. 609.

This view is consistent with itself, but it is not consistent with the facts. It must be admitted that the sexes have physical marks, but this is not to admit those marks to be the cause of the difference between men and women; for the woman, though her frame be weaker and her skin softer, is as brave and makes as unyielding a martyr as the man. It must be admitted that bodily decline is often accompanied with mental weakness; but in the extreme weakness of illness the mind is often strong and the will imperative, and in old age there is often discernible a youthfulness and innocence which are exactly the reverse of what a shrunken and marred body would lead us to expect. It must be admitted that hard hands and a certain stupidity are often found together; but, so far are the hands from producing this state of the mind that Tolstoï is by no means a singular instance of hard hands and tender sensibilities; indeed, every community furnishes its learned blacksmith or its studious apprentice. There is reason to think that the hand of the college oarsman is harder than that of the mechanic, and that the soft hand of the effeminate student is not a sign of intellectual superiority. It must be admitted

that in warm climates the natives are more excitable than those of colder regions; but this correspondence of man with nature is carried too far when it makes the climate determine the character, as may be seen with the Africans who, transported to America, make no change of character except through self-determined and persevering effort.

That madmen have no liberty is a dangerous argument for Hume, since their very capriciousness in many cases defies all attempt to ascertain physical causes of their moods. They are more free than the sane, seeing that they recognize no bonds of moral and civil law.

As for Hume's suggestions that liberty is a wilful self-deception from pride of autocracy, or a deception imposed by some other from kindness, or a religious delusion, it is enough to say that vilification is not argument, and that men are neither so vain nor so fallible as they are here represented to be in order to sweep away common sense arising from consciousness and observation. Hume felt that his assault had been successful, but his "entire victory" was spoiled by his own performances rather than by those of his unperturbed foe; for note some of

the expressions which he saw fit to use in his "advertisement," in which he was guilty of mentioning "my design"—"the subjects I have here planned out to myself"—"I was willing to take advantage of this natural division in order to try the taste of the public"—"if I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed"—"the approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labors, but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction." And these phrases, full of liberty in Hume and in the public, from the one who rejected the idea! As with the woman, of whom Valerius Maximus tells, who appealed from Philip drunk to Philip sober, so here an appeal needs only to be taken from Hume speculating to Hume advertising.

Wundt disposes of this cavil against liberty of will when he says, "When we say that the character of a man is a product of light and air, of education and circumstances, of food and climate, that it is necessarily determined, as every natural phenomenon, by these influences, we draw an entirely undemonstrable conclusion."¹

¹ Grundzüge, II., p. 396.

Schopenhauer, naming his treatise "Freedom of the Will," but meaning the opposite, has said, "Man never does but what he wills, nevertheless he always acts necessarily. While we act we are at the same time acted upon."¹ To this Wundt also answers.

This tendency, strongly augmented by Hume, to consider the mind in the light of physical research alone, has been brought to maturity by many modern scientists famous for their achievements as such, but less successful as metaphysicians than as physiologists. Thus, Herbert Spencer has said, "That every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is negatived as much by the internal perceptions of every one as by the contents of the preceding chapters."²

What perceptions are meant here will be apparent in a moment. They are not direct perceptions of a character to be compared with those of conscious freedom of the will, but they are physical, and imply to Spencer determinism.

¹ *Freiheit*, p. 44.

² *Principles of Psychology*, sect. 207.

He says again, after showing the correlation of physical forces and effects, "The forces which we distinguish as mental come within the same generalization. There is no alternative but to make this assertion, the facts which justify it or rather which necessitate it being abundant and conspicuous. . . . Besides the correlation and equivalence between external physical forces and the mental forces generated in us under the form of sensations, there is a correlation and equivalence between sensations and those physical forces which, in the shape of bodily actions, result from them."¹

This bowing out of the freedom of the will is joined with remarks upon the heart beating quickly under excitement, the teeth grinding together in pain, the muscles tightening for energetic action, the circulation of the blood in the brain in connection with mental activity, the effects of stimulants, and other "proofs," as Mr. Spencer calls them. But do they prove more than the corresponding conditions of the organs employed? Looking upon these and similar phenomena, does the observer know what is

¹ First Principles, Part II., chap. vii., sect. 71.

taking place in the mind of the subject? The observer sees that the man is in pain; can he predict what the man will do? If these causes have their precisely correlative effects, the man suffers according to his injury; but do two men, under the same degree of pain, act alike? May not one, while the pain lasts, rail on the Christ, while his crucified companion rebukes him and uses a wholly different tone? One is reminded of Dryden's lines,—

“A man so various that he seemed to be,
Not one, but all mankind's epitome;
Stiff in opinions, always in the wrong;
Was everything by starts, but nothing long;
But, in the course of one revolving moon,
Was chemist, fiddler, statesman, and buffoon.”¹

In defending the freedom of the ego in the volume already referred to, Professor Momerie quotes as an authority Bain's “Emotions and Will,” and answers the arguments of this necessitarian with those of Carpenter's “Human Physiology,” and adds what R. S. Wyld has said in his “Physics and Philosophy of the Senses:” “Cerebral actions are the symbols of thought, but they are no more thought itself

¹ Absalom and Ahithophel, Part I., line 545.

than the sentences of a book. We must assume the presence of an intelligent principle to interpret the symbols, or we cannot conceive thought to exist. Though the brain may follow a certain involuntary course of action, and may suggest to the mind a train of thought, we know that the mind has the power of controlling the cerebral action. We can interrupt one chain of thought and start another, and out of a variety of thoughts we can reject those that are the most pressing." "In other words," concludes Momerie, after an exceedingly instructive discussion, "the ego is not merely passively acted on by the brain, but is also capable of voluntary self-originated action."¹

As the exclusion of free agency by Spinoza is due to an exaggeration of the superior influence, so that of the scientists is due to an exaggeration of the inferior influence. Between the two influences, both of which are here acknowledged, a balance exists, and man's choices are actual and not seeming. The youth considering various ways of life among which he must choose, Cæsar upon the bank of the Rubicon, every man not

¹ Page 100.

a willing slave to habit, is an example of free agency. Each side of the scale is examined, while, by a power not the man's, the beam remains level, and then, when the weight of his decision is joined to either side, the beam inclines. To go or stay, "to serve God or mammon," these are the decisions which men can make, and which men must make, or they ignobly surrender to some enslaving passion and sell their birthright. Personal liberty is the universal demand, but what is that worth unless it be the correlative of mental liberty, of free agency?

The moral value of the doctrine of free agency has, of course, always been recognized. Men, regarded as the creatures of circumstance, are irresponsible. Men necessitated from any cause, outward or inward, can have no account to render. The unfaithful servant in the parable, bringing back the unused talent, pleaded that he was under necessity to let it rust, for his master was so unreasonable and implacable that the servant was forced to remain inactive, and he thus represented the large class of people who do nothing but grumble over their situation; but the just answer was and is that the imaginary severity of master or environment cannot be

pleaded as an excuse, since there is still left abundant opportunity to turn the talent to account.

This is the ground taken by Kant in the "*Metaphysic of Morality*," namely, that "the will is the causality of living beings so far as they are rational," and "that freedom is that causality not determined to action by any cause other than itself," and that "freedom is a property of all rational beings," and that "a true conception of morality is reduced to the idea of freedom," and that "the idea of freedom explains the possibility of categorical imperatives;"¹ but this owes much to Aristotle's treatment of the freedom of the will in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the third book of which concerns itself with that subject, not refraining from difficult practical questions: "Praise and blame accompany voluntary acts; pardon and pity, involuntary. Violence, being external, adds nothing of benefit to him who acts or to him who suffers. Choice is accompanied by reason. . . . Choice is a desire for or tendency to what is in our power, accompanied by consultation. The acts pertaining to an end

¹ Watson's *Selections*, sect. 3, pp. 250-255.

must be voluntary and of deliberate choice. . . . In a bad as well as in a good man, there is a power to act from himself. . . . The temperate man acts conformably to right reason. . . . That part of the soul which energizes according to desire should live conformably to reason.”¹

“Fatalism and atheism,” said Hamilton, “are convertible terms;”² and here is a profound fact which needs at the present only to be stated, namely, that a belief in God is so far from taking away the freedom of man that it alone opens the way for a clear conception of that freedom, a freedom which he is too weak to provide for himself, but which he constantly receives from the providence of the Omnipotent.

It may be well here to pause a moment upon the difficult problem of reconciling freedom, especially freedom to do wrong and to inflict misery, with the goodness of God or even with His government. Perhaps the difficulty, which so many writers among the Scholastics have struggled with, and which has led to such noble but fruitless efforts as Leibnitz’s *Theodicy*, lies

¹ Nic. Eth., Book III.

² *Metaphysics*, p. 556.

in the original misconception of creation. It is assumed that God had many possible worlds in view, and for inscrutable reasons found the one we have, sin and suffering included, to be the best, and so, by a kind of necessity, made it for better or worse, and thus that His plan can only be regarded with a resigned and apologetic spirit which represses question and refuses to doubt His goodness. This is certainly a very crude idea of the Divine. How much more rational it is to regard the world as the natural outcome of the love and wisdom and power of God, a form of Divine order produced by Him for the sake of His children and embodying His purposes. If there were another God, there would be another world, but with our God—and no other can be thought without accepting some inferior conception of Him—comes our world. He is not the mere chooser of it, He is the soul of it in an unpantheistic sense. He made everything by sending forth His creative energy forming its receptacles and filling them with creatures, and the world was good as its Source was goodness itself.

How then with evil? It is not a foreign creation introduced by necessity or mistake. It is

man's free perversion of the good things. The love of self, for example, is surely good in its own place; but, made supreme, it renders man selfish. The love which would have protected his body now becomes his dominant motive. He bows down to that as an idol which otherwise would have been an innocent thing. The calf was good in itself, but, named Jehovah, it was a means of injury and sin to those at Sinai.

This old difficulty was pressed to its extreme form when the question was raised, Is not the Divine redemption itself indebted to evil for its opportunity and so made subservient to disorder? The answer to this is that the redemption was the Divine care of men taking that form which their perverseness required, but which, in its essential motive, was, as always, the Divine providence. While the law was in their hearts, God was manifest; while angelic messengers sufficed, God thereby was manifest; but, when only this mode would suffice, God made His love and wisdom manifest in the Christ and perfectly delivered men from the accumulated power of evil so far as they would freely receive the aid. In redemption, as in creation, God was the loving parent, free in Himself and loving the freedom of others.

CHAPTER VII.

MAN'S INHERITANCE.

It might seem at first sight highly important to postulate for man absolute freedom from hereditary influence, and to insist that every one is in no sense dependent upon nor influenced by his predecessors. The appearance is that, if the least hereditary factor be admitted into the account, the individuality is so biased as to lose its freedom. To assent to the ordinary claim made in the name of heredity is apparently to surrender human freedom, making the ancestor the master. But let the questions first be answered, Must the claim of heredity to be a law of life be allowed? And is it the case that every man has an inheritance which is a factor in his individuality?

The answer Yes must be given at once. There is not a shadow of doubt about the fact of human heredity, nor about all other forms of it. Parentage means transmission of characteristics of race, family, and individual. They are not always

conspicuous in the descendant, but they are sufficiently evident to place the theory among the laws of nature. The accumulation of examples is enormous and need not be gone into. In his book on the subject Ribot¹ has traced the transmission of instincts, sensorial qualities, memory, imagination, intellect, passion, will, national character, and disease. Under all these heads, drawing upon the facts collected by Galton, Lucas, Darwin, Montaigne, Morel, Despine, and others, he has shown that the reception of life through a parent brings with it for good or evil an inheritance which may seem overwhelming in its influence upon the will.

There should be no disposition to ignore or undervalue heredity. It is an indispensable provision for preserving the symmetry of the human race and of all life. Without it the races would lose their distinctive qualities and mankind would be but a chaos, not a harmony of varieties, not a unit. Without the operation of this law, there could be no improvement of domestic animals by careful breeding. Without it the farmer would not know what seed to plant. Without

¹ Heredity: English edition, by D. Appleton & Co., 1875.

it the order of the universe, in every form in which science observes it, would be at an end. It is, therefore, not only impossible to deny the fact of heredity, it would also be irrational to do it. Does it then take away from man his free agency, and so make the liberty of self a sham and not a reality?

As, in the consideration of freedom in the preceding chapter, it was found that the negative side had been taken by two widely different parties, the religious enthusiasts and the materialists, so here we have two kinds of negative reply to the question, Does heredity leave a man free?

The answer of that theology commonly called Calvinistic (but it is older than Calvin) has been that man received from the earliest pair a tendency to evil which he could not counteract. This was to deny freedom in the name of heredity under cover of religion. To this Calvin added the dogma, derived through his legal training from Tertullian and the Roman Law, that some were "elected," or involuntarily freed from the controlling influence of heredity which otherwise made them of the reprobated class. But this was only to make men more fully slaves, since it took away from the elect the power to

fall and from the reprobates the power to rise. A general doom to evil still left room for descent, but this took away from the elect even that liberty. Here Calvin was not the first. Five hundred years before him the Angelical Doctor had said, "Many who now are living well are reprobates, and many who now are evil-doers are elect."¹ Du Moulin, Professor of History at Oxford, published in 1680 a little book² in which he reached the conclusion: "That there is a million of reprobates to one that shall be chosen so as to be saved;" by which he seems to mean that the vast majority had no freedom in matters of eternal interest, and that the little minority, "chosen so as to be saved," of course had not.

Calvin, however, was the chief assailant of human freedom in the name of original sin: "Grace snatches a few from the curse and wrath of God and from eternal death, who would otherwise perish; but leaves the world to the ruin to which it has been ordained."³

¹ Commentary on 2 Peter i. 10.

² Moral Reflections, etc., London, 1680.

³ Commentary on John xvii. 9.

“I ask, how has it come to pass that the fall of Adam has involved so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, and this without remedy, but because such was the will of God? It is a dreadful decree, I confess.”¹ Many expressions of a like nature in creeds and discourses may be found gathered with the industry of theological controversy in the “Doom of the Majority,”² by Rev. S. J. Barrows.

This view of the effect of heredity resulted from a confusion of evil with sin, an inexplicable mistake unless the writers of that day are supposed to have been so hard-hearted that they cared to look for no escape from their grim doctrine. It was seen that evil was transmitted, that lawlessness and passion showed their traces in the third and fourth generation, and this transmission was mistaken for a transmission of sin and guilt. “In Adam’s fall we sinned all,” was the word constantly spoken, but never questioned. The least examination would have annihilated the doctrine of hereditary guilt.

Understanding by hereditary evil the trans-

¹ Institutes, Book III. 23, 7.

² American Unitarian Association, Boston, 1883.

mitted tendency to repeat the sins of the parent, the disarrangement of the nature, an ill condition, there is no room to doubt the fact of such inheritance. The facts with regard to transmitted criminal tendencies are overwhelming; and, if no such facts had been collected, it would be easy to conclude *à priori* that all tendencies, good or evil, are transmitted. But, just as surely, sin and guilt cannot be transmitted. The infant is innocent, and cannot be otherwise, except he be regarded as a specimen of metempsychosis. Guilt cannot be transmitted. The inclusion of children in the punishment of parents under Greek, Roman, and later law has been seen since Calvin's day to be utterly unjustifiable, and the Constitution of the United States therefore prohibits it. The very Scriptures on which the Genevan commented would have taught him: "What mean ye, that ye use this proverb, . . . The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, saith the Lord God, . . . all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth, it shall die. . . . The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity

of the son. . . . Wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye.”¹

When this distinction has been made, the fact remains that a righteous parent transmits helpful tendencies to the child, and an unrighteous parent unhelpful tendencies. What is the power of those tendencies to control the life? is the question; and this may be considered in connection with materialistic fatalism held in the name of heredity.

There are three views which make heredity fatal to the freedom of the will. The first is that God dooms many and elects a few in spite of themselves, thereby leaving men no more free than Spinoza leaves them. Of untheological views one holds that the inherited mental qualities control the life, and the other lays stress on the physical transmitted peculiarities as controlling the mind and so the life.

The first view has been considered. The second view is nearly the same except as it may be held by an atheist. If so held, it must be met by an *à priori* appeal to man's essential need of free agency if he be man, and by an *à posteriori*

¹ Ezekiel xviii. 2, 3, 4, 20, 32.

appeal to experience and observation. Both have been already dwelt upon. It is sufficient to say that a man's sense of freedom, which is not the easy self-deception which Hume described, has the same ability to disregard inherited tendencies that it has to disregard circumstances.

Suppose one of a passionate race. He looks with envy on others who have inherited no such temper. Does he perceive himself to be borne along irresistibly by his nature, so that it is absolutely impossible for him to pause before he strikes? If he has given way already to this tendency till a habit of passionate utterance and action has been formed, does he find it impossible to change his course? Perhaps as good an answer as any is the increasing conviction in the world that bad men can be reformed, that prisons are not to be conducted in a hopeless, fatalistic spirit, and that the Howards and Elizabeth Frys and Whitefields were justified in their undertakings. As one reads the statistics of crime in certain families, and sees the fearful effects of heredity, let him ask himself, Were these necessary effects? and he will find himself answering, No, if he has had experience with criminals and

has seen the successful efforts of some to reform. Alcoholism is a terrible source of hereditary depravity, but instances are many of its worst effects being overcome.

Physiological fatalism is the most difficult of all forms of determinism to meet, because its claims are so arrogant. Here the aid of Ribot is valuable: "Suppose it to be proved," he says, "that all modes of psychical activity are transmissible; is the aggregate of these modes the whole sentient and conscious being? We often hear of hereditary talents, vices, and virtues; but whoever will critically examine the evidence will find that we have no proof of their existence. The way in which they are commonly proved is in the highest degree illogical; the usual way being for writers to collect instances of some mental peculiarity found in a parent and in his child, and then to infer that the peculiarity was bequeathed. By this mode of reasoning we might demonstrate any proposition."¹

This is a severe arraignment of the inductive method and goes near to being unjust. It may be granted that much evidence for fatalistic

¹ Heredity, pp. 140, 141.

heredity has been gathered in the way of statistics, but it can justly be urged that statistics of reformation of the character have been left out of the account. Again, Ribot says, with greater force, "By free-will we are ourselves; by heredity [viewed as controlling] we are others." But it must be confessed that he closes with the admission: "This supreme antithesis between free-will and mechanism is insolvable to us."¹ He has only a hope that the solution will sacrifice neither the one nor the other.

Neither will be sacrificed. Man will come to say to himself, "I perceive my tendencies, and I learn that they are hereditary; what shall I do? Shall I go down the inclined plane of self-surrender, choosing always to do that which requires the least exercise of will? Or shall I resist my tendencies, set myself another goal, and, taking command of myself and my powers, say with the centurion to this one, Go; to another, Come; and to a third, Do this?"² Tendencies so ruled will become servants, and he in his noble purpose will be king, ruling his own spirit. As Goethe said, "I will be lord over

¹ Page 392.

² Luke vii. 8.

myself. No one who cannot master himself is worthy to rule, and only he can rule.”¹ But long before him Seneca had declared that no man is free who is a slave to the flesh. And long before him Solomon had said, “He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty, and he that ruleth his own spirit than he that taketh a city.”²

It may be well to refer again to the fact that, while the physiologist observes from without the movement of the system in reflex action, the man within looks upon the sensations only as suggestions, and is not controlled by them.

It may also be pointed out that governments must recognize as factors the hereditary traits of the people to be governed, but must not regard these traits as absolutely controlling the people, for there can be no reward of righteousness and punishment of guilt unless the individual be regarded as free, and so as responsible for his acts; nor can laws be made with any hope of their beneficial influence unless the people regard the law-makers, and the law-makers the people, as free agents.

¹ Lewes's Life, Book V.

² Prov. xvi. 32.

In parental government the child's inherited tendencies must be viewed with full recognition of their strength, but the child's ability to resist temptations from within and from without must not only be recognized but pointed out, so that he may gradually learn to rule his own spirit.

The heritage is not the man, and the influence of inherited quality is not the man's master, if he determine to call no man master upon earth. Neither by motive nor by heredity is the man ruled unless he voluntarily accepts by repeated surrenders such a ruler. "Man is his own star," wrote Fletcher again and again in his "Honest Man's Fortune," and Milton repeated it in his lines,—

"The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven."¹

And Tennyson put into the mouth of Enid the words,—

"Turn, Fortune, turn thy wheel with smile or frown;
With that wild wheel we go not up or down;
Our hoard is little, but our hearts are great;
For man is man, and master of his fate."²

¹ *Paradise Lost*, i. 253.

² *Idylls of the King*,—Enid.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE POWERS OF MAN.

THE self is a unit, but it has various powers. As it beholds the operations which are modifications of itself, it distinguishes them into classes and notes their interrelations. "Man's spirit has a self-cognizant existence," says Hegel.¹ That consciousness constantly reveals the self, has been remarked upon. As to the proper classification of the activities which it has and takes note of, there is a difference of opinion.

Sir W. Hamilton remarks, "The distinction taken in the Peripatetic School, by which the mental modifications were divided into Gnostic or Cognitive, and Orectic or Appetent, and the consequent reduction of all the faculties to the *facultas cognoscendi* and the *facultas appetendi*, was the distinction which was long most universally prevalent, though under various but usually less

¹ Philosophy of History, iii. 2.

appropriate denominations. For example, the modern distribution of the mental powers into those of the understanding and those of the will, or into powers speculative and powers active,—these are only very inadequate, and very incorrect, versions of the Peripatetic analysis. But this Aristotelic division of the internal states into the two categories of Cognitions and of Appetences is exclusive of the Feelings. . . . Kant was the philosopher to whom we owe this trilogical classification. But Kant only placed the key-stone of the arch which had been raised by previous philosophers among his countrymen. The phenomena of Feeling had attracted the attention of German psychologists, and had by them been considered as a separate class of mental states.”¹ Hamilton then mentions Sulzer as having done this in 1751, and others later. “It remained, however, for Kant to establish by his authority the trichotomy of the mental powers.”¹ He then gives some account of efforts to restore the dual classification.

Krug² declares against thus dignifying the

¹ *Metaphysics*, Lecture XLI.

² *Grundlage zu einer neuen Theorie der Gefühle*, 1823.

feelings, because they seem to him to look neither inward nor outward, with no “determinate direction”—“in fact directed upon nothing”—“nothing better than a powerless power”—“a wholly inoperative force.” To this Hamilton finds no difficulty in replying that it underestimates the feelings, and he calls attention to them as they come into exercise: “In reading the story of Leonidas and his three hundred at Thermopylæ, what do we experience? Is there nothing in the state of mind, which the narrative occasions, other than such as can be referred either to the cognition or to will and desire? Our faculties of knowledge are called certainly into exercise, for this is indeed a condition of every other state; but is the exultation which we feel at this spectacle of human virtue to be reduced to a state either of cognition or of conation in either form?” Hamilton grows still more ardent, and cites the ballad of “Chevy Chase,” as if it were unmanly to give the feelings less than the highest rank.

Dr. McCosh goes still further back, to the Eleatic School, but he does not modify essentially the account which Hamilton gives of the ancient classification. He adds, “Of a later

date some have felt it necessary to draw distinctions of an important kind between the various powers embraced in the Will, and this led to a threefold division, the Cognitive, the Feelings, and the Will, a classification adopted by Kant and Hamilton. In this division the senses must be included under either the Cognitive or the Feelings, or divided between them. To avoid this awkwardness there is a fourfold distribution, the Senses, the Intellect, the Feelings, and the Will. It should be observed that in this distribution the Conscience or Moral Faculty has no place.”¹ This spreading of the classification leads him to propose a new arrangement of the faculties under the two great heads of the Cognitive and the Motive, the former including Sense-Perception, Consciousness, Memory, Judgment, and Imagination, and the second including Conscience as a motive-power, the Emotions, and the Will.

Thus McCosh returns to what Hamilton calls, when blaming Reid for accepting it, the “vulgar division of the faculties.” Without going more thoroughly into the history of the controversy,

¹ The Cognitive Powers, Introduction, VIII.

and admitting that the threefold division now prevails, let me examine for a moment the apparently firm position of the Hamiltonians. They regard the threefold distinction as self-evident. "I see a picture, I recognize what the object is. This is Cognition or Knowledge. I may experience certain affections in the contemplation,—gratification or dissatisfaction. This is Feeling, of Pleasure and Pain. I may desire to see the picture long, to see it often, to make it my own, and perhaps I may will, resolve, or determine so to do. This is Will and Desire."¹ This intermediate state is the one which is not to be "reduced" to the others, as Hamilton puts it.

The only question is, Does the mind proceed from knowledge immediately to desire, or does it pause—a longer or shorter time, as the case may be—between knowledge and desire? I see the picture in the first place, and I end with a strong desire to possess it; do I pass from sight directly to longing, or do I abide meanwhile in pleasure? Undoubtedly there is a middle ground; which is neither all cognitive, as when I am first looking at the picture and concluding

¹ Hamilton, p. 127.

as to what it represents, nor all appetent, as when I am borne along by a craving to possess it. Yet in this middle state neither the cognitive nor the appetent is wholly wanting. I continue carefully to scan it. I begin to desire it. What else do I do? What other states have I than of contemplating its excellence and closing my affections upon it? "The feeling of pleasure," answers the Hamiltonian. Certainly, the pleasure of the contemplation and the pleasure of the longing which anticipates possession. In passing from the cognitive end of the line, so to speak, to the appetent end I pass through a combination of knowledge and will which is certainly not neutral,—that is, without knowledge of perfection or imperfection and without craving or aversion, but which seems to be a state in which both enter so evenly that neither predominates in a marked degree.

But Sir William appeals to the exploits of Leonidas and Widdrington,—that is, to past events,—as if to cut off all possibility of will in the matter, and as if to leave one in passive patriotic feeling alone; but here again the feeling only describes the transition from knowledge to will, their interpenetration in the middle of the affair. For no one repeats the story or

the ballad merely to produce pleasure or pain; and, if this were the object alone, the mind would not be content with that, but would feel the movement to do likewise, the desire to praise and proclaim the act, and the will to act bravely in the immediate circumstances of life.

A better defence of the feelings as a third grand division of the powers might be made by appealing to the sentiments of pleasure and pain, which are felt but are not readily accounted for, as a pleasure in tormenting animals or an uneasiness in the company of certain persons. Here knowledge seems to be wanting, and desire does not move one so much as in other cases. But is not this pleasure the result of knowing or of desire to know what animals do when tortured, and of wish to obtain the pleasure of contemplating the victim's writhings? And the uneasiness in certain company,—what is it but a perception of some unsympathetic condition and a desire to escape from it?

Another way of looking at the case is from the ground of bodily analogy. If the mind has three divisions, it must be acknowledged at once that nothing in the body corresponds with it; if it has two, everything corresponds. The two

lobes of the cerebrum, the halves of the cerebellum, the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the bones, the double lungs and heart, the members, all divide into two, into a right and a left. The doubleness of the body is no more evident, however, than its arrangement into internal and external parts. Every portion has its inner and its outer. Let us see if this universal distinction of right and left, inner and outer, is illustrative of the mental arrangement.

“The soul,” says Schopenhauer, “is the union of will and intellect.”¹ He places the will first. Indeed, Weber, in making up a motto for his “History of Philosophy,” says, “The will is at the heart of everything,” and places as authorities the names of Schelling, Schopenhauer, Secrétan, and Ravaisson. He also quotes the saying of Maine de Biran: “No perception without volition;” and in his conclusion he quotes Wundt as declaring, “It is from the will that the perception proceeds, and not the reverse.” He would make the will “being in its fulness, and all the rest phenomena.” It is the “essence of the human soul” (Duns Scotus), “the principle

¹ Will in Nature, I.

on which heaven and all nature depend" (Aristotle), "the individual's life itself" (Brandis).

The least reflection shows that the will is the spring of action, as the heart is of the bodily life. Without the will to do something, knowledge is as powerless to effect action as the winter sun to produce vegetation. With will, knowledge is operative. With desire aroused, the intellect co-operates. With this precedence of the will in potency it is not necessary that it should precede in time. The senses are always reporting to the intellect events and conditions. The will is always instructed and guided by the intellect. If it were not so guided, it would be blind, as when passion controls reason and leads the will to disregard the intellect, making its voice heard through conscience or memory or foresight. But, when the will is aroused, what does the intellect do?

It ministers to the wish, as the lungs minister to the heart. It finds the way, it provides the means, it puts at the disposal of the will its whole accumulation of information. The intellect is a helpmeet for the will. The thought embodies the desire. It is the *existere* of which the will is the *esse*. It is the left of which the

will is the right. It is the outer of which the will is the inner. In their mutual dependence, their co-operative activity, the will and understanding are in correspondence with the sexes, for in the man the intellectual predominates, and in the woman the voluntary. It is with will and intellect as Longfellow truly says of man and woman,—

“As unto the bow the cord is,
So unto the man is woman;
Though she bends him she obeys him,
Though she draws him, yet she follows;
Useless each without the other.”

The will and intellect uniting bring forth act, as Horus was born of Osiris and Isis. It is easy to illustrate: A piano is heard, and the desire to play upon it and bring forth like music is formed. The intellect responds with information slowly acquired. But daily practice is necessary to bring will and intellect into act. When at last this has been done in the plane of the body, the end is gained. Or, a young man desires to enter the ranks of some profession. The desire is not enough. The intellect must respond, or he will fail. If the intellect does respond, he will slowly prepare himself. His preparation is a constantly

perfected union of will with intellect, so that, when he desires to do a professional act, he may know how to do it, and so that, when he has learned how to do this and that part of his work, he may have the will which will give energy and patience and power.

In the third the former two are one and efficient. This is life, not to will only, nor to know only, but to go forth from the will by means of the understanding into serviceableness.

It will be observed that, in this view of the mental operations, the movement of life is from above downward, from the spiritual into the natural, and not the reverse. Of course it is not denied that the organs of sense, affected by external causes, often offer the first incentive to action; but that they do not control the action, which they may advise, is evident from the fact, already referred to, that the mind may, and often does, reject the impulse to cry out, or to run away, or otherwise to obey the prompting of the flesh.

Spiritual influx from mind to body, therefore, is here maintained instead of the physical influx preferred by materialists. Thus man may be described as will and intellect looking to act.

His qualities are love and wisdom looking to use. His possessions are goodness and truth for the sake of life, of that life which shall make him useful, which shall vindicate his existence, and which shall make all men rejoice in the exercise by each of his own gift. "Life," nobly said Mazzini, "is a mission. Religion, science, philosophy, though still at variance upon many points, agree in this, that every existence is an aim."¹

It is, however, in the power of man to will for himself—that is, for some private enjoyment—rather than for others and for useful service. He may love that which is evil. His intellect pointing out to him two possible ways, he may choose that which is injurious rather than that which is helpful. Thus he may refuse to listen to conscience which would guide him, and may degrade his intellect to serve his base desires. In this case, the more intellect, the more harm will result; because the intellect must serve the will, be it never so depraved. The man finds a way for his anger or his greed. And now man is not love and wisdom looking to use, but lust and folly looking to sin and harm. The

¹ Life and Writings, Chap. v.

corrupt tree does not bring forth good fruit. The light that is in him is darkness. And instead of life, larger and larger, as the years go on, he earns the wages of sin, which is spiritual death.

The origin of evil is not entered upon at length here, but it may at least be said that the possibility of sinning is bound up in man's free-agency, and so a selfhood, not devoted to use, reluctant in its obedience to laws which exalt the good of others as of equal importance, at least, with that of the individual, is a source of disorder and danger. But man would not be man were he deprived of this power to regard self as paramount if he would; and that man has misused this power, and has for a long time been transmitting from generation to generation a tendency to misuse it, must be granted at once on historical grounds.

The history of human decline in innocence is repeated in every wayward youth. It is a movement to consult for self, which, imperceptibly originating and increasing with increase of conscious power, separated and separates the soul from its purity and makes it ashamed before its judge. While men were infantile in intellect there was no transgression. But the growth of

rationality opened the way to perversions of every kind; and that it was taken and pursued, and is pursued, the wars, the crimes public and private, testify on every hand. "So many laws argue so many sins."¹

It is true that ways have been found to make the selfish man useful, to make the wrath of man to praise God; but this is only a palliation of evil, not a cure of it; and cure cannot be found except in the formation in the evil man by means of his own intellect, which can discern a better life and is able to rise above his will, of a new heart and a new spirit.

In so far as this is done, the self dies to live again; it operates in the symmetry of human order; it is the image of its Maker; it is such that the king in Hamlet could say, "Try what repentance can: what can it not?"

Herbart in sad play on words said, "He who was yesterday the best (*beste*) may to-day be the worst (*böseste*);"² but the reverse is also true, and sins, though they be as scarlet, may be made as white as snow.

¹ Paradise Lost, xii. 283.

² Lehrbuch, Book IV., chap. ii., sect. 130.

Man does not escape injury from his transgressions; but, with the change of his purpose, the evil is remedied at its root. He is not only forgiven, but rescued. The self, humbled, purified, becomes a house of God eternal in the heavens.

The disposition to regard evil as merely immature good, as a transient phase of development, is natural if, by a perversion of reason, evil is associated only with the state of the savage or the ignorant. The mild forms of sin which men commit, knowing no better, are much like the act of a child who throws a valuable vase to the floor to hear its fragments rattle, having no idea of the evil it is doing. The serious sin is done wittingly and purposely. Callicles was intelligent enough to know better than to say to Socrates, "Greatness is providing to the full indulgences of evil passions;" and Socrates was able to show him that nothing could be further from greatness, and to declare, "None but a fool is afraid of death, but of wrong doing. To go to the world below having one's soul full of injustice is the worst of evils."¹

¹ Gorgias of Plato.

Cyrenaic indifference to evil has found many apologists. Herbert Spencer¹ quotes Shakespeare's saying, "A soul of goodness in things evil," and seems to hold this as an ethical opinion, but Henry V. was speaking of circumstances then threatening him from without.² To say in any sense that moral evil is good is self-contradictory. It is to say that things diametrically opposite—a quality and its perversion—are one. Epictetus was more just when, looking upon the adulterer, he declared that he knew not where there was a place for him, as there was no place for a stinging wasp.³

The confusion of evil with good seems to be due to the obscurity which arises from associating evil with ignorance and brutishness. Evil is to be found in its genuine form and mature development among the cultured, among those who know perfectly the difference between good and evil, and who are capable of instructing others and perhaps are in the practice of giving such instruction. It is Dr. Faust rather than the untutored Marguerite who can grievously

¹ First Principle, chap. i.

² Henry V., Act IV., Scene 1.

³ Book II., chap. iv.

sin, and who in sin presents evil in its true aspect. If the men about the Christ had said that they were blind, they had not had sin:¹ if He had not come and spoken unto them, if He had not done among them the works which none other did, they had not had sin; but now, fully informed of the right attitude to take, they had chosen to hate Him, and their sin was without excuse.²

¹ John ix. 41.

² John xv. 22, 24.

CHAPTER IX.

THE DIVINE.

THE self of man has been found to be a recipient, a reactive agent, and a free agent whose freedom it finds but which it does not produce by the exercise of power sufficient to govern the rest of the universe and to hold it in equilibrium. The implication of these facts is, to say the least, most significant, and has not been sufficiently considered by theistic writers. They seem generally to take too distant views of the Divine, and to view it as if they had no relation with it.

In ancient times this was not so. "All is full of Jove," said Virgil, as Augustine relates. "Jupiter is whatever you see, wherever you move," said Lucan. "Think oftener of God than you breathe," said Epictetus. "God is truth, and light is His shadow," said Plato. "There is certainly a God who sees and hears whatever we do," said Plautus. And this conception remained while men grew sensual in

their lives. But at length their idea of God became so degraded that the worship of Him consisted of animal sacrifices, and He was thought of as likely to show special favor to chosen peoples.

The question of polytheism, whether it or monotheism preceded, and how, if it followed, polytheism arose from monotheism, does not require full consideration here; but the suggestion may be offered that the more degraded men become, the more superstitious they are, and the more inclined to make deities to reign over places and diseases and events. Primitive Christianity, with its purity of thought and life, was markedly monotheistic; mediæval Christianity, with its priestcraft in place of ministry, its defence by tortures of what was called faith but which was ecclesiasticism, its indulgences, its enormities of every kind, multiplied divine persons and saints to be invoked at this place and at that till the litany included as adorable "*Maria Dei genetrix*, Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, angels and archangels, holy orders of blessed spirits, all the disciples, the innocents," thirty others by name, all the popes, and the *sanctæ et sancti* not numbered, but said to amount to at least twenty-five thousand.

The change from that one God to this pantheon may be safely regarded as having an actual connection with the ignorance and depravity of the later period; and the inference is that a similar period in antiquity had like characteristics,—priests in power multiplying objects to be worshipped with costly offerings, and people in ignorance accepting with superstitious compliance the deities and sub-deities presented for their prayers. A pristine state, however, free, on the one hand, from priestly oppressions and, on the other, from superstitious fears arising from a sense of guilt on account of disorderly practices, may be supposed to have been monotheistic from the lack of reason to be otherwise. “The one is God,” said Xenophanes, striving to cure polytheism. “I am about to become a god,” said the dying, avaricious Vespasian, showing the evil at its height.

Thus, not only does it appear that polytheism arises out of monotheism when unfortunate conditions favor its development, but it is also evident that the theistic conception, the recognition of God, has been subject to marked vicissitudes. To one like Augustine, who could find God rather by ignorance than by knowledge, there

was no need of attempted demonstration. To one of atheistic temper, however, arguments seemed necessary, and in the formulation of such arguments much mental effort has been expended, with some success and some failure. Some have undoubtedly been thus convinced; others remain unmoved in their doubts, not only as to the pantheon claimed by the mediævalists, but even as to the One of the best religious conception.

These arguments have been stated over and over again, and their respective claims have been examined by friends and foes.

There is the ontological proof which Professor Knight regards as having "a singular fascination to the speculative mind,"¹ but he finds it inconclusive. It holds that the notion of God, being conceivable, must be true. The ground of Descartes was that all which he could clearly and plainly perceive was true. "Possible ideas are true, impossible are false," is the dictum of Leibnitz.² But these are overstatements, and would not be made at the present time when in-

¹ Essay on Theism in *Studies in Philosophy and Literature*.

² *Nouveaux Essais*, Book II., chap. iii.

telligent scepticism has forced theists to weigh their words. Wolff was more cautious when he made the declaration, "That is possible to which some notion responds;"¹ but even then he was on an insecure foundation for an extended argument, since it might be retorted that it is as possible to think of a malign God as of a merciful one. "Falsehood can never be clearly conceived or apprehended to be true,"² declared Cudworth; but this is also unsound, as the long acceptance of the Ptolemaic theory shows. The ontological proof will never satisfy a doubter, who will not admit that the logical is actual, that an idea well founded in reason is necessarily as well founded in fact. Descartes, reasoning that "necessary existence is contained in the concept of God,"³ is reasoning round a circle. He put the contents into the concept and then drew them out.

The cosmological argument seeks for the cause of things. It enlarges upon the order of the universe and concludes as to its Maker. This has been the common way of appealing to

¹ *Ontologia*, sect. 102.

² *Eternal Morality*, p. 172.

³ *Meditations*, *Objections*, 1.

scientists of atheistical turn. The student has been appealed to on the ground of his own discoveries. But the difficulty with this argument has been often pointed out. It is incomplete. Its first cause is not necessarily personal, nor intelligent, nor even omnipotent. "In the admission of a first cause," remarks Hamilton, "atheist and theist are at one."¹ This proof may end in Spencer's Unknowable as well as in the Christian's Father in heaven.

The argument from design, the teleological proof, is well known. Kant called it "the oldest, clearest, and most adapted to ordinary human reason."² Everything has a purpose. The watch found on the sea-shore is not dumb, but has a tale to tell of the intelligent designer and skilful manufacturer. The preference has been given by many to this argument because it so fully presented God as personal. But there is also difficulty here, for many phenomena tempt one to infer an imperfect designer whose plan did not exclude accidents and disorders, and there is all the time the possibility of concluding that Law, an impersonal working out of

¹ *Metaph*, Lecture II., p. 19.

² *Kritik der R. V.*, p. 651.

a self-caused evolution, has produced what is in itself so wonderful a universe. Professor Knight wisely remarks that from this proof we get Nature, which is not quite what was sought for. He says, too strongly, "The conception of deity as a workman could never lead to reverence,"¹ for this is not impossible; but it is true that skill is not the best attribute to dwell upon in presenting the idea of God to a sceptical mind.

The argument from intuition, from instinct, is preferred by Knight. He grants that the innate idea of God is at first weak and dim, but claims that it improves with mental growth. He regards it as a revelation within the soul. This revelation is not qualified by man's conceptions, as in the case of other arguments, but comes pure and perfect from above. It is not constant in the mind, to be sure, but sometimes clearly declares itself. He finds these recurring intuitions persistent in the individual, the same in various generations, harmonious with all other useful ideas, and vindicated from all suspicion by their beneficent influence upon the mind. He defends this instinct against the "cold

¹ Essay on Theism.

nescience" of Comte, Bain, Spencer, and others, and charges Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel with being of like tendency. He claims that, to deny this, we must give up the omnipotence of God, for we take away His power to reveal Himself. He holds that to find God revealed in this instinct is to find Him, not in nature, but in man, and thus in the most perfect image of God. He finds the whole æsthetic or poetic sense responding to this view. Worship vindicates it, being instinctive. With appeal to Fénelon and Cardinal Newman, Professor Knight ends his essay.

On the other hand, Dr. Momerie, in the bright little book previously cited,¹ has a chapter on the Infinite Ego, in which he favors the argument from design.

Again, Dr. Hedge, in an essay on "Theism," questions all the arguments, concludes that reason alone "does not suffice to prove the God whom religion craves," and looks to faith "which requires the qualifying check of science, without which she would lapse into monstrous superstition."²

¹ Personality.

² "Theism of Reason and of Faith," in *Luther and other Essays*.

It would seem that an argument drawn from nature must always be inferior to one drawn from man, because the God of nature manifests power, skill, or majesty,—some one quality or other by no means foreign to a true conception of God, but not by itself adequately representing Him.

Is it then to be held that man knows God transcendently, that there is not only a consciousness of the self and its operations, but also of God and His relations therewith; not only a self-consciousness, but a God-consciousness? “When I become self-conscious,” said Theodore Parker, “I feel that dependence [upon God], and know of this communion, whereby I receive from Him.”¹

It is idle to claim a universal God-consciousness in so sweeping a way. History will not support the claim. Observation must reject it. A general sense of dependence on man’s part may be admitted. A sense of personal relation with God cannot be admitted as an integral part of self-consciousness, or as a necessary concomitant of it. If this were so, there would be no

¹ *Views of Religion*, p. 243.

atheists but the insane. If this sense of God's presence came unbidden to every youthful mind, free agency would be with some affected, and with some at least prevented from development. It is with Parker as with others: controversy spoils calm reasoning and leads to too large a claim for the intuitional proof of a mooted point. The same claim is made by Mulford in his "Republic of God," though from another point of view: "From the beginning, and with the growth of the human consciousness, there is the consciousness of the being of God and of a relation to God,"¹ to all which the answer is every atheistic book.

But, when we return to the ground that man is a recipient, a reagent and a free agent, we find that he is adapted to, and dependent for his best development upon, a rational recognition of the Source of his life, the One omnipotent upon whose inflowing life he and all conscientious men react with prayerful co-operative energy, the all-merciful One who preserves him in freedom from hour to hour, save as he voluntarily makes himself slave to some citizen of the

¹ Page 1.

country far from the Father's house, the country of the harlot and the swine.

With his sense of dependence he freely accepts everything which leads him to acknowledge God. As a child, if properly taught, he already confesses Him. If untaught, he has this fact of a Father's care still to learn. If taught a polytheism as the source of his life, he accepts it. He is left of God free to accept Him or to reject Him. He is not compelled in this or in anything. He is led, indeed, as by a good shepherd; but he may go astray, if he will, saying, in his folly, "There is no God."¹

As revealed to the man who has been well taught, and who has practised what he has learned, such a man as Dr. Mulford had in mind, God is a Father. He is wholly personal. He is the infinite prototype of man. In Him the will is full of infinite love, embracing all, even the unthankful and the evil. In Him the intellect is full of infinite wisdom, caring for no one to the exclusion of others. In Him the union of these is perfect, and they go forth, the Love by the

¹ Psalm liii. 1.

Wisdom, the Wisdom from the Love, in infinite activity. God is seen to be humanity in its source. In the imperfect image of weak and wayward man He is dimly seen as having in perfect form every attribute of an infinite Humanity.

It may also be seen that this infinite One, concerned with all that He has made or will make, dwells above the laws of space and time which He has introduced into the world as the necessary accompaniment of material conditions; and that He is omnipresent, in all space but not of space, and in all time but not of time, so that the here and the there, the past and the future, are ever in His presence. "Before Abraham was I am"¹ is Divine language as to time; "where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them"² is Divine language as to space.

"Not circumscribed by time, nor fixed to space,
Confined to altars nor to temples bound."³

It is by a self-revelation that God is made

¹ John viii. 58.

² Matthew xviii. 20.

³ Hannah More's poem, "Belshazzar."

known, whether directly to one entering into his closet to pray in secret, or by the spoken word of the prophet. To early innocent man the inward conviction, to depraved man the spoken word belongs. Had man been left without such a revelation of God by God in some form, he would not have known Him; for the ignorance of his infancy would, in this respect, have continued. And, having learned to know God, and losing his light through neglect of it, man would have remained unconscious of God if He had not renewed the knowledge among men of His nature.

But all revelation of God to man, through the ear or in the heart, was incomplete till, in one life, the infinite love and wisdom and gracious activity of God were revealed in a day-by-day manifestation. If the Christ failed to be tender to all, if He failed to be so wise as to know the future and to speak as never man spake, and if He failed to be able to succor the fallen who accepted His aid, He failed to manifest God; if He were infinitely loving, even to enemies, so wise that He was the very Word made flesh, so powerful that no one's cry of anguish was in vain, He was such that he that had seen Him had seen the

Father,¹—that in Him dwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily.²

This is not the place to consider the work of the Christ, but it is proper to point out that, in the Christ, when He had freed Himself by purification through temptation from all the infirmity of the flesh, and when He had thereby made Himself supremely victorious over all forces of evil,—that is, when He had finished the work given Him to do,—the Divine Being not only declared His existence, but vindicated His providence. Thenceforward all arguments, from the possibility of the conception, from the cosmical demand, from the wonders of design, from instinctive want, and from human history, must yield in power to the demonstration of the Divine by the Divine in the Christ. The argument from the Christ,—the Emanuel, “God-with-us,”—is, and forever will be, unmatched. He was actually Jesus,—that is, Jehovah the Saviour. He was “the image of the invisible God.”³

There are two probable reasons why this argument has not been used: first, the histories of the Christ had been called in question; secondly,

¹ John xiv. 9.² Colossians ii. 9.³ Colossians i. 15.

He was not so much regarded in His constantly declared representative, as in His supposed propitiatory, character. This was double surrender to scepticism and to dogmatism. The past time of darkness may have required it, but it is no longer necessary to yield to such influences. As more and more the life of the Christ is studied in the land of His work and among all nations, as more and more His mighty works are spiritually fulfilled in mankind, the scepticism which was mainly the revolt from gross, mediæval traditionalism will be cured, and the simple and sublime facts of the life of the Christ will stand forth in their majesty, while their infinite significance will afford a constantly increasing proof of the truth of Gospel history.

Again, the prevalence of juster ideas of God, less marred by gross notions of His temper and judgments, will lead men to look upon the Christ as one with God in mercy and in everything,—“the brightness of His glory, the express image of His person.”¹

At the same time the personality of God, at first so clearly seen in the terms Father, Son, and

¹ Hebrews i. 3.

Holy Spirit of the baptismal command that the apostles obediently baptized their converts in the name of the Lord Jesus,¹ but later so misunderstood that a return towards polytheism was made, especially when Mary was recognized as a fourth person to be worshipped, will be seen to be represented, not by three human images, but by a single human nature with its trinal constitution of love and wisdom and their union in outgoing usefulness, which three are sometimes spoken of as heart, head, and hand.² So God in His essential Divinity presented Himself through the glorification of the Christ in a Divine Humanity, forming it as man's soul forms for itself the body full of life.

The Son was thus the embodiment of the Father, and the saying was fulfilled: "Unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is given: and the government shall be upon His shoulder: and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace."³ In their perfect union, when the Christ had "ascended on high," when captivity

¹ Acts viii. 16.

² Campanella's human trinity is *velle, cognoscere, posse*.

³ Isaiah ix. 6.

to sin had been made captive, and when death had been swallowed up in victory,¹ the Holy Spirit was sent forth, as the energy of human life proceeds out of the body from the soul. We read, "The Holy Spirit was not yet [given] because Jesus was not yet glorified,"² and we also read that He came to them in the evening of the resurrection day and said, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit."³

Before the completion in time of this incarnation there was the infinite wisdom, the Divine form, of which infinite love was the substance, and from these the spirit of God had created and preserved the universe; but, with the Incarnation, the Word, which was in the beginning, was made flesh, that which was to the infinite love as son to father dwelt among us, and, when the redemptive work was done on the part of the Lord, He breathed on His disciples the Holy Spirit, and they went forth to make disciples of all nations, with the baptism of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit received into their lives, making them the sons of God.

So far as this is received there is a conscious-

¹ Psalm lxxviii. 18; Isaiah xxv. 8.

² John vii. 39.

³ John xx. 22.

ness of God in the Christ watching over the life, ministering to it, and doing mighty works in it from day to day even to the changing of the nature, so that the blind in spirit see and the spiritually leprous are cleansed. With this consciousness the self perceives the Divine Self operating upon it, yet always leaving it free. With this consciousness the acts and words of the Christ become transparent with eternal meaning, and Christianity is seen to be a walk with God, who is but indistinctly revealed in other religions. The self, retaining its full freedom, takes Him for its Lord, and follows in His footsteps in order to be most serviceable to mankind. It finds its place in the kingdom of God; it is a member of the body of which the Christ is the head; it becomes part of an eternal structure of which the Christ is the chief corner-stone, rejected, indeed, by the builders in their blind depravity, but made according to the Divine plan the head-stone of the corner.¹

Morell has truly said, after reviewing in his "*History of Modern Philosophy*"² the arguments

¹ Psalm cxviii. 22.

² New York, 1848, p. 740.

for the personality of God, "Were we required to point out the region in which the whole argument is best concentrated, we should refer to man as himself a living embodiment of all the evidences. If you want argument from design, then you see in the human frame the most perfect of all known organizations. If you want the argument from being, then man, in his conscious dependence, has the clearest conviction of that independent and absolute One, on which his own being reposes. If you want the argument from reason and morals, then the human mind is the only known repository of both. Man is in fact a microcosm,—a universe in himself; and, whatever proof the whole universe affords, is involved in principle in man himself. With the image of God before us, who can doubt of the Divine type?"

This is what Jacobi had already said, "Nature conceals God, man reveals God."¹

But man, so examined, may give only an impersonal deity, only an Over-Soul with Emerson, "a pure identity" with Hegel, Fichte's "opera-

¹ Works, iii. p. 424.

tive moral order," Leibnitz's "original monad," Spencer's Unknowable, or some germ from which man may have been developed. It is in the Christ, with God as His inmost soul, ministering to man—every motive full of love, every word one of wisdom, every act a gift of grace—that the argument becomes perfect. Lotze has said, "Perfect personality is in God only, to all finite minds is allotted but a pale copy thereof,"¹ and this is true, but to the Christ the spirit was given without measure.

The Divine Self is in the Christ. The "I am that I am,"² *sum qui sum*, is not unrevealed, cognizable only as hidden behind a veil, but the "I am" is before us as "that I am," the *esse* in *existere*, the Divine Substance in its Form; and so it is man's fault if he does not know it when unperverted Christianity proclaims it and presents it in love and light and life.

The Divine Self is in the Christ, and needs no other manifestation than its own. Cousin was right when he said, "Everything leads us to God; there is no bad way of arriving thither;

¹ Microcosm, Book IX., chap. iv., sect. 5.

² Exodus iii. 14.

we may go in different ways.”¹ But of all good ways there is a best, and it is to look to Him who truly said that He was the Way, the Truth, and the Life.²

As the man walks with God in Christ he has empiric understanding of His wise ways. He finds that evil is to a degree permitted when man is determined to go wrong, for otherwise he could not be led in freedom, and the use of his own reason would be infringed. He learns to say, “Before I was afflicted I went astray.”³ He also comes to perceive that the many disorders of the world are directly or indirectly such as man has produced by the abuse of the powers committed to him, and yet that they are so wisely watched over that not a sparrow falls unnoticed. The man, with his feeble outlook, does not gain the explanation of every calamity, but sufficient experience convinces him that, if he does not know now, he will know hereafter when he will see eye to eye.

The objection to this view of the Divine is not a practical one, a charge that it is likely to lead

¹ Critique of Locke ad finem.

² John xiv. 6.

³ Psalm cxix. 67.

the receiver of it astray from morality ; but it is a theoretical one, namely, that it is an anthropomorphic view. *Determinatio est negatio*¹ (Definition is denial), said Spinoza. Matthew Arnold declared² it a delusion "that God is a person who thinks and loves." God, he would have us believe, is not personal at all, but "a power that lives and breathes and feels;" "a stream of tendency;" "the eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness." Herbert Spencer selected the term "ultimate cause," and Hamilton and Mansel held that the Infinite, being unconditioned, is unknowable. Fichte's doctrine was that every precise notion we form of God must be an idol ; to have an idea of God is to limit Him : "The act of Thy will I cannot comprehend, I only know that it is not like mine. Thou art not as I now and always must conceive of being."³

Thus is the perfect revelation of God in the Christ set aside, and nothing but a sense of loneliness is left to the mind, with a metaphysical abstraction to be contemplated. But the weight

¹ Ueberweg's History, vol. ii. p. 66.

² God and the Bible.

³ Vocation of Man, Book III.

of this objection is seen to be easily lifted. If we cannot know God in His infinity, we can know Him in His influence upon us. If we form an idea of Him from the risen Lord, we neither degrade the reason nor lower the standard of righteousness. Dr. F. E. Abbot is not unwilling to say, in his "Scientific Theism," "Because the universe is an infinite organism, its life principle must be an infinite, omniscient Power, acting everywhere and always by organic means for organic ends, and subordinating every event to its own infinite life,—in other words, it must be infinite Will directed by infinite Wisdom. . . . It thus manifests infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. It must be conceived as infinite Person, absolute Spirit, creative Source and eternal Home of the derivative finite personalities which depend upon it, but are no less real than itself.¹ . . . On the other hand, Pantheism is the denial of all real personality."²

In his "Idea of God," John Fiske, who is equally remote from mysticism, has said, "The utter demolition of anthropomorphism would be the demolition of theism."³

¹ Page 209.

² Page 211.

³ Page 117.

This is the same as to say that it is wholly possible to avoid those limiting and lowering notions of God, from which Christianity, in common with all faiths, has suffered, and yet to receive God as revealed in the Christ who, for a time in the flesh like others as to mortality and all that space and time control, rose in the end superior to every limitation, yet remained a Person.

The spirit which prevents one from forming a low conception of God is commendable. The spirit which puts Him aside behind a veil of metaphysics is wholly to be deprecated, in that it takes away what life requires for its peace,—a shepherd of the sheep.

To him who abhors gross anthropomorphism much of public prayer must be extremely objectionable. The attention of God to the sick, to the crops, to the country, is urgently asked for as if He were, indeed, indifferent till aroused, or unlikely to provide till informed. This is wholly unbecoming to the present age, and ought to cease. In the prayers uttered by our Lord a very different spirit prevails, that of humble expression of trust, of need, of dependence, and of danger. God is not asked to hearken, nor to

show special favor, but the soul opens itself to the Divine influence in order that it may say, "Thy will, not mine, be done," and may persevere in its patience.

With all that is objectionably anthropomorphic, because falsely conceived, removed from our idea of God in the Christ, He remains the essence and source of Personality, and reveals to man the Father to his sonship, the giver to his reciprocity, the agent to his reagency, the master to his freedom, the rock to his dependence, the redeemer to his sinfulness, thereby restoring to man what was lost by waywardness, and which only God could restore. "As in Adam all die, so in the Christ shall all be made alive."¹

¹ 1 Corinthians xv. 22.

CHAPTER X.

MAN IMMORTAL.

To the question, Is man conscious of being immortal? the answer must be given at once in the negative, on the ground that it is not given to man to know by his own consciousness anything except what is either present or past. What goes on with him now he knows, and he also knows so much of past experience as he at any time recalls; but, except for rare presentiments, he has no knowledge of the future. His predictions and aspirations are not perceptions, but are inferences from present conditions. He does not live in the future, but only in the passing instant. "The present hour alone is man's," as Samuel Johnson said.

But when man has gained some conception of the Divine Lord, his view of life is greatly enlarged. Already he may have perceived that his was a recipient, though not a passive life; but now he comes to know the motive of his

Creator and Preserver. He finds Him a being of surpassing love joined with wisdom, he comprehends that the power of God is the exercise of love, and he learns that the whole universe is an expression of love and wisdom, except so far as man may have marred it. But he also sees that he is himself the head of the creation; that it has been made to serve him; and that he is superior to it in his capacity to understand it and to make use of it. He distinguishes himself from all else, and gives names to all.¹ He finds that a relation may exist and, for the promotion of his usefulness, ought to exist between him and his Lord; not the relation of the servant who knoweth not what the master doeth,² but that of friend, as in the case of a father and son who are at one in spirit. He comes at length to perceive that this God of love could not have dwelt alone, contemplating His own perfections, but must in His very nature have sought for those whom He might bless, thus loving not Himself so much as others out of Himself. He finds, as all students of mind have found, that he cannot think of God except in His universe;

¹ Genesis ii. 20.

² John xv. 15.

that he cannot form an idea of Him except in the field of His work, surrounded by His children, or preparing a place for them that they might dwell with Him.

The arbitrary and perverted ideas of a God before whom the world is doomed, who has relented to elect a few, which few in consideration of infinite pain endured by the Son of God are forgiven, while all the rest are calmly contemplated as irrevocably destined to perdition,—all these ideas, it is needless to say, have no basis in the religious experience, except so far as man condemns himself for his own perverseness, and they can have no place in a philosophical view of God. To fallen man He so at times appeared, and, since the prophet's messages, to be of any avail, must be clothed in the language and ideas of the people addressed, He suffered Himself so to appear; but, as the sun emerging from its cloud shows its full radiance, so in the Christ the quality of God was plainly shown, and it was a fearful perversity which led men back to the old conceptions, afresh denying the self-revelation of God in the Christ, or rather insisting upon holding concerning it a purely Jewish view, beholding the blood that was spilled, but

overlooking the spirit that led to the sacrifice. These lurid views of God are disproved by all genuine experience wherein men daily learn that to obey is better than sacrifice, to hearken than the fat of rams.¹

It also comes to be empirically known that God is a spirit; not a law merely, though His name is law and His work is order; not a force merely, though there is no force but has its origin in His infinite love; but a spirit, whose mind was seen in the Christ and may be known by every child who looks to Him for its daily blessing.

It is also perceived that man is a spirit. This is made plain from his capacity to grow in intellectual power while his body is from any cause declining, from his constant transcendence of space and time as he reads of the past or accompanies in imagination his friend upon a journey, and from his ability to come into relation with the Divine Spirit.

He comes to perceive that his highest aim is to co-operate in carrying out the sublime purposes of his God, and that his highest attain-

¹ 1 Samuel xv. 22.

ment will be to do so with increasing love and wisdom and power for ever. The perception of these aims, as representing the purpose of the infinite One in creating and preserving man, is the perception of the certainty of immortality.

“ ’Tis the divinity that stirs within us,
’Tis heaven itself that points out an hereafter
And intimates eternity to man.”¹

That this understanding was that of the best life of ancient time there can be no doubt, in view of the indisputable evidence of this fact in the sacred books of Egypt and Asia, and in the traditions of all nations. “There is, I know not how,” said Cicero, “in the minds of men a presage, as it were, of a future existence;” and, in the first book of his “*Tusculan Disputations*,” he treats of the “*Contempt of Death*” by showing that all men look beyond death. “It was the deep-seated belief of those of the Latin race whom Ennius describes as of the greatest antiquity, that there is consciousness in death;² . . . that it is not a catastrophe that takes away and

¹ Addison’s *Cato*.

² Peabody’s *Translation*, Boston, 1886, p. 20.

blots out everything, but is, so to speak, a migration and a change of life.”¹

And Cicero made the right distinction between the mortal and immortal parts when he said, “It was not Hector that you dragged, Achilles, but the body that had been Hector’s.”²

In his “*Phædo*,” Plato treats of the soul’s immortality, giving his authorities from Homer down. The Latin poet Ennius, a century before the Christ, wrote as his own epitaph,—

“Let no one grace my funeral with tears;
A living soul, I fly where floats my song.”

It is, however, in the Christ that the perception of personal immortality is most distinct. In perfect calmness, as He was about to lay down His life, He spoke of the house of the Father and the place to be prepared for the disciples, using as always the language which they would best understand, and promising them that in due time they should be with Him. In all that occurred with Him the perception of immortality was conspicuous.

But the disciples had originally only the Jewish tradition that the bodies, placed in

¹ Page 21.

² Page 77.

graves, would at some time far distant be raised again; and, though they were better instructed by word and example by the Christ, they lapsed again, so that there was no difference between the Jewish and the mediæval Christian notions of resurrection as to physical bodies to be raised and skies to be rent. That more light is now enjoyed by many is perhaps in part due to a study of the doubtful phenomena of spiritualism and other evidences of a spirit in man and its continued existence after death; but belief in immortality is especially due to a fuller participation in the consciousness of relation with God in the Christ and to a consequent understanding of the words and example of the Christ. He removes the fear of death, and it presents itself as the entrance to a life more full than this because less burdened with tribulation and less hampered with doubt,—a life still in conjunction with the Lord, but free from death and sorrow and pain.

“ In the desert of the Holy Land I strayed,
Where Christ once lived, but seems to live no more;
In Lebanon my lonely home I made;
I heard the wind among the cedars roar,
And saw far off the Dead Sea’s solemn shore:
But ’tis a dreary wilderness, I said,
Since the prophetic spirit hence has fled.

Then from the convent in the vale I heard,
Slow chanted forth, the everlasting Word,
Saying, 'I am He that liveth, and was dead,
And, lo, I am alive for evermore.'
Then forth upon my pilgrimage I fare,
Resolved to find and praise Him everywhere."

For doubts about resurrection and immortality, arising from a solely material view of man, there is no remedy save in the training of the mind by reason and experience. If Clifford could write for his epitaph only, "I was not, I lived, I loved, I am not," it is evident that, in exclusive attention to science and in abhorrence of unreasonable dogmas, he had closed his mind to the Christ who could remedy Sadduceeism without making a man a Pharisee. There are, indeed, myriads of men who through ignorance do not at present participate with the Christ in the faith of immortality, but as it is certain that all are created for heaven so surely will they sooner or later be given in freedom an opportunity to dwell with Him. "And other sheep I have which are not of this fold; them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold and one shepherd."¹

¹ John x. 16.

The existence of the spiritual world is not a direct revelation of consciousness, because that is concerned with the work of this life; but, so far as the mind is enlightened with the presence of the Christ, it draws the necessary and joyful inference that the earthly body and the physical world are not the whole of the creation but are its basis, and that the spirit within man, not physical and not mortal, already belongs to a world of spiritual substance, not, of course, revealed to its organs of flesh, but existing as certainly as the infinite spirit itself.

Reason may also conclude that the world adapted to its immortal life is no place of idleness nor of mere ecstasy, but is a world of noble uses, of scenes superior to those of earth, and of indefinite variety of forms of life. As man finds that his conception of God must rise above the earthly rule of space and time, he may infer that, in the spiritual world, space and time will be rather the apparent than the actual environment, that souls in sympathy will need no arduous journey to be in converse, and that time will not be measured, as in this world, by lapse of days, but rather by the movement of the mind. With the sense of the presence of the Christ as

the light of daily life may be conjoined the thought that His presence will be the sun of heaven, even as when He was transfigured.¹

From its own experience in sin, the mind infers that every one, however wayward, will be cared for with mercy and kindness in the hereafter, though it is seen that the region in which disorderly thought surrounds itself with its like will be utterly different from that in which the life of the inhabitants reflects itself in holy forms and precious substances, and in which

“Trees of life ambrosial fruitage bear.”

The effect of sleep upon the mind is nothing save as, refreshed by gift of life during unconsciousness, it gathers strength. The effect of the brief sleep of death upon the mind will be nothing unless it wakes ere long endowed with peaceful and restful gifts. “In the third day He will raise us up, and we shall live in His sight.”² But it is clear that, in a spiritual world, the energies of the soul will find an ability to go forth, which they could not have while using a physical body restrained by physical laws and more or less diseased.

¹ Matthew xvii. 2.

² Hosea vi. 2.

The mind now can free itself from an organized body only in thought. It will always be so. Thought alone, not life, works without hands. A spiritual body will be necessary to the spirit's usefulness. And research has already gone far enough to show that man now has a spiritual body encompassed by a physical, but to be freed from it by death. How much of this was known a century ago is plain from Jung-Stilling's "Theory of Pneumatology." Mrs. Browning put the same perception into poetic form,—

“With stammering lips and insufficient sound,
I strive and struggle to deliver right
The music of my nature, day and night,
With dream and thought and feeling interwoven,
And inly answering all the senses' round,
With octaves of a mystic depth and height,
Which step out grandly to the infinite,
From the dark edges of the sensual ground.”¹

The immortality of man is the destiny which infinite Love has assigned to him, and to which infinite Wisdom trains him. To become aware of this great truth, and to keep it ever in view, is human wisdom. So to live that man conjoins himself with God in the Christ is to protect his

¹ Sonnet: "The Soul's Expression."

recipieney from the intrusion of evil, to promote his reactive work in casting out what is unworthy in motive and in obtaining what is worthy because helpful to the fellow-man, to magnify his free-agency above all subversion to the slavery of sinful habit, and to open before him a vista of increasing usefulness.

Man can imagine nothing better, he can ask for nothing more, than that he should be thus preserved and promoted in strength and righteous service, world without end.

CHAPTER XI.

MAN IN CHRISTIANITY.

IF the previous portions of this essay seem to contain rational views, their reasonableness may be deemed their sufficient support. If they seem to reach the ultimate ground of human knowledge, they are philosophically approved. The course of the treatment, however, led us up to God, not as an idea only, but as Himself a self, a personality of infinite and self-subsisting nature, self-revealed in part in the working of the world, but especially and perfectly in the qualities of the Christ. It would therefore seem fitting to compare these views with the words of the Christ in order that it may be seen whether they obtain favorable judgment as being of the Truth which was in Him.

The same order of thought may be followed, and this brings first to mind—

1. THE SELF OF MAN.

Of course it will be granted that, if the self of man be but a delusion, there is no rationality

in the words of appeal or warning or instruction which may have been uttered by the Christ or by any other. In that case man does not control his acts, and is not responsible for them. In that case the gospel, or any uplifting message, is a mockery and a part of the general deceit to which man is subject. The very attitude of the Christ is, therefore, an evidence of His finding a self in man, and such a self, it may in the end appear, as has been herein described.

It would be easy to show from many of His sayings that the Christ found in Himself no mere reflection of Divinity, but an actual personality, whose name was Jesus, whose inheritance was weighted with that which made Him open to constant temptation, and whose purification from all frailty was the work of overcoming the world's evil, and so delivering man; but this is not the point which needs here to be enlarged upon: only let it be understood that the words of the Christ were not words of which He was merely a messenger, but were words from His own experience. He knew what was in man.¹ He spoke that which He knew, and He testified

¹ John ii. 25.

that which He had seen.¹ The gospel is the experience of the Christ which, for their sakes, He shared with men. For their sakes He sanctified Himself that they might be sanctified through the truth.² To as many as receive Him is given power to become the sons of God, so that He may speak to each one of "my God and your God,"³ and so that they may say one to another, "Beloved, now are we the sons of God."⁴

It is, however, to His words as to others, rather than as to Himself, that attention is now called.

A striking passage is found in His address to some Jews who were examining His claim to be from God. They, boasting of their sure inheritance of the promise made to Abraham, were warned by Him that they were of another father, another nature, and that this devil, or spirit of evil, was deceiving them: "There is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar and the father thereof."⁵ This is the rendering of both versions. The

¹ John iii. 11.

² John xvii. 19.

³ John xx. 17.

⁴ 1 John iii. 2.

⁵ John viii. 44.

new has, however, as an alternative the interesting change,—“When one speaketh a lie,” making the declaration universal, and to the effect that a lie, a misuse of intellect and voice to declare the opposite of the fact in any case, is an act of evil self-assertion. “He speaketh of his own,” ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, is as complete a declaration of the selfhood as could be indirectly made. It recognizes the self of man, and points out its power. What man has as his own to use or to abuse is that which some call the ego and others the personality, and which is the *proprium*, the peculiar possession, intended to be used by each in filling his particular place in the great whole of humanity, but intended also to constitute him an individual and truly a man. The lie is not spoken from God by man, and it is not the truth of God; it is spoken by man of or from what is his own, and it is the truth of a wayward, self-directed man who has rejected the father who gave the portion of goods and has gone away to a far country to waste his substance and to join himself to one of that country in place of his father. The lie is riotous living.

The same marked declaration of the selfhood is found in a passage addressed to the disciples

to forewarn them of difficulties to be met with in their work: "If ye were of the world, the world would love its own."¹ Here the world means, of course, the company of the worldly. If the disciples could fall in with the way of the majority, all would be made pleasant; but if, as was necessary, they must oppose the world, then danger would arise from the general hatred of them. If they were of the world, of the world's party and opinion, they would be safe, for the world would love its own, τὸ ἰδίον. It had self-love and no other. For that which did not serve its self-love it had hatred. Here the men, not loving to serve, but loving each to rule from self-love, were described as having a selfhood perverted and hostile to its true use. If the selfhood of men had not been perverted, there would have been no one persecuted for righteousness' sake.

When speaking to the disciples about faithfulness, the Christ said, "If ye have not been faithful in that which is another's, who will give you that which is your own?"² This is the same as to say that, if, as stewards of Divine gifts, men

¹ John xv. 19.

² Luke xvi. 12.

are unfaithful, they do not acquire thereby true riches, but are wanting in noble qualities. They reject what is given, and then, as to the treasures of heaven, have not any that are their own. Their own possessions are base and, in the sight of heaven, valueless. This passage does not take away selfhood, as might appear to be the case at first sight, but points out the emptiness of the selfhood of the evil as to all that is of true worth.

An important saying is that which is found in two gospels and which was the subject of an extended explanation: "Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth the man; but that which proceedeth out of the mouth, this defileth the man."¹ In another place the saying is recorded thus: "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him; but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man."² The Pharisees had showed their displeasure at a doctrine which neglected their ceremonial ablutions, and the disciples, who were not clear as to their Master's teaching, appealed to Him for an explanation.

¹ Matthew xv. 11.

² Mark vii. 15.

It was at once given by making use of food as an example. If a substance which the body could not assimilate was taken into the system, it was finally expelled; and so a man might reject a harmful influence and go undefiled. But, if he received it with appetite and appropriated it, then it became a part of himself, of his selfhood, and it defiled him from within. This was the only defilement to be feared.

With this belongs the saying, "The good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and the evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil: for out of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh."¹ This clearly points out that, whether it be good or evil, and, of course, equally so if it be of a mixed quality, the selfhood is the heart of the man, and its acts are truly his acts.

A similar recognition of the self in man is found in the rebuke which was given to one of the disciples who, yielding to fear and to a short-sighted affection for his master's comfort, had sought to dissuade Him from going to Jerusalem

¹ Luke vi. 45.

and death: "Thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men."¹ Here the things of men represent those self-seeking and unloving qualities which had unfortunately become the characteristics of the self in man.

The same unholy condition is fully illustrated in the parable of the wicked husbandmen who refused to recognize the rights of the owner of the vineyard, seeking to render themselves free from his authority, and even killing his son with the hope to "take his inheritance," "that the inheritance may be ours," as they said.² This precisely sets forth the waywardness which leads man to refuse to exercise himself for the sake of his God,—that is, of others, for God has no selfish aim,—and to prefer to exercise himself in fancied contempt of God and for his own sake. The good husbandman would have enjoyed his gifts as constituting a trust, but the evil husbandman would brook no supervision but wished to be as God, knowing no superior authority.

The same thought as to perversion of the self is found in the words spoken to the disciples:

¹ Matthew xvi. 23; Mark viii. 33.

² Matthew xxi. 38; Mark xii. 7; Luke xx. 14.

“What is a man profited, if he gain the whole world, and lose or forfeit his own self?”¹ This question is also found in the form, “What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own life?”² For “life” here the old version read “soul.” But the meaning is conveyed by the words “his own self.” If he pays away the purity of his nature for worldly benefits, making himself a slave to greed, he has forfeited his own self, he has profaned the dwelling-place of God even to the ground.

It was this evil independence—which is really slavery—which was meant when the Christ said that, if one came “in his own name,” he would be received;³ for it was plain that His enemies had a high appreciation of the self-assertive life and no respect whatever for the life of stewardship.

The possibility of man’s self-assertion and consequent abuse of his gifts is implied in the words uttered by the father to his son in the parable of the prodigal: “All that I have is thine.”⁴ The elder son, to whom this was said,

¹ Luke ix. 25; Matthew xvi. 26.

² Mark viii. 36.

³ John v. 43.

⁴ Luke xv. 31.

might also go away, it was granted, with the goods of the father, and waste them.

These explicit teachings show how fully the self, the individuality, the *proprium*, was recognized out of His own experience and through His unmatched enlightenment, by the Christ of God.

2. RECIPIENCY AND REACTIVITY

are no less fully recognized. Indeed, they are implied in the passages already quoted, for it everywhere appears that true or false stewardship, the righteous use or the unrighteous abuse of gifts, is human life as seen by the Christ. Some other sayings will be quoted, however, which especially indicate man's reciprocity.

The question, "Shall He not clothe you?"¹ implies man's recipient relation to God. "It shall be given you in that hour what ye shall speak"² teaches the same lesson. The parable of the sower³ presents men receiving with much variety of capacity, as the field receives its seed with varying results which it cannot control, as man can.

¹ Matthew vi. 30.

² Matthew x. 19.

³ Matthew xiii., Mark iv., Luke viii.

The whole of what is said about prayer expresses the truth that man receives what he has ; that he is able to enlarge his capacity by consecration of his powers, and that his becoming attitude towards God is that of request and affectionate trust. "Give us this day our daily bread"¹ is the model supplication. "Give, and it shall be given unto you"² is the law of life. "Ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and it shall be opened unto you : for every one that asketh, receiveth ; and he that seeketh, findeth ; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him ?"³ And the value of prayer has its fullest statement in the words : "All things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive,"⁴ which words are interpreted by the other saying : "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ask whatsoever ye will, and it shall be done unto you."⁵

¹ Matthew vi. 5. ² Luke vi. 38. ³ Matthew vii. 7, 8, 11.

⁴ Matthew xxi. 22. ⁵ John xv. 7.

A remarkable evidence of the recognition of human reciprocity by the Christ is found in the frequent use of the proverbial phrase, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear,"¹ or, as it is said in one place, "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it;"² plainly indicating that every man has not only his inherited measure given him in his creation, but that he makes that measure larger or smaller by his own use of it in life.

So He spoke of receiving the kingdom of God, saying, that unless one received it as a little child, he could not enter therein;³ and to a man making surrender of his selfish interests for the sake of God's service, He promised that he should "receive manifold more in this time, and in the world to come eternal life."⁴

When our Lord spoke of good deeds as "wrought in God,"⁵ He did not ignore man's reactive free-agency, but He showed that the good deed is the unperturbed exercise of the gifts of God.

It was precisely this relation fully recognized.

¹ Matthew xi. 15.

² Matthew xix. 12.

³ Luke xviii. 17.

⁴ Ibid. 30.

⁵ John iii. 21.

which led the Christ to say, "I can of mine own self do nothing. I seek not mine own will, but the will of Him that sent me;"¹ for He felt within Himself a power bestowed for good, and He avoided all thought of perverting it by denying its source.

"I give unto them eternal life,"² He said of those who followed Him, meaning that as "in Him was life," so by Him it was communicated in rich measure to those who would prepare themselves to receive it. "I am come that they may have life," He said, "and may have it abundantly."³ And this interprets the words which ignorance, having no living experience of their truth, is apt to regard as mysterious: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have not life in yourselves. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life. He that eateth Me he also shall live because of Me."⁴

Similarly, in the parable of the talents, it was said that the gift was "to each according to his several ability;"⁵ and it is made plain in this

¹ John v. 30.

² John x. 28.

³ John x. 10.

⁴ John vi. 53, 54, 57.

⁵ Matthew xxv. 15.

and in the parable of the pounds that no more was expected of any one than his nature and acquired abilities would warrant.

This law is illustrated by the saying in respect to the Spirit of Truth: "Whom the world cannot receive, for it beholdeth Him not, neither knoweth Him; ye know Him, for He abideth with you and shall be in you."¹

Thus does the fact of man's self as reactive and recipient stand forth everywhere in the teachings of the Christ. It is not necessary to follow any of these points into the apostolic teaching, but this fact is also conspicuous there, for example, in Paul's saying, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him."²

Passing to the subject of man's

3. FREE-AGENCY,

we note, as before, that this is implied in all that has been already quoted. The recipiency by the Christ of what was of God, and by man of what was of God in the Christ, is never spoken of as a passive, much less as a compelled, agency.

¹ John xiv. 17.

² 1 Corinthians ii. 14.

The servant takes the talent to be in his own keeping, and to do with it what he will,—this is always the view presented. In addition, however, for the sake of greater definiteness, some passages may be cited.

Every command to sinful men to “repent” recognized their self-control, their ability to choose or to alter their course. Such commands as that they were to love their enemies, to do good to them who hated them, to resist not evil, to forgive seventy times seven times, to give no anxious thought to the morrow, to deny self,—all these and many others proposed a new way of life, and one of great difficulty, which they could pursue only by taking command of themselves and insisting within themselves upon acting freely in spite of strong pressure of scorn without and of self-love within. They were thus not only regarded as free, but they were urged to demand a larger liberty, a kingship over themselves.

When the Pharisees were warned that for every idle word they must give account,¹ the same meaning is conveyed. The man who sells

¹ Matthew xii. 36.

all that he has and buys the precious field¹ exhibits his liberty. So is it with the man who might have had compassion on his fellow-servant, but did not pity him.² So is it with the son who said, "I go and went not;" and with him who said, "I go not, but afterwards he repented himself and went."³ So was it with those who received the invitation to the feast, but "made light of it," and "would not come," and "went their ways."⁴ So was it with those whom the Lord would have gathered, but to whom He must say in truth, "And ye would not."⁵

It is noticeable throughout that the freedom of man is as distinctly recognized in his relation to God as in his relation with men. The Christ said to the Pharisees, "Ye tithe mint and rue and every herb, and pass over judgment, and the love of God; but these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone."⁶ He predicted that they were so hardened that they would refuse to accept any evidence of their own depravity: "If they hear not Moses and

¹ Matt. xiii. 44.² Matt. xviii. 33.³ Matt. xxi. 29⁴ Matt. xxii. 3, 5.⁵ Matt. xxiii. 37.⁶ Luke xi. 42.

the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, if one rise from the dead.”¹ In a similar strain He spoke of those who “loved darkness rather than light; for their works were evil.”²

The custom of the Christ to ask one what he would have, before exercising His beneficent power upon him, should not be overlooked, for it was a needless question in itself to address to a blind or sick man; but it was always asked, or the equivalent of its answer was always demanded,—“What wilt thou that I should do unto thee?” “Wilt thou be made whole?” Had a negative answer been given, He must have passed on, as He passed neglected among Pharisees or scribes.

An important passage is that which was spoken when, at the last, He confided many thoughts to the disciples, saying, “No longer do I call you servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends;”³ meaning that they were to rise above the inferior liberty of obeying or disobeying to that of participation in the plan of their master.

Another word of the Christ, not in the gospels,

¹ Luke xvi. 31.

² John iii. 19.

³ John xv. 15.

must be cited because it so perfectly expresses the free agency of man: "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with Me."¹

As to the

4. DIVISION OF MAN'S POWERS,

it may be enough to note that, in all the teachings which have been quoted, the will of man with its loves is constantly dwelt upon and the intellect of man is constantly instructed; that, in fact, the appeal is always to man's love through his intellect; but that the feelings are in no case recognized as of equal importance. It is very true that joy and sorrow are spoken of, and that, in His last words, the Christ speaks of His joy to be fulfilled in the disciples;² but it is easily seen that it is the peace from work well performed that was enjoyed in that hour of danger, the joy of the will which had sought and did seek the lost sheep, and of the understanding which discerned the way to final triumph.

The law that

¹ Revelation iii. 20.

² As in John xv. 11; xvi. 20-24; xvii. 13.

5. USE IS THE DESIGN

of the self, which destiny it accepts or rejects, is everywhere set forth. The whole example of the Christ indicated this sole aim. It is found in all His words. He said, "Whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister; and whosoever would be first among you shall be your servant; even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many."¹ And again He said, "He that is greatest among you shall be your servant."²

He taught them that the talents must be traded with. He showed them that the Sabbath was not made for idleness when good deeds could be done. He likened Himself to a shepherd whose whole thought is for his sheep. "My Father worketh even until now,"³ He said to the indolent class of His day, "and I work." "I must work the works of Him that sent me, while it is day,"⁴ He said.

A striking saying was that in which He drew the picture of the servant coming in from the

¹ Matthew xx. 26-28; Mark x. 43-45.

² Matt. xxiii. 11.

³ John v. 17.

⁴ John ix. 3.

field, and not demanding to be served, but waiting upon his master: "Even so ye also, when ye have done all the things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do."¹ This saying is at one with the words, "Freely ye received, freely give."²

Such was always His principle of conduct: "Be ye perfect,"³ was His injunction. "If thou wouldest be perfect,"⁴ was His address to the young man who was boasting his righteousness, as He showed him how much remained to be done. His golden rule, as it is justly called, is an ethical standard, which is not extravagant, calling upon men to forget themselves, but which is perfect wisdom in its requirement that they should remember others with equal care. And this is the law and the prophets also.⁵

The Christ was equally clear in what He said of

6. EVIL IN MAN.

He plainly taught its source when, standing in the court of the temple, He charged the priests

¹ Luke xvii. 10.

² Matthew x. 8.

³ Matthew v. 48.

⁴ Matthew xix. 21.

⁵ Matthew vii. 12.

with the crime of polluting it: "Ye have made it a den of robbers."¹ Here was no room for doubt as to the cause of the evil which had made its way into the high places of Judaism. And from this one may conclude as to all evil. But it is even more plainly declared in the long series of woes which He denounced to the hypocrites, who would not go into the kingdom of God and would not let others go in, who made proselytes and rendered them children of hell, who quibbled about oaths and were liars, who strained out the gnat and swallowed the camel, who cleansed the outside of the cup but filled it full of extortion and excess, who whitened themselves outwardly like sepulchres but were black and foul with iniquity within, who had slain the prophets and who must bear the burden of their deeds.²

There is no evil in the talent, and there is none given to him who receives it; he himself creates the evil by misusing the talent, and is therefore judged out of his own mouth.³

The wretched fate of the betrayer was that of

¹ Matthew xxi. 13; Mark xi. 17; Luke xix. 46.

² Matthew xxiii.

³ Luke xix. 22.

his own devising. He was caught in the net which he had made. He betrayed himself to his own destruction. "See thou to that."¹

When our Lord said that from him who had not should be taken even that which he seemed to have,² He meant that, sooner or later, the wilful abuse of possession would bring possession to an end.

And this leads to the thought of the control of evil, which control, by successful resistance to its continued assaults, He gained, and which He would have others gain by resisting evil for themselves with His aid. Not only the embodiments of evil in priest and scribe opposed Him, but even more the people of the other world who were in complete possession of some in this life. It is no fancy that He contended with evil spirits, and no delusion of an ignorant time. Spiritism has confirmed the record. Possession is still known, under the form of "control."³ But the mischievous ones who now torment a mediumistic victim are nothing to those "legions"⁴ of the day of Herod and Caiaphas.

¹ Luke xxvii. 4.

² Luke viii. 18.

³ New Psychology, vol. i. pp. 228, 394.

⁴ Luke viii. 30.

Before the attack of such as He contended with, the Christ bowed in the garden of Gethsemane, and His sweat of blood made record of His agony.

It was a contest of Person against persons, of one self against many; yet the many yielded once and again till every plant which the heavenly Father had not planted was rooted up, as was predicted.¹ Yet this kind of enemy was not conquered without "prayer and fasting."² The life of the Christ was a contest. The contest was between Him and all the human foes of God. In His victory He led captivity captive, and the prince of this world was cast out. Henceforward evil was limited by the power of the Christ as it had not been limited before, and it still is and forever will be limited by Him; not prevented from arising in any perverse will, but issuing only as permitted for possible good.

7. MAN THE IMAGE OF GOD

was an essential principle of Judaism and was taken for granted in all the teachings of the Christ, and distinctly uttered in the oft-repeated phrase, "Your Father," in the instruction to

¹ Matthew xv. 13.

² Matt. xvii. 21.

open prayers with "Our Father," and in the words to Mary Magdalene, "My Father and your Father." "Ye therefore shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect"¹ admits of no other interpretation. "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God"² marks the use of the term to designate those who were sons of God not merely in view of their origin, but in conscious relation of filial affection. "The children of God that are scattered abroad"³ was the designation of the people needing help.

In a marked manner the idea of man made in God's image appears in all that was said as to a new birth, a regeneration, by which a new nature took and takes the place of the old, and a purified selfhood is obtained. "But as many as received Him, to them gave He the right to become children of God; which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."⁴

It would not be out of place here to remark that, though

¹ Matthew v. 48.

² John xi. 52.

³ Matthew v. 9.

⁴ John i. 13.

8. MAN AS MICROCOSM

is nowhere distinctly presented, for the words of the Christ were always addressed to the practical aspects of life, yet that His teaching is full of indirect evidence of this great fact. To form some idea of what is meant one need only recall the constant use of all nature as representative of man and the absolutely perfect recognition that every visible object and act was significant of human life in some way. A mere enumeration of some of the objects employed will be sufficient. Without pausing to give references, we note: childhood, youth, old age, king, prince, noble, beggar, poor, physician, priest, shepherd, bridegroom, bride, fisherman, judge, virgin, servant, thief, heir, hypocrite, adversary, traveller, childbirth; sowing, reaping, watching, sleeping, marriage, hireling, health, sickness, war, famine, dancing, weeping, purging, buying, selling, paying; eyes, ears, hair, hand, head, foot, mouth, cheek, face, lip, voice, belly, heart, blood, shoulder, loins, finger, hunger, thirst, dinner, supper; cattle, ass, sheep, lamb, goat, dog, wolf, calf, fox, fish, worm, hen, dove, eagle, sparrow, raven, serpent; tree, fruit, root, harvest, field, ground, vine, grass, thorns, reed, vineyard, mar-

ket-place, grapes, seed, lily, water, salt, bread, leaven, wine, oil, wheat, tares, fig; sand, earth, hill, earthquake, sepulchre, light, darkness, rock, wind, sky, sun, moon, star, rain, cloud, east, west; house, chamber, closet, gate, mill, throne, crown, seat, beam, mote, altar, door, prison, tower, barn, fold, cross; lamp, cup, candle, bushel, sickle, needle, plough, yoke, bag, bottle, pitcher, bed, purse, girdle, linen, napkin, coat, cloak, hem, pipe, net; treasure, tribute, wages, talent, pound, pearls, gold, silver, bank, debt, account, alms, burden, snare, sword, furnace, stumbling-block, lightning, fire.

This enumeration, without further and more full examples of the Christ's usage of symbols, may indicate that, to Him, the environment was transparent with a meaning, a correspondence with humanity, which all poets have seen to some degree, or there had been no poetry, but which has its perfect exemplification in the sayings of the Light of the World.

9. THE DIVINE

was fully revealed, as has been remarked, in the Christ. It was also described in His words. It was set forth as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,

which terms have been treated of as exemplified in man's will, intellect, and outgoing activity of life. When He commanded His disciples to baptize in this threefold name, they understood Him, and rightly, that they were to think of all three as in Him; and they baptized "in the name of the Lord Jesus." God is the father of man, God is a spirit, there is none good but One,—these are the expressions which lead the thought to turn to God, not as a "stream of tendency," not merely as the Unknowable, but as Person. His love is declared in such teachings as,—“It is not the will of your Father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish.”¹ His infinite intelligence, knowing no bound in time or space, is evident in the predictions of which Palestine is to-day the unmistakable fulfilment. His power, the power of wisdom full of love, is manifest in all the works of the Christ, and in the endurance and growth of Christianity.

When the Divine would reveal itself for the succor of man, near destruction of all that was above the brute in him, and when, with infinite

¹ Matthew xviii. 14.

patience and skill, the Divine would apply itself to the task of subduing without destroying evil men and evil spirits, it is most important to notice that God made His

10. ADVENT BY MAN ;

that He was incarnated in human nature as His appropriate manifestation. The Christ came in the name of Jehovah; He declared the God whose voice had not been heard, whose shape had not been seen; in Him God was glorified and did glorify Himself;¹ He was before Abraham,² and, having conquered, ascended up where He was before;³ he that hated Him hated the Father also;⁴ he that had seen him had seen the Father;⁵ he that received Him received Him that sent Him;⁶ therefore, when triumphant, He had all power in heaven and on earth.⁷ He was the bread of God that had come down from heaven to give life unto the world.⁸ The helpless infant of Bethlehem was only in a faint degree, only potentially, God manifest; the perfected Christ, forgiving all, knowing all, working

¹ John xiii. 31, 32.

² John viii. 58.

³ John vi. 62.

⁴ John xv. 23.

⁵ John xiv. 9.

⁶ Matt. x. 40.

⁷ Matt. xxviii. 18.

⁸ John vi. 41.

wonders of Divine energy, was one with the Father, the Christ of God.

These expressions from the words of the Christ may suffice to bring the fact to plain view that God is infinitely Human, not such a being as the Jews worshipped in the desert, deeming Him kind to their nation only, nor such as benighted Christians have worshipped, deeming Him angry and appeasable with their tortures or their gifts, but so perfectly Human that He is the One, the "I am that I am," the Alpha and the Omega of being.

11. THE IMMORTALITY OF MAN

is as clearly indicated as possible in the sayings of the Christ, but it is an immortality of Divine gift. Men had sunk so low that the full faith in future life characteristic of more ancient time was lost to view, and only later generations have brought it to light as they learned to decipher hieroglyphic or cuneiform records. The Sadducees doubted resurrection. The Pharisees regarded it as the exclusive privilege of their sect of that nation, and they held it to be a revival of life after long delay and a restoration of the physical body. They buried their dead near

to Jerusalem in order not to be overlooked at the last day, or put a handful of Jerusalem dirt into the grave, if remote, to effect its upheaval.

To all this came the words of the Christ like the dawn to the night. His first words were a proclamation of immortality: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God; rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven."¹ He spoke of laying up treasures in heaven.² He said that he who endured to the end would be saved.³ He told much of the angels in heaven to whom the risen righteous would be equal.⁴ He spoke of eternal and everlasting life. He declared the Father's house to be of many mansions.⁵

More than this, He convinced the Sadducees by bidding them know that all the dead were living with God, who was not a God of dead men, but of living.⁶ He taught Martha of Bethany that He was Himself resurrection and life.⁷ To the dying thief He promised paradise that day.⁸

¹ Matt. v. 3, 8, 12.

² Matt. vi. 20.

³ Matt. x. 22.

⁴ Luke xx. 36.

⁵ John xiv. 2.

⁶ Matt. xxii. 32.

⁷ John xi. 25.

⁸ Luke xxiii. 43.

The eternal life of righteous co-operation with God was much treated of: "There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or mother, or father, or children, or lands, for my sake and for the gospel's sake, but he shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come, eternal life."¹ The wicked were not to be annihilated, but their future He described in terms of sorrow.

His own resurrection lifted the disciples out of despair, and made them meet death calmly, saying, "To live is Christ, to die is gain."² Peter spoke of the "inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven."³ John wrote of "the promise which He hath promised us, even life eternal."⁴

In His closing words our Lord manifested His own approaching victory over evil and the grave, and assured His disciples of every age that the other world was a real world, and that

¹ Mark x. 29, 30.

² Philippians i. 21.

³ 1 Peter i. 4.

⁴ 1 John ii. 25.

He would prepare a place for them, that they might be with Him in the Father's house, and go no more out.¹

It is important to note that the Christian system recognizes three grand divisions of life, namely,

12. GOD, SPIRIT, MATTER,

and that one of these is no more distinctly presented than the other. The prayer in Gethsemane reveals God in Divine love prompting the utmost patience in suffering for the sake of redeeming man, the spirit or burdened mind of the Christ "willing" to do all the Divine purpose, and the flesh which was "weak" and in agony. More distinctly perhaps this threefold division of all being is seen in several parables, where the lord of the vineyard, the householder, or the father, represents the Divine, the steward or laborers or husbandmen or servants represent the spiritual, and the pounds or talents or goods represent the material. It will be found upon reflection that God, spirit, and matter are constantly in view in the gospels, and that they are spoken of in relation.

¹ John xiv. 3 ; Revelation iii. 12.

13. THE VITAL INFLUENCE

is the influence of God upon spirit and through spirit in the inhabitants of heaven and in the mind of man upon matter. It is a movement of life and a circulation of force downward in the scale of being, and it is responded to by the reactivity of the recipient. When the body, which is matter, loses its connection with the spirit or mind or essential man, it dies and returns to its dust. When the spirit in its unfaithfulness closes itself to the life from above, its power for good lessens. In so far as it opens itself to that influence by prayerful activity, it lives with eternal vigor. It is an influence which man controls so far as the use to which he devotes it is concerned; that he cannot utterly cut off his connection with the source of life is the Christian teaching.

14. MIRACLES,

which have been a stumbling-block to those who rightly refuse to regard them as arbitrary infractions of law, Divine or natural, are intelligible enough in view of this vital connection, or constant transmission of life, or perpetual creation. A miracle wrought by human power is impossible, and so is one wrought by material force;

but a coming forth of the Divine life manifesting its quality is not a miracle, that is, a mere wonder, but a sign, as the Greek *σημεῖον* means, and as the revisers have rendered it. A marked sign of Divine power, not annulling law, but quickening it, bringing for the time heavenly phenomena to view upon earth, is the normal accompaniment of the Christ, but at the same time let it be noticed that He did not do such works for the unbelieving or those who checked the inflowing energy.

Thus His presence brought forth from the evil spirits their ready submission, and even entreaty that He would suffer them to go into swine rather than compel them to retire to their own place; but nothing of the sort would have occurred if He had not resisted His own tempters, thereby achieving by orderly methods the subjugation of the evil. The miracle is, therefore, in the faithfulness of the Christ; with this proved, the casting out of the devils, however impossible to others in their doubts, was certain to follow His command.

In the case of disease, the hand upon the head or eyes put into effect the thought, "I will, be thou clean;" and leprosy was cleansed, and

blind eyes opened, and palsied arms strengthened. But He gave charge that the patient should sin no more lest a worse thing should come to him,¹ because all the time the man was a free agent, had been healed only through his wish to be made whole, and had retained liberty to involve himself in worse evils.

In feeding a multitude with a few loaves and fishes, the Christ could have done nothing if His love had not gone out to the people, materializing itself as it went; so that the loaves were the form of His "compassion." It should be remembered, in connection with this very event, that He said, "It is the spirit that quickeneth: the flesh profiteth nothing."² And He gave the clew to the source of His power when He said to the tempter that man must not live by bread alone.³

This power of the self over its benefits received from above was constantly illustrated by the use of the words, "Thy faith hath saved thee," "According to thy faith be it unto thee;" for the people referred to had received just that which they had prepared themselves to receive,

¹ John v. 14.² John vi. 63.³ Luke iv. 4.

and the blessing had been awaiting their desire to receive it when the Christ was nigh.

The forgiveness of sins depended upon a similar state of the recipient. Active repentance secured healing of the nature,—that is, the remission of the power of evil; but the opposite state had no forgiveness. “Her sins, which are many, are forgiven; for she loved much.”¹ A sin which had no forgiveness² was spoken of, and this language has caused much disquiet among Christians. Its meaning was explained at the time of utterance to be that one may so “sin against the Holy Spirit,” so determinedly oppose the voice of conscience in his soul, that he actually and permanently stifles it and does himself a lasting injury.

These signs of the connection of God, spirit, and matter were not wrought to astonish people, much less to gain approval and applause for the meek and lowly One, but were the outcome of His presence wherever need was and wherever the wish to be helped was found. And these signs in their spiritual efficacy may be wrought again, and must be wrought if the Christ is to

¹ Luke vii. 47.

² Mark iii. 29.

be more than a historic figure, even the Saviour of men from all unworthiness. Belief in Him cannot be transferred from one to another: it must be the fruit of one's own experience with the Christ, not an experience merely with those called Christians, but an experience with the Christ Himself, establishing a relation between the human self and the Divine Self, a relation in which the recipient, free in his reactivity, eternally assured of his own life and place in the commonwealth of uses, abides in the Christ and the Christ in him, so that they, God in the Christ and the Christ in men, are made perfect in one.¹

¹ John xvii. 23.

CHAPTER XII.

THE KNOWABLE.

A FEW concluding pages may not be out of place by way of anticipating the objection that the writer has passed, or has attempted to pass, from the firm ground of consciousness to that of mere belief, and has disregarded the spirit of the age, which is above all things critical, and which does not so much ask "What do you know?" as "How is such reputed knowledge possible?" It is said of Renan that he praised Spinoza by saying that "he could not accept Christianity, for he could not surrender his liberty, since Descartes was his master."¹ This, if so spoken, was only another and a needlessly deistical way of stating the same unwillingness to be led by aught but reason, which made Dante declare, "Aristotle is the master of those who know."

¹ Quoted by E. S. Phelps in *The Struggle for Immortality*: Boston, 1889, p. 13.

Especially since Kant is it impossible to confound knowledge with assumption without instant detection. His strongest claim on the respect of posterity is the revolution which he made by the introduction of criticism into philosophy. Descartes had attempted this and had honestly freed his mind of its prepossessions, but had immediately readmitted without challenge such ideas as seemed to him "clear and distinct." Before him Hobbes and after him Hume had carried the questioning spirit on to scepticism. It was Kant who led philosophy back to more positive ground. He avoided the Scylla of a credulous scholasticism and the Charybdis of an equally unfruitful scepticism, and safely made his way where every wise pilot will be careful to follow. His minor tenets may be but stepping-stones to higher views, but his principle of criticism as a substitute for dogmatism, whether scholastic or sceptical, is impregnable. There can be no more scanning of the surface of the field of knowledge with affirmation or denial according to the onlooker's real or fancied powers of vision, but men must now sink their shafts and learn what lies below the surface. There shall be no more descriptions of the tree

of knowledge, but men must tell us how its roots are placed. Gnosticism in the second century thought that it knew everything about thirty ranks of gods;¹ and, as the natural consequence, there were atheists in plenty then. Now, in place of mere denial, we have criticism, which asks, "How do you know?" Seeing Q. E. D. at the end of an argument, men do not ask for the figure of the syllogism but for the foundation of the premises.

Such a change in the state of the public mind necessarily involves much questioning of historical beliefs, both philosophical and theological. The scientist who lately said that he attended church till he could no longer endure the repeated declaration by the clergyman of a faith which certainly was not in any sense knowledge illustrated the common feeling. In its reluctance to submit its creeds to criticism and revision, the church has been unintentionally a "stone of stumbling" to many, and has caused them the suffering of being drawn in one direction by reason and in another by respect for a traditional faith. A new spirit, however, begins

¹ Valentinus.

to be found and to utter itself courageously. Men begin to obey the wise saying of Confucius: "When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it; this is knowledge." ¹

It has already been suggested that man's self-knowledge is a knowledge of himself as spiritual,—that is to say, of the sensations and ideas which, whatever their source, present themselves to his mind as immaterial. The ground of the idealist is perfectly firm as to the ability of the mind to have immediate knowledge only of its ideas. The argument of Johnson kicking the stone is out of date. There can be no question about the dictum of Plato that the mind proceeds from ideas through ideas to ideas. Locke expanded this into the remark, "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them." ²

¹ *Analects*, Book I. chap. iv.

² *Human Understanding*, Book II. chap. iv. n. 1.

Spirit, then, it may be taken for granted, is knowable in the ideas presented to the mind,—that is, it is known if man knows anything.

“*Rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet.*”¹

“I know by seeing and hearing,” said Locke again, “that there is some corporeal being outside of me; I do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears.”²

To materialists this statement may seem an inversion of the truth, for they may hold that man knows himself only as a body or material organism, the brain secreting thought as the liver secretes bile (Professor Huxley), but there is no ground for such a comparison, since the bile has its limited physical field, while the thought is by no means limited to the brain or body. It is no parasitic Anchises riding in his shrivelled helplessness on the back of pious Æneas, but it may say of itself,—

“I have flown on the winds through the vaulted sky,
In a path unseen by the vulture’s eye;

¹ *Æneid.*, viii. 730.

² *Ibid.*, Book II. chap. xxiii. sect. 15.

I have been where the lion's whelps ne'er trod,
 And nature is mute in the sight of God ;
 I have girdled the earth in my airy flight,
 I have wandered alone 'mid yon spheres of light." ¹

In regard to our knowledge of matter, it is granted at once that we cannot mentally go to it and have immediate knowledge of it as we have of spirit. Indeed, to attempt this would be to surrender the vantage-ground of the spirit's intermediate position between the two other objects of desired knowledge, namely, matter and the Divine. Kant was unquestionably right when he placed the things in themselves outside of the field of consciousness and limited our knowledge to that of the phenomena. In declaring the noumena to be in themselves unknowable he wisely followed Aristotle, who had said, *Ἡ ὕλη ἀγνώστος καὶ αὐτῇ*, Matter in itself is unknowable.²

Admitting, then, that the mind has no immediate dealing with matter, are we shut up to eternal ignorance of the outer world? It is by some said that Kant should have been so consistent with himself as to reject the things in

¹ Henry Smith, *Thought*.

² *Metaph.*, vii. (vi.), chap. x.

themselves and to hold a purely idealistic ground ; but there is some reason to doubt the positions taken by those who came after him in this respect ; and this for the simple reason that a purely subjective idealism, unfruitful of any knowledge of aught above or aught below itself, is as unsatisfactory in its way as Spinozism, which finds its single ground in the Divine and ignores both spirit and matter ; or again as materialism, which ignores everything above its plane, whether finitely spiritual or absolutely Divine. We must hold Kant to be consistent when he says, " Behind phenomena are things in themselves which, though hidden, are the conditions of phenomena.¹ . . . The conception of noumena is not only possible, but necessary.² . . . By means of practical postulates we learn that there are objects corresponding to ideas."³

If, then, matter cannot be ignored without turning our ideas into phantasies, and if nevertheless it is impossible to know matter immediately, how can we know it ? The answer is, of course, that we know it through our sensations

¹ Pure Reason, p. 307.

² Practical Reason, p. 46.

³ Page 141.

which come over a wire, as it were, at one end of which the mind is and at the other that which originates the sensation, namely, the body. This is common philosophical ground. For example, in Walter's "Perception of Space and Matter" we read, "By ordinary inference from ideas, sensations, and perceptions we are able to gain a trustworthy knowledge of matter. In the muscular sense something resists our volition. Touch gives magnitude."¹ Bain says in his "Senses and Intellect," "The sum total of all the occasions for putting forth active energy, or for conceiving this as possible to be put forth, is an external world. This leads us to form to ourselves an abstraction that comprehends all our experience, past and present, and all the experience of others, which abstraction is the utmost that our minds can attain to respecting an external or material world."² Bascom, with equal care, speaks thus in his "Science of Mind," "What the mind directly knows must be purely mental, what it indirectly knows are the phenomena interpreted by its own experience. Did not perception constantly involve inference, per-

¹ Boston, 1879, p. 405.

² New York, 1879, p. 377.

ception and consciousness would give but one and the same set of data, and the distinction would disappear.”¹

Thus it would appear that by an inference, which it would be insanity not to make, the material world is known, of course most intimately by every one in his own body, and less intimately, but not less accurately, in other forms. All scientific knowledge is immediately of ideas alone, but inferentially and accurately of beasts and trees and rocks.

If it be granted that nescience as to the material world is irrational, and that matter is indeed knowable, a brief survey of our possible knowledge of the Divine may next be made.

No one will deny that we can know another, for example, a near friend from whom we derive information and in whose companionship we find joy. The ideas which come to us by hearing while our eyes are looking upon a beloved face never bring with them any doubt of the reality of the friend unless we have previous reason for indulging a temporary doubt of the healthful working of our organs. When a man says that

¹ New York, 1881, p. 113.

he knows another, he means that by experience he has been made certain of his existence, has at first perceived him only externally, but has gradually been made aware of the emotions and thoughts of his friend, who has not only convinced him thus of his possession of a distinct personality, but has also displayed that similarity of purpose or sympathetic quality of heart which has made the two one in a real sense. Pythagoras defined friendship as one soul in two bodies. They are, of course, not one, but at one.

This knowledge of another is as trustworthy as the knowledge of one's own body, and is even more easy to gain than a knowledge of matter in general, because the other, being a spirit, is on the same plane of life. With our eyes of flesh we see only the friend's body, but we may know him as to his spirit much more thoroughly than we know his body. Indeed, we may never have seen the general of our army or the president of our nation, and yet we may have come to know this one or that by other means sufficiently to put a rational trust in the honesty, or to feel a well-grounded distrust in the dishonesty or incapacity, of general or president.

Now, if we are to know the Divine at all, it

must be as another whom we have not seen in His person. Knowledge of the Divine is more than an inference as to its existence. It is more than an examination of the arguments which were reviewed above in their own place. We may conclude that there is every reason for believing that Washington did exist or that Gladstone does exist without having any knowledge of them except remotely and partially; but if we are to know God or man sufficiently to justify the use of the word knowledge, we must have some relation with them. Experience must enter into the acquaintance. We must know "not because of thy saying,"¹ as the Samaritans said to the woman, but must know actually, rationally, indisputably.

We certainly cannot know God in His unmanifested infinity; of that which so far transcends us we can only use negative terms,—

"Being above all beings! Mighty One

Whom none can comprehend and none explore!

Who fill'st existence with thyself alone,—

Embracing all, supporting, ruling o'er,—

Being whom we call God and know no more!

And thought is lost ere thought can soar so high,

Even like past moments in eternity."²

¹ John iv. 42.

² Derzhavin.

But this impossibility of adequately conceiving of the Divine should not lead men, as before remarked, to suppose that they can know in religion only rules of conduct. Even in the material world we find a limit beyond which it is too vast for us. But the scientist, knowing but little of the world, knows enough to affirm it and to claim acquaintance with it. Even with a friend it is not necessary to know everything of his secret thoughts before we can feel at one with him. It is not necessary to be as wise as God in order to know Him sufficiently and very much as a child knows its parent whose vastly greater wisdom it does not fathom.

The boundlessness of the Divine qualities is no bar to our knowledge, if they be qualities leading to friendship and not to aversion. To say, "Thou art great and doest wondrous things, Thou art God alone,"¹ is not to confess inability to know Him with sufficient certainty, but rather to declare that the mind rests in a sense of its inferiority to Him as contentedly as in a sense of its superiority to the body.

It is not only reasonable to conclude that the

¹ Psalm lxxxvi. 10.

God who made all things is most like the most perfect of His creations, namely, man; but it is also easy to conclude that His capacity is such that He can make Himself known, and that He has in man the most adequate means of manifesting Himself. A finite man would, to be sure, reveal God only in the very inadequate degree seen in Moses or Socrates; but one of such an origin as the Christ might reveal Him fully, or with increasing fulness as He grew in grace, till at length the glorified Christ, with face as the sun, would reveal God as fully as man can ask. "All mine are thine and thine are mine."¹

Avoiding a repetition of what has been already said as to this manifestation, let me only meet the question, Can we know the Christ? If He be known only historically we do not know Him, and thus do not know the Divine in any adequate sense. We may not doubt that the Gospel account is true, but to assent to it is not to know the Divine as we know ourselves, our friends, and the external world.

In his "Oriental Christ" Mozoomdar gives this experience: "I sat near the large lake in

¹ John xvii. 10.

the Hindu College compound, in Calcutta. It was a week-day evening. I was meditating on the state of my soul, on the cure of all spiritual wretchedness, the brightness and peace unknown to me, which was the lot of God's children. I prayed and besought Heaven. Suddenly, it seemed to me, let me own, it was revealed to me, that close to me there was a holier, more blessed, more loving personality, upon which I might repose my troubled head. The response of my nature was unhesitating and immediate. Jesus, from that day, to me became a reality whereon I might lean."¹

Such was the experience of the Oriental, for no one can doubt that the account is truthful. Varied according to temperaments, it would be that of all those who can truly say that they know God in the Christ. The zealot, on his way to Damascus as a Jewish hater of Christians, was quickly convinced of his error, and could never thereafter doubt nor be "disobedient unto the heavenly vision."² The language of Thomas à Kempis is not extravagant: "All the glory and

¹ Published Boston, 1883, p. 11.

² Acts xxvi. 19.

beauty of the Christ are manifested within . . . and the peace that He brings passeth all understanding.”¹ All the way down the Christian centuries there have been some who could say, even under threats of martyrdom, that they knew the Christ, and, though once called mystics with a degree of contempt, they have endured, and their numbers have increased. Natural religion, with its general perception of the immanent God in nature, needs to have no scorn for that more intimate, even personal, relation which the Christ enables one to form with the Divine,—a relation unknown to idolatrous antiquity and unknown to Christian formalism, but definitely promised by the Christ,—“I am with you always:”² where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them,”³ and so easily realized that a writer says with truth, “Christ never was more really in the world than He is now. He is as much to those who love Him and believe on Him as He was to the friends in Bethany. . . . We may form with Him an actual relation of personal friendship

¹ Imitation of Christ.

² Matthew xxviii. 20.

³ Matthew xviii. 20.

which will grow closer as the years go on, deepening with each new experience.”¹

The philosopher must remove himself from all that is irrational, whether it goes under the name of Christian theology or otherwise, but to regard the Christ as the greatest of all teachers is to bring the reason into the largest light and the fullest liberty, “the liberty of the glory of the children of God.”²

“All knowledge is a gathering into one,” said Priscianus, and these knowables, the spirit, the Christ, and the flesh, are not to be thought as three disjoined worlds, but as mutually related, reciprocally active, and finding their meeting point in that which is midway between the Divine and the material, namely, the spirit, the mind. It looks upward to its Lord in prayer and in service, it looks inward with the ability which man alone of all created forms of life possesses and which makes him a philosopher, and it looks downward and outward to the flesh and the world. In its relation to the Divine it finds the purposes of life, in its own intelligence

¹ *Silent Tunes*, by J. R. Miller, D.D., p. 23.

² *Romans* viii. 21.

it finds the means of realizing those purposes, and in the outer world it produces from its purposes by the means or causes which the mind supplies the effects, which are words and deeds. So is humanity one from its Source to its outmosts. The worlds of spirit and matter are one because they are the homes of men, and the Creator and created are one because both are human, the one absolutely such, the other finitely such; but here is no mystery, for the Word, which was with God and which was God, and by which all things were made, and in which was life, "was made flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth."¹ "For of Him and through Him and unto Him are all things."²

"All human knowledge," says Morell, "rests upon the three notions of nature, man, and God."³ And this is only repeating the great first note of Holy Scripture: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;"⁴ for man, while he dwells upon the earth, is not in place if he be earthy, and in the heavens—that is, in a spiritual life—he is truly a man. "Knowl-

¹ John i. 1, 14.

² Romans xi. 36.

³ Modern Philosophy, ii. 466.

⁴ Genesis i. 1.

edge," said Spencer, "is permanent consciousness."¹ Precisely, it is the permanent consciousness of the self in its relations upward and downward; it is a consciousness which is "a temple of the living God,"²—"a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens."³

"That we do know" is the distinct and permanent self, its recipiency, its reagency, its free agency, its inheritance which affects but does not determine its acts, its trinal form, its relations testifying of the Divine, its immortality,—aspects which are fully presented in the teachings of the Christ,—in whom we have certain knowledge of God and spirit and matter. When the Christ said to Nicodemus, "We speak that we do know and testify that we have seen," He used the plainest terms to declare what was known to Him, and what any man may know by the aid of the Christ Whose light lighteth every man that cometh into the world, and Who promised that His disciples should know the truth.

¹ First Principles, p. 142.

² 2 Corinthians vi. 16.

³ 2 Corinthians v. 1.

Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004

PreservationTechnologies
A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 013 651 536 6

